On 1.9.2013, at 16.57, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
To answer your question Juho, «When you wrote about a form of
government that is elected by the people, did you mean that voters
should have more say on what the government (coalition) will be like?»:
My intention behind that statement was purely
On 1.9.2013, at 22.02, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 07:05:12PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
I tried to outline some scenarios where the voters could more or less
directly determine the composition of the coalition. I guess this is too
dynamic for you, and you actually like
On 31.8.2013, at 15.24, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
This may be a bit outside what is usually discussed here, but I'll give
it a shot and if someone know of some resources I should check up on
then please let me know.
I've not followed this list for a long time, but my impression is that
the
On 22.7.2013, at 16.43, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2013 at 04:04:03PM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
Yes, it is possible and even typical that many small parties get their best
results in the same district. One simple fix (and one step more complex
algorithm) is to allocate full quota
On 22.7.2013, at 23.50, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/22/2013 05:37 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 22.7.2013, at 16.43, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
That might produce a sensible result, I'll see if I can modify the
code to do something like this.
I think that approach is at least quite easy
On 20.7.2013, at 13.07, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/19/2013 11:50 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 19.7.2013, at 10.18, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In such cases, I would also suggest a few of the seats of the
parliament be given by a centrist- or minmax-based method (e.g.
Condorcet, CPO
Some random notes. Please treat them as such. Just trying to point out what PAL
representation looks like from different angles.
I guess the key feature of PAL representation is the dynamic size of the
districts. In this thread one central theme has been practical reforms in the
Norwegian (or
On 21.7.2013, at 14.42, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 08:23:04AM +0300, Juho Laatu wrote:
I do feel that distributing first seats to small parties first makes
more sense, especially considering that certain small parties (such as
Rødt) got a lot of support in districts
On 19.7.2013, at 10.18, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In short, multiple constraints might mean that the results over here
depends on what happens over there in a way that's not easy to understand.
And the more constraints you add, the harder it could get.
One could estimate the level of
On 18.7.2013, at 14.15, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
the percentage of the votes the party received in the
district that plays a role
This expression is actually ambigious. It could mean percentage of the votes of
the district votes or percentage of the votes of the party votes.
It could be an
On 18.7.2013, at 21.13, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
For each district and each party, calculate the quotient.
Quotient = partyDistrictVotes / (2 * partyDistrictSeats + 1)
In the category of simple and straight forward algorithms, here is one approach.
- first use SL to determine at national level
On 18.7.2013, at 23.36, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(And now that I think about it: if it's desired, it should be possible to
make n-proportional apportionment methods for n2 -- e.g. a method that tries
to balance regional representation, national representation, and
representation of
On 18.7.2013, at 3.11, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
so the party gets
the seat in the district with the highest:
partyVotePercent / (2 * partyDistrictSeats + 1)
Will the size of the district impact the results? (i.e. 20% of the votes in a
district that has 6 seats altogether should always
This message (that was sent by me) was not properly delivered to me. Did
someone else have similar probelms or was it only me?
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2013-July/032170.html
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for
On 7.7.2013, at 23.49, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
But this raises the question of where the regional MPs should reside.
Two approaches (just thinking out loud). 1) One could have multiple layers from
single member districts to counties etc. I recommend natural historical
borderlines, not
On 7.7.2013, at 16.16, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
On Fri, Jul 05, 2013 at 11:37:55PM +0200, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
The argument then
is that if you add in lots of very small parties, any of them might
become a kingmaker and so get extremely disproportional amounts of
power.
While I see
On 4.7.2013, at 21.39, Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
that we're using 1.4 as the first divisor in Sainte-Laguë
is what's making it difficult for smaller parties to get a foothold
I can see the followig factors that influence the ability of the smallest
parties to get seats:
- constituencies /
Some late comments follow.
Vidar Wahlberg wrote:
The short answer to why not vote directly for persons? would be that
in Norway there's more focus on the goals of a party rather than the
goal of its politicians, and some may argue that the extra abstraction
layer is a good thing, as well as
On 4.7.2013, at 6.57, Chris Benham wrote:
STV meets Later-no-Harm because lower preferences only count after the
the fate (elected or definitely eliminated) of more preferred candidates has
been set.
