2011/6/23 Juho Laatu
> What is the difference between "least extra votes" and MinMax(margins)?
> Isn't "least extra votes" pretty much the definition of MinMax(margins)?
> (assuming that the extra votes rank the candidate in question first)
>
Sorry, you're right. I was thinking that it was "leas
What is the difference between "least extra votes" and MinMax(margins)? Isn't
"least extra votes" pretty much the definition of MinMax(margins)? (assuming
that the extra votes rank the candidate in question first)
Juho
On 22.6.2011, at 10.28, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> My impression was that the
My impression was that the "remember Toby" thread(s) was (were) inclining
towards advocating simpler systems than CSSD. I heard more support for C//A,
minimax, and SODA.
Separately, I agree that it's best to describe a system by focusing on the
outcome rather than the procedure. The difference is
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
As I remember it, when Toby settled on CSSD, we made a huge
psychological mistake: we got bogged down in the description of the
CSSD algorithm for the public proposal. I think that was a fatal
mistake, and I would like to propose a strategy for avoiding that
mistake in th
As I remember it, when Toby settled on CSSD, we made a huge psychological
mistake: we got bogged
down in the description of the CSSD algorithm for the public proposal. I think
that was a fatal mistake,
and I would like to propose a strategy for avoiding that mistake in the future.
It was a
On 9.6.2011, at 5.48, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> > It seems I have to give one more example to cover also
> > cases where the difference between major an minor candidates
> > is not that clear.
> >
> > 26: A>B
> > 25: B>A
> > 49: C
> >
> > Again, if two of the B supporters vote B>C, then B wins.
>
Yes, that's about it. But of course the situation is still somewhat
uncomfortable to regular voters that are not interested and active enough to
register themselves or that are unwilling to reveal their preferences to all
(i.e. no secret vote allowed), but that would like to participate also in
2011/6/9 Juho Laatu
> On 9.6.2011, at 11.23, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> 2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson
>
>
> (this is worse than IRV.) i (and i would hope that most intelligent
>> voters) do *not* want someone else voting for me in elections.
>>
>
> And in SODA, you and anyone else who feels t
On 9.6.2011, at 11.23, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> 2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson
> (this is worse than IRV.) i (and i would hope that most intelligent
> voters) do *not* want someone else voting for me in elections.
>
> And in SODA, you and anyone else who feels that way can easily make sure i
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson
>
> On Jun 8, 2011, at 10:32 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
>>
>> 2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson
>>
>> On Jun 8, 2011, at 9:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>
>> On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>> 1. Before
On 9.6.2011, at 5.04, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> i still think this Asset thingie is crappy. it is *immaterial* how
> candidates rank or value the other candidates. the only thing that matters
> is how the electorate values the candidates.
>
> No Smoke-Filled Rooms!!!
Yes, there are ris
On 9.6.2011, at 4.51, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>> On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>> 2. Voters submit approval ballots, with up to two write-ins. "Do not
>>> delegate" is a valid write-in.
>>
>> Your definition seems to define also the use
On Jun 8, 2011, at 10:32 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson
On Jun 8, 2011, at 9:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. Before the election, candidates (including declared write-ins)
s
>
>
> > It seems I have to give one more example to cover also
> > cases where the difference between major an minor candidates
> > is not that clear.
> >
> > 26: A>B
> > 25: B>A
> > 49: C
> >
> > Again, if two of the B supporters vote B>C, then B wins.
> > If some A and B supporters truncate in or
2011/6/8 robert bristow-johnson
>
> On Jun 8, 2011, at 9:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
> On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
>>
>>> On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>>
1. Before the election, candidates (including declared write-ins) submit
full rankings of ot
On Jun 8, 2011, at 9:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
1. Before the election, candidates (including declared write-ins)
submit full rankings of other candidates.
...
i still think this Asset thingie is cr
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 8.6.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> I was busy with other activities for a while but here are
> some comments.
>
> >
> > --- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu
> a écrit :
> >>> I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there
> is one,
> >> else elect the
> >>> candid
On Jun 8, 2011, at 1:32 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
I've posted a full definition. However, this definition included my
On 8.6.2011, at 16.15, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> 2011/6/8 Juho Laatu
> Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
>
> There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
>
> I've posted a full definition. However, this definition included my
> additional step of recount
OK, here's an *imaginary* SODA election with "Nader", "Clinton", "Dole", and
"Perot". Any resemblance to the actual 1996 election is passing; I've cooked
the books to make the election "interesting" - which means skewing it left,
because otherwise Nader is not a factor. Standard ideological disclai
Dear Jameson,
you wouldn't have a four-candidate example, which include all the
options and alternatives that can arrise in the elections (bullet
voting, full preferences etc.)?
It is difficult for me to understand how the elections will work.
What happens if all the voters candidate in the elect
2011/6/8 Juho Laatu
> Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
>
> There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
>
I've posted a full definition. However, this definition included my
additional step of recounting the top two without mutually-delegated votes.
In furth
Here are some random observations about the SODA method.
There should be a full definition of the method somewhere.
If there are three candidates and their declared preferences are A>B>C, B>C>A
and C>A>B, the method may introduce some additional problems. If most voters
delegate, then we may ea
On 1.6.2011, at 13.48, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Juho,
Hi,
I was busy with other activities for a while but here are some comments.
>
> --- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
>>> I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one,
>> else elect the
>>> candidate ranked (or ranke
Having flunked on a detail Saturday, I will try to do better tonight.
This SODA is a possibility for improving Approval.
I remain a Condorcet backer:
. What it offers is valuable to voters seeing the value of
ranking in voting.
. Approval voting is doable within Condorcet (and having
Having flunked