Just the subject line on this is the most amusing thing I've read on this list
in a while.
Well said, sir!
On Dec 2, 2011, at 2:19 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
David Wetzel said:
s for center-squeezing, that's not really a problem in the US as a
whole...
Third parties are too small and
so much with the
IRV advocates? They recognize that election method reform is important, but
then they go all-in on a mediocre reform.
Anyway, that's my random afternoon strategy opinion, I could be wrong.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http
There's been some talk lately of publishing good reference implementations of
all the election methods we talk about in various forms of description. This
inspired me to write up my thoughts on programming election methods. It's in
the body of the message below, and also posted as a Google Doc
I counter-recommend git. I don't like it. If you like the new 'distributed
version control' system style, I recommend Mercurial. code.google.com also
supports mercurial.
My own election simulator is also up on google code, also with subversion.
It's kinda hidden inside my project for
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123388752673155403.html
Cites our own Warren Smith!
Clearly we've been going about advocacy all wrong. Politics is boring, we
should appeal to American's fascination with celebrities and sports.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
specifically, my results are here:
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/www/
Ka Ping Yee did them first. I think I did them second and bigger and more. I
haven't done any in a while, but my source is out there and there are other
implementations as well.
, don't have that flaw and are just as easy or easier to
implement than IRV. A few people have latched onto IRV and promoted it a lot,
perhaps somewhat staking their reputations on it now, but really for the same
amount of work we could have much better reforms.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org
There was a question on the list a while ago, and skimming to catch up I didn't
see a resolution, about what the right way to measure multiwinner result
goodness is.
Here's a simple way to do it in simulator:
Each voter has a preference [0.0 ... 1.0] for each candidate. Measuring the
A couple years ago I moved from the California Democratic Party Machine to the
Massachusetts Democratic Party Machine.
I'm not sad when my party wins, I'm sad when they run boring stick-in-the-mud
establishmentarian candidates.
I'd love pressure from other parties to keep them honest, and that's
On Mar 11, 2010, at 11:29 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
As with any choice system based on cardinal utility, there end up being two
problems that are not, I think, amenable to solution. One is the
incomparability of individual utility measures from voter to voter (and here
we're talking
On Jan 13, 2010, at 8:06 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
1. A rank choice ballot method:
Any number of candidates may be running for office and any number
allowed to be ranked on the ballot.
Voter ranks one candidate vote =1
Voter ranks two candidates, denominator is 1+2 = 3
votes are worth 2/3
just how these things play out amongst real Americans who aren election theory
wonks.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
http://bolson.org/dist/TX/txmask.png
http://bolson.org/dist/ME/memask.png
(All of the states should be available by similar URLs by state postal code.
Note the odd XX/xx capitalization.)
On Nov 28, 2009, at 6:57 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
I generated some pdf maps of Texas.
They are pretty big
. For any voter or bloc of voters, honest voting
maximizes expected utility.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Catching up from a couple weeks ago, I just wanted to add my short-
short version of explaining Proportional Representation that usually
gets a good response from people:
A 20% group should get 20% of the seats.
It's pretty easy for people to be agreeable to that. I think in
general it
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20090810/
I think a few of these plots show Single Transferrable Vote behaving
badly in the same ways IRV does, with discontinuities and irregular
solution spaces.
I also ran Condorcet and IRNR using combinatoric expansion.
Combinatoric variants of
On Aug 13, 2009, at 9:18 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Brian Olson wrote:
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20090810/
I think a few of these plots show Single Transferrable Vote
behaving badly in the same ways IRV does, with discontinuities and
irregular solution spaces.
I also
As this isn't something I really want it's going to be hard to get
motivated to work it out.
That said I think the way to go about it is to make unbiased districts
by my current district, then pick one district with the highest
proportion of the desired minority to elevate and adjust all the
/
XX where XX is any US state abbreviation.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Interesting UI. I'd thought about doing something like that but got
discouraged when I tried to make it work on Internet Exploder. Had it
for Firefox and Safari briefly though.
My apps are also still out there, doing simultaneous Condorcet
counting, histograms and other methods.
I'm late to the party, but I downloaded their vote data and ran it
through my software and wrote up a page on it here:
http://bolson.org/~bolson/2009/20090303_burlington_vt_mayor.html
I think the most important point is the fundamental failure of IRV as
itself, not any quibbling over a bad
http://bolson.org/voting/sim_one_seat/20081203/
Tight population grouping at the left moving to widely spread on the
right.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
(Sent from my iPhone)
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Disorganized thoughts:
Standard deviation could be considered to be interchangeable with the
spacing between the choices.
Wider spacing is equivalent to tighter standard deviation.
I keep imagining a way to explain this as starting with a blank black
space and colored dots representing the
On Nov 26, 2008, at 5:53 AM, Greg wrote:
Greg, you didn't actually say that IRV is good, you just said that
it's
unlikely to be bad.
Huh? One reason I think it's good in part because it's very likely to
elect elect the Condorcet candidate, if that's what you mean by
unlikely to be bad. Some
There's been a lot of discussion lately started by people who advocate
IRV. I'm mystified. Really? You really think IRV is a good system?
I've spent so long considering it to be pretty much junk that I really
am confused by that position. Here's my summary of why I think IRV is
junk.
Greg, you didn't actually say that IRV is good, you just said that
it's unlikely to be bad.
Why bother with something that's unlikely to be bad when we can just
as easily get something without that badness?
Oh, and actually it _is_ likely to be bad. See that first graph? See
how over
Hmm, only kick out the losingest loser. I kinda think there would
still be discontinuities, but it might be better. Probably worth
trying. Now I just need to code that up and run the diagram code.
Dunno when I'll actually get around to that.
Has anyone checked what happens to regular IRV
-per-buck we can get out of
changes to work on.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Oct 15, 2008, at 1:59 PM, Peter Barath wrote:
I'm not sure I would vote honestly in such circumstance.
Let my honest rangings be:
100 percent for my favourite but almost chanceless Robin Hood
20 percent for the frontrunner Cinderella
0 percent for the other frontrunner Ugly Duckling
I
process. Needs to be
experimentally (in simulator) checked, though.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Oct 14, 2008, at 12:11 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Oct 14, 2008 at 2:04 PM, Brian Olson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Once upon a time, I designed an election method to fix the strategy
problem
with Range Voting.
The method I call Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings (IRNR):
1. Collect ratings
against electoral malfeasance is probably through the political and
legal processes, and through the vigilance of the citizenry. We'll
never make a system so mathematically perfect that we don't still need
those other things.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods
the
desired result. It could even wind up that the best way to solve for
the desired goals is to have a computer do 99% of the work and have a
human come back and clean up the edges. Since it's subject to the same
scoring in the end, the human couldn't deviate too far from the ideal
mapping.
Brian
, on my one puny computer! With more it'd only
get better!
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
sets. Maybe different parties or candidates try to find
alternatives where they would do better. If nothing is found then
the first
found set is declared elected.
Brian Olson suggests this approach for his anti-gerrymandering
proposals.
http://bolson.org/dist/USIRA.html
and
http://bolson.org
underrepresented groups is inconveniently long, but is
the best mix of connotation and denotation that I can think of right
now.
Just some things to think about so that once we've figured out what
the best possible election method is, we'll be ready to switch into
advocacy mode.
Brian Olson
http
win, you don't
get any say over which of the others might get elected. Vote on as
many choices as you feel informed enough to vote on.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
In case anyone's interested in what the general public are hearing
about voting strategy.
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/10/07/
ballot_query_to_bullet_or_not_to_bullet
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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