My suggestion doesn't because by not truncating a voter could have their
ballot count
On 4.7.2013, at 13.55, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/04/2013 08:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
In principle ability to vote for persons helps populist candidates.
My best understanding is that in Finland, that uses open lists, well
known candidates (from sports, TV etc.) probably have
On 30.6.2013, at 23.19, Benjamin Grant wrote:
I’ve been coming at understanding better the options and choices, merits and
flaws of various approaches to holding votes – mostly with the kind (and
sometimes not-so-kind) help of the people on this list.
However, a (I assume) basic thought
On 1.7.2013, at 23.12, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Thanks for everyone's candor and feedback. I can certainly appreciate how
annoying it is to deal with someone like myself that 1) is often asking
questions that everyone else had heard many times before and knows the
answer by heart, and 2) someone
On 26.6.2013, at 22.48, David L Wetzell wrote:
This is in response to an earlier post by Juho where he speculates that IRV
is the preferred reform by politicians in the two major parties who want to
accommodate change that does the least harm to the status quo. I think it's
useful to
On 25.6.2013, at 12.13, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 06/25/2013 09:17 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 25.6.2013, at 1.25, Benjamin Grant wrote:
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com mailto:km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Scenario 1: Voters don't rank
On 25.6.2013, at 11.57, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 06/25/2013 09:00 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 25.6.2013, at 1.06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Remember that criterion compliances are absolute. So a method may
fail a criterion yet be perfectly acceptable in real elections.
I just
On 25.6.2013, at 18.00, Benjamin Grant wrote:
On Tue, Jun 25, 2013 at 2:53 AM, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com wrote:
On 24.6.2013, at 16.06, Benjamin Grant wrote:
So, as far as *I* can see, this converts Score Voting into Approval voting.
The only people who would bother to vote
On 26.6.2013, at 13.31, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 06/26/2013 11:24 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 25.6.2013, at 18.07, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Now there are some criteria that aren't important to me at all, that I
do not value what the try to protect - and those I factor out.
I think I
On 24.6.2013, at 16.06, Benjamin Grant wrote:
So, as far as *I* can see, this converts Score Voting into Approval voting.
The only people who would bother to vote sincerely are:
1) Those who truly prefer Gore highest and Bush lowest (or vice versa),
because there’s no strategic
On 25.6.2013, at 1.06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Remember that criterion compliances are absolute. So a method may fail a
criterion yet be perfectly acceptable in real elections.
I just want to support this viewpoint. It is not essential how many criteria a
mehod violates. It is more
On 25.6.2013, at 1.25, Benjamin Grant wrote:
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Scenario 1: Voters don't rank now, but will rank when they see it's worth it.
Here IRV will eventually crash but BTR-IRV is, well, better.
Scenario 2: Voters
On 25.6.2013, at 1.06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
So there are really three stages to a prospective new party or candidate
(like the Greens or Nader):
1. the candidate is not competitive (e.g. fringe candidate).
2. the candidate is competitive but either not strong enough to win, or
On 18.6.2013, at 4.24, Benjamin Grant wrote:
From: Jameson Quinn [mailto:jameson.qu...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, June 17, 2013 3:14 PM
Subject: Re: Participation Criteria and Bucklin - perhaps they *can* work
together after all?
Unfortunately, Bucklin systems fail that one too.
Hold
That has sometimes happened to me too.
Juho
On 18.6.2013, at 15.49, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Well, I did put my computer consultant hat on (my day job) and this is what I
found:
With regard to the 2 or 3 emails that showed up on the list archive page but
not in my inbox,
1) They
I quickly read the article. Here are some observations.
- Term Bucklin system has not been defined. I can guess that it probably
refers to Bucklin style stepwise addition of new approvals, but that may not be
as obvious to all readers. If there is no definition of Bucklin system, maybe
one
On 17.6.2013, at 18.26, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Majority Criterion
My definition of Majority Criterion is simply something like if more than 50%
of the voters prefer candidate A to all other candidates, then A shall win.
