Kevin Venzke wrote:
er... Is this right? I thought your penalty in the 3c case would have
to be just a single candidate's first preferences.
I think I am probably right here. If you draw a triangle with ABC,
you have two cycle possibilities. In both cycles IRV elects the winner
between A and
2011/6/16 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com
Kevin Venzke wrote:
er... Is this right? I thought your penalty in the 3c case would have
to be just a single candidate's first preferences.
I think I am probably right here. If you draw a triangle with ABC,
you have two cycle
Hi Juho,
I have to trim this due to being short on time.
--- En date de : Mar 14.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
If
the answer is no or almost never, and I'm the
only
nutty voter that wants
to vote ACB, lose nothing, maybe gain,
with
everyone else voting
sincerely,
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Lun 13.6.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com a
écrit :
If you want something that deters burial strategy, how
about what I called FPC? Each candidate's penalty is equal
to the number of first-place votes for those who beat him
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Mar 14.6.11, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com a écrit :
[start quote]
Of course, this causes favorite betrayal strategy, because you may
care more about giving a penalty than about helping your honest
favorite. And this strategy is obvious enough that I think
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mer 15.6.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com a
écrit :
I guess that anything else that does something similar
would have a
similar advantage.
FPC has some problems, though, as Jameson Quinn pointed
out. It is possible to reduce the compromise
Edit:
--- En date de : Mer 15.6.11, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr a écrit :
I am not sure I am able to follow this. In the first
paragraph, if Y
is the CW, you can't have an XYZX cycle created
by X voters.
I just realized you're not talking about a cycle but a score order.
Also am I
On 15.6.2011, at 14.23, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
I have to trim this due to being short on time.
Thanks, compact opinions are always a good approach.
In margins (and maybe in other variants too) ties
should
not carry any other additional meaning but that
the voter
didn't support XY
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Mer 15.6.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com a
écrit :
I guess that anything else that does something similar
would have a
similar advantage.
FPC has some problems, though, as Jameson Quinn pointed
out. It is possible to reduce
Hi Kristofer,
Quick one:
--- En date de : Mer 15.6.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com a
écrit :
I haven't tested FPC (since my reimplementation of JGA's
strategy ideas was done before I moved to a more modular
design for Quadelect), but as far as I recall, the really
standout
On 13.6.2011, at 17.33, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Is Condorcet//FPP a bad method?
I agree with Jameson Quinn, the gap is too far and so it could be quite
tempting to compromise as in FPTP (and failing that, to engineer a cycle if
your candidate has great first
If you want something that deters burial strategy, how about what I called
FPC? Each candidate's penalty is equal to the number of first-place votes
for those who beat him pairwise. Lowest penalty wins.
Burying a candidate may help in engineering a cycle, but it can't stack
more first-place
Is Condorcet//FPP a bad method?
Yes. The danger is that FPP strategy would dominate Condorcet strategy. This
is especially true since people are so used to FPP strategy.
How about a method where, if there is a cycle, we take the top three
FPP candidates (call them ABC in descending
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Is Condorcet//FPP a bad method?
I agree with Jameson Quinn, the gap is too far and so it could be quite
tempting to compromise as in FPTP (and failing that, to engineer a cycle
if your candidate has great first place support).
Smith,FPP... perhaps better, but there's
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 11.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
Maybe strategic, maybe misled to think that
ranking C above
B would always decrease the chances of B to win,
maybe you
want to discourage B by showing that he is not
much more
popular than C.
Why
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com a écrit :
Seems that some are so lacking in
understanding Condorcet that they fear it. So, a
couple basics:
. The voter can rank such as A=B=C, saying exactly
equal approval of these three over all other
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are
methods
that offer two
bad options and one of them is burial,
though.
(There is no
On 12.6.2011, at 0.26, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Ven 10.6.11, Juho Laatu juho.la...@gmail.com a écrit :
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are
methods
that offer two
bad options and one of
On 10.6.2011, at 3.04, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are methods
that offer two
bad options and one of them is burial, though.
(There is no working strategy, but there are
On 9.6.2011, at 5.28, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of
Condorcet
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Jeu 9.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
No, I wouldn't say that. I do think there are methods
that offer two
bad options and one of them is burial, though.
(There is no working strategy, but there are some
options??)
Absolutely. I'm being honest
Seems that some are so lacking in understanding Condorcet that they
fear it. So, a couple basics:
. The voter can rank such as A=B=C, saying exactly equal approval of
these three over all other candidates. This has the same effect as it
would have in true Approval.
. The voter can rank
There has been quite a lot of discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities
of Condorcet methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one of the least vulnerable to strategies, and in most typical
elections their vanilla versions are simply good enough. In the case
It's easy to minimize the problems with one's preferred systems, and focus
on the problems with other systems you see as competing for mindshare.
It's not even dishonest: the truth is that, compared to the giant issues
with plurality, any good system has problems that are minor, but that on the
On 8.6.2011, at 16.33, Jameson Quinn wrote:
It's easy to minimize the problems with one's preferred systems, and focus on
the problems with other systems you see as competing for mindshare. It's
not even dishonest: the truth is that, compared to the giant issues with
plurality, any good
In SODA I'm most worried about the Approval related problems,
Do you mean the near-clone game-of-chicken problems? These apply to WV
Condorcet methods too (although less-obviously to an unsophisticated voter),
and with margins, there is the opposite burial problem:
35: AB
25: B
40: C
What
On 8.6.2011, at 18.58, Jameson Quinn wrote:
In SODA I'm most worried about the Approval related problems,
Do you mean the near-clone game-of-chicken problems?
Yes.
These apply to WV Condorcet methods too (although less-obviously to an
unsophisticated voter), and with margins, there is
On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 8:58 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote:
From my experience talking to normal people not already interested in
voting or math, I think that it is very important to keep your list of
proposals short. 1 is good, 2 is tolerable, 3 is approximately pointless,
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one of the least vulnerable to strategies, and
in
On 9.6.2011, at 1.31, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I think Condorcet
methods are one
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk a écrit :
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
a écrit :
There has been quite a lot of
discussion around the strategic vulnerabilities of
Condorcet
methods on this list recently. In general I
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