On 7.8.2011, at 2.04, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/6 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't truncate.
But IRV elects A when the B
faction truncates. Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't
likely to truncate, and as you
P.S. One can use trees / exact clones also with the vote set that was discussed.
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
The tree structure could be just a forest here. One tree is A alone. The other
tree is (B, C). The idea is that support to B/C means also support to C/B. If I
try to vote BAC, that would be
Like IRV, tree approaches would not allow supporters of candidates from
other branches to help decide which of the clones on the winning branch
wins. They would also not allow a situation where A likes B but B doesn't
like A. In both cases, this leads to an IRV-like center-squeeze problem,
which,
I sent also another mail that explained that the basic / simplest tree method
uses bullet votes (and is therefore limited to giving opinions that influence
one branch only), and that trees can be used with richer votes too. In that
case tree methods become hybrids since the tree concept and the
Please, finish elaborating and describing a method before you claim benefits
for it. I think that building the trees is not as easy or safe as you think.
I know that I myself have been guilty at times of claiming benefits for
something before I'd sat down and really worked it out on paper, and I'm
Sorry if the explanation was not clear enough. A basic tree method with bullet
votes indeed has the limitation that you mentioned below (inability to
influence the preference order in the competing branch).
I think the explicit clone preprocessing of the votes + Condorcet description
that I
I think the explicit clone preprocessing of the votes + Condorcet
description that I gave below is a quite accurate definition of a method
that both eliminates the clone problems and has rich ballots (rich enough to
take position also on the order within the competing branch).
I still think
Ok, I agree that you need a concrete enough description to check the properties
of the method.
If the tree is (((A,B),C),D), then all of them are explicit clones at top level
(trivial), A, B and C are explicit clones, and also A and B are explicit clones
within those larger clone groups.
If
?
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
Date: Saturday, August 6, 2011 4:04 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] : Chicken problem (was: SODA and the Condorcet
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
2011/8/6
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't
their significant preferences ahead of time, especially when there
is no chicken standoff, but
even in that case as well.
Am I misjudging this orI over-looking a worse problem?
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
Date: Saturday, August 6, 2011 4:04 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] : Chicken problem
I wrote:
One thing that I did not cover explicitly is how to handle equality. I guess
it is ok not to require clones to be separated from others but just require
them to be next to each others. What I mean is that if A and B are the only
clones and there are three candidates {A, B, C},
More thoughts on the chicken problem.
Again, in Forest's version, that's a scenario like:
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
C is the pairwise champion, but B is motivated to truncate, and C to
retaliate defensively, until A ends up winning.
In my opinion, scenarios like this make the single most intractable
To review for other readers, we're talking about the scenario
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
Candidates B and C form a clone set that pairwise beats A, and in fact C
is the Condorcet Winner, but
under many Condorcet methods, as well as for Range and Approval, there is
a large temptation for the
25 B
when the B faction truncates
sincerely because of
detesting both A and C, IRV still elects A instead of B.
Date: Sat, 6 Aug 2011 11:46:12 -0600
From: Jan Kok
To: Jameson Quinn , Election Methods Mailing
List
Subject: Re: [EM] Chicken problem (was: SODA and the Condorcet
criterion
On 6.8.2011, at 19.40, Jameson Quinn wrote:
More thoughts on the chicken problem.
Again, in Forest's version, that's a scenario like:
48 A
27 CB
25 BC
C is the pairwise champion, but B is motivated to truncate, and C to
retaliate defensively, until A ends up winning.
In my
2011/8/6 fsimm...@pcc.edu
Jan,
IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't
truncate. But IRV elects A when the B
faction truncates. Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't
likely to truncate, and as you say C
will be elected.
The trouble with IRV is
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