There are methods that aim at respecting the wishes of the majority
On 12.2.2013, at 0.33, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by quoted-in
proportionality in the sense that the Czech Green Party desires it. Then one
may make a quota proportionality criterion and design methods from the
ground up that
On 12.2.2013, at 1.24, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2013/2/11 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
(Also, speaking of criteria: if I had enough time, I would try to find a
monotone variant of Schulze STV. I think one can make monotone
Droop-proportional multiwinner methods, since I made a
On 7.2.2013, at 20.43, Peter Zbornik wrote:
At second sight, I think that giving different quota weights (V) to
quoted-in candidates would lead to strategic voting leading to the
weaker-gender candidates being placed at the end in order to be
quoted-in, as you mention yourself.
Coming
On 5.2.2013, at 19.50, Peter Zbornik wrote:
i] that the seats are quoted-in fairly proportionally between the
voters (i.e. the same voters do not get both quoted-in seats) and at
the same time
50: w1 w2 m1 m2
50: w3 w4 m3 m4
The first seat goes to w1 (lottery). The second seat goes to
someone will propose a better formula to value the quoted-in candidate,
which might (or might not) depend on the number of the seat being
elected (i.e. it is worse to get seat no. 2 quoted-in, than seat no.
5).
P.
2013/2/7 Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com:
2013/2/7 Juho Laatu juho4
on the mail below should be softened a bit = w3 could be
automatically ranked third. That depends on the used algorithm.)
Thus, the quota would be 2/11, and the leftover (unrepresented) quota at the
end would be between 1/11 (Hare-like) and 2/11 (Droop-like).
Jameson
2013/2/7 Juho Laatu
different quota weights (V) to
quoted-in candidates would lead to strategic voting leading to the
weaker-gender candidates being placed at the end in order to be
quoted-in, as you mention yourself.
Best regards
Peter Zborník
2013/2/7 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk:
I try to address
Is there a quota or gender requirement or both requirements?
- If we assume that the quota rules are not needed since both genders will get
seats also otherwise, is it ok if one grouping gets 3 women and the other one 2
men?
- Is it ok if the second seat goes to a male candidate of some
On 6.2.2013, at 12.29, Juho Laatu wrote:
- Is it ok if the second seat goes to a male candidate of some grouping and
the fifth seat goes to a female candidate of the same grouping?
Clarification: In the second and fifth seats the quota rule forced the sex to
be changed.
Juho
Election
On 4.2.2013, at 15.40, Peter Zbornik wrote:
Being a green party member (although a Czech one and not US), I would
advocate only the top-two-run-off
variant of IRV, i.e. elimination of the candidates and transfer of
votes until two remain, no quota for election (or quota=100%) except
for the
On 3.2.2013, at 13.13, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 01/30/2013 05:30 PM, Peter Gustafsson wrote:
Kristoffer:
Thanks for pointing out those possibilities for how a big party can
instruct its voters on how to thwart the intent of this proposed
criterion. Obviously, BVP is not
EM's own web site is also a good source of definitions for abbreviations that
are often used in the EM discussions.
(http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Special:AllPages)
But in general I too recommend writers to open all abbreviations that are not
obvious to all. There is no point in making the
On 6.12.2012, at 23.54, ⸘Ŭalabio‽ wrote:
¡Hello!
¿How fare you?
Yesterday, I noted that Majority-Judgements does not work if we have
too many adjectives because we have only so many adjectives and voters might
confuse adjectives too close in meaning.. ¿Would an
On 26.11.2012, at 0.03, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
You have a parliamentary system.
Forming a government requires a supermajority (say 60%).
That says to me that the policy of the governmnet will be on average more
centrist (averaged) than e.g. with 51% governmnets. Since the governments
On 4.12.2012, at 15.35, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 10:21 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
In Finland the political system has resembled this approach in the recent
years although there are no specific supermajority requirements to form or
to break governmnets. Having
On 15.11.2012, at 18.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If I ranked all of the candidates sincerely, the Democrat and the
Republican would be at the bottom of that ranking. Even if they're
winnable.
So you can't say that not ranking unwinnable candidates allows you to
vote a short ranking.
I
On 14.11.2012, at 2.59, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
- Mail original -
De : Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
I don't believe the public needs to understand the terms
plurality criterion
or implicit approval or even strategy to find the
scenario problematic.
I guess people
On 14.11.2012, at 15.21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
There's no best winner. We've been over that. But, if you really
want a best winner, then look at the significant social optimizations
of Approval and Score.
There may be different elections with different needs. The society is free to
decide
On 12.11.2012, at 17.59, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Margins, it seems to me, is DOA as a proposal due to the Plurality
criterion.
That 35 AB, 25 B, 40 C would elect A is too counter-intuitive.
I agree. For those who don't know, the Plurality criterion says
On 11.11.2012, at 18.16, Chris Benham wrote:
[robert bristow-johnson wrote:] the most realistic path to accomplishing
that is *not* to advocate a method
that cannot be explained to citizen-legislators.
Yes, but it also helps to advocate a method that opponents can't easily
ridicule
On 11.11.2012, at 18.33, Chris Benham wrote:
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Margins, it seems to me, is DOA as a proposal due to the Plurality criterion.
That 35 AB, 25 B, 40 C would elect A is too counter-intuitive.
I agree. For those who don't know, the Plurality criterion says that if X is
Resent. Also I seem to have some problems getting my mails through on the list.
Juho
Begin forwarded message:
From: Juho Laatu
Date: 8. 11 2012 20.32.01 UTC+2.00
To: EM list
Subject: Re: [EM] 3 or more choices - Condorcet
On 8.11.2012, at 18.55, Chris Benham wrote:
Robert Bristow
On 6.10.2012, at 0.03, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 10/05/2012 12:12 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
And even in the three-categories classification, it's hard to find
any objectively best method.
The third category was quality of the outcome under honesty. For
this category only, finding
On 5.10.2012, at 6.45, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Thu, Oct 4, 2012 at 6:51 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 4.10.2012, at 23.53, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I think you recommended Symmetrical ICT for informational polling. I guess
you like and trust it within that framework.
I
On 4.10.2012, at 7.49, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
, maybe the question if you recommend the voters to rank sincerely or
if you recommend them to sometimes use the top ties (although the
candidates are not equally good).
[endquote]
Good question. In a public election, I'd
On 4.10.2012, at 16.18, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
Maybe you don't worry about recommending voters to turn strategic in
Condorcet elections since you don't like (or trust) Condorcet methods
very much anyway.
[endquote]
That isn't true. Symmetrical iCT is a Condorcet method, and
, at 22.44, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 10/02/2012 12:50 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
I just note that there are many approaches to making the pairwise
comparisons.
- One could use proportions instead of margins = A/B isntead of
A-B.
- If one measures the number of poeple who took position
On 4.10.2012, at 23.53, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I think you recommended Symmetrical ICT for informational polling. I guess
you like and trust it within that framework.
I like and trust Symmetrical ICT within every framework.
In official public elections, I like and trust Symmetrical ICT.
On 3.10.2012, at 3.35, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Tue, Oct 2, 2012 at 12:55 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 2.10.2012, at 4.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
A) What is it that is gained by using traditional (unimproved)
Condorcet instead of Symmetrical Improved Condorcet
You explanation sounds like a pretty regular ranked ballot approach. If I rank
U and V second, I want them to lose to the firsts and win the rest.
Juho
On 3.10.2012, at 6.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho:
In improved Condorcet, the voter who equal top ranks X and Y, or who
equal bottom
.
Juho
On 3.10.2012, at 13.53, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 3:25 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
You explanation sounds like a pretty regular ranked ballot approach. If I
rank U and V second, I want them to lose to the firsts and win the rest.
Quite so
include that
difference also in the definition of what the ballots mean.)
Juho
On 3.10.2012, at 14.56, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 7:24 AM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
Yes, it seems that the interpretation of the ballots and sincere wishes of
the voters
On 3.10.2012, at 20.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
(In that case, probably you should include that difference also in the
definition of what the ballots mean.)
Wrong. My definition of Symmetrical ICT fully specifies the method and
its count rule.
No doubt about that. I was interested in if
On 1.10.2012, at 17.31, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Everyone here agrees that natural (sincere) circular ties would be
rare.
Quite rare in typical political elections.
Also, the choice is a lot less clear when there isn't a circular
tie.
More difficult to think, but can be as clear.
For
On 1.10.2012, at 19.16, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 10/01/2012 12:13 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 30.9.2012, at 15.41, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
As far as intrinsically Condorcet methods go, Ranked Pairs feels
simple to me. The only tricky part is the indirect nature of the
unless
I just note that there are many approaches to making the pairwise comparisons.
- One could use proportions instead of margins = A/B isntead of A-B.
- If one measures the number of poeple who took position, one would have to
know which ones voted for a tie intentionally, and which ones voted for
On 2.10.2012, at 4.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
A) What is it that is gained by using traditional (unimproved)
Condorcet instead of Symmetrical Improved Condorcet?
The downsides of unimproved are:
.1. FBC failure (though unimproved-Condorcet advocates speculate
that people won't mind)
On 30.9.2012, at 11.56, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/29/2012 10:49 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
What is a strong Condorcet method?
Basically, one that gives good results while being resistant to tinkering by
the parties (who have greater capacity to coordinate strategy than do the
voters
On 30.9.2012, at 16.06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/30/2012 11:47 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 30.9.2012, at 11.56, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
In practice, that means: is cloneproof, passes independence of as
much as possible (independence of Smith-dominated alternatives,
say
On 30.9.2012, at 15.41, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/30/2012 12:51 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i still think that a cycle with a Smith set bigger than
3 is s unlikely since i still believe that cycles themselves will be
rare in practice.
...
Currently, single-winner
On 1.10.2012, at 5.05, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
But in typical political elections top cycles of 4 should be very rare.
and my understanding is that Schulze, RP, and Minmax all elect the same
candidate for case of a simple 3-choice cycle and, of course, they all elect
the same
What is a strong Condorcet method?
Juho
On 29.9.2012, at 23.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/28/2012 10:11 PM, dn...@aol.com wrote:
A B
Choice C comes along.
C may - head to head ---
1. Beat both
C A
C B
2. Lose to both
A C
B C
3. Beat A BUT lose to B
C A B
Ok, thanks for the effort, trying to convince me.
Juho
On 28.9.2012, at 4.47, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
It's time to agree to disagree.
But thank you for demonstrating (as if it needed more demonstrating on
EM) the impossibility of ever adopting or enacting a rank-method, due
to the
Since Wikipedia says in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:VOTE that
voting is used maily to help in building consesus. The polls are thus not
expected to be competitive. The final decisions are not made based on the poll
results but in a discussion that the polls should help.
Because of
On 28.9.2012, at 22.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/9/28 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
Since Wikipedia says in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:VOTE that
voting is used maily to help in building consesus. The polls are thus not
expected to be competitive. The final decisions
that
Wikipedia aims at making the working practices as discussion and consensus and
agreed policy oriented as possible.
Juho
On 29.9.2012, at 1.16, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/9/28 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 28.9.2012, at 22.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/9/28 Juho Laatu juho4
On 27.9.2012, at 9.21, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
...about some things.
But first, regarding some of the other things:
1. You seem to imply that you think that there is a single, objective,
right ideal sincere winner. Of course you'll deny that, but you've
repeatedly fallaciously based on
On 25.9.2012, at 7.56, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
Minmax(margins) can elect outside the top cycle if such a candidate is
closest to being a CW (measured in number of required additional
votes)
[endquote]
Now, you see, that's exactly what I was talking about. Now you're
back
On 25.9.2012, at 9.31, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho:
Here's the MinMax(margins) chicken dilemma example that I promised, in
which defection by B voters is successful and rewarded::
Sincere preferences:
75: ABC
51: BAC
100: C(A=B)
Voted rankings:
75: AB
51: B
100: C
Try
I will not comment the Dodgson and changing vs. adding votes related
misunderstandings. I hope that misunderstanding is now solved. My example best
sincere winner criterion was meant to refer to the Minmax(margins) philosophy.
On 24.9.2012, at 16.33, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
If you think that
On 23.9.2012, at 8.01, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On Sat, Sep 22, 2012 at 6:11 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
On 22.9.2012, at 22.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
2. Your statement above implies that Symmetrical ICT doesn't choose as
well as [...what?] when
people rank sincerely
be a problem in Approval, and, posted specifically,
about SFR, that I don't think that I should repeat it again this soon.
On Fri, Sep 21, 2012 at 7:43 PM, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk wrote:
We are about to dive into the details of some methods. I'm not sure if there
are still some unanswered
On 22.9.2012, at 22.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
2. Your statement above implies that Symmetrical ICT doesn't choose as
well as [...what?] when
people rank sincerely. That statement requires specification of what
method(s) choose(s) better than SITC under sincere voting, and why
that is so.
On 21.9.2012, at 4.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
When you say can't be elected, you need to examine what you mean by
that. Do you mean can't be elected under combination of a selective
media blackout, and Plurality voting? Or do you mean can't be
elected because the public prefer the policies
On 21.9.2012, at 22.52, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Just in practice. Some more weight on Duverger's law, some less on media
(would happen also without media).
So you keep repeating. But, in this country, the 1-party monopoly
_wouldn't_ happen without the media fraud that I've discussed.
On 22.9.2012, at 1.17, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Do you claim that unimproved Condorcet can be
defended in a comparison with Symmetrical ICT, or ordinary ICT?
I don't know if I have anything important to say. You are probably a better
expert on the properties of those methods. Also definitions
We are about to dive into the details of some methods. I'm not sure if there
are still some unanswered questions that I should cover, or my own claims that
I did not clarify yet. I'll comment some random points below.
On 22.9.2012, at 1.48, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Maybe you meant to compare
On 20.9.2012, at 8.20, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
The idea that there are third candidates but that are never elected,
and that can act as spoilers does not fly very well.
[endquote]
In what sense doesn't it fly well? What does that mean?
I just meant that it is a waste of
On 18.9.2012, at 18.03, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/16/2012 02:35 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 16.9.2012, at 9.57, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
(More precisely, the relative scores (number of plumpers required)
become terms of type score_x - score_(x+1), which, along with SUM
x=1
On 19.9.2012, at 20.26, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho--
This thread is demonstrating something that I spoke of earlier: There
are an unlimited number of things that different people can ask for
from voting systems, just as there are infinitely-many ways to count
rank ballots.
It couldn't
On 17.9.2012, at 21.08, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 9/15/2012 3:02 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/15/2012 09:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.9.2012, at 6.05, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
You can also now save Condorcet results in HTML format but still
working on the best graphics to visualize
On 15.9.2012, at 6.05, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
You can also now save Condorcet results in HTML format but still working on
the best graphics to visualize Condorcet results.
One solution is to support minmax(margins). With that method you can simply
draw a histogram that indicates how many new
On 15.9.2012, at 13.02, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/15/2012 09:55 AM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.9.2012, at 6.05, Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
You can also now save Condorcet results in HTML format but still
working on the best graphics to visualize Condorcet results.
One solution
On 25.7.2012, at 19.35, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Juho
re: In the quoted text I assumed that your question What would
you think of letting interest groups (or parties) select
their most effective advocates to compete with other
candidates for public office? referred to
On 23.7.2012, at 0.22, Fred Gohlke wrote:
re: If we start from low/local level and parties set the
candidates, I might try giving the decision power on who
will go to the next levels to the regular voters, and not to
the candidates that may already be professional politicians.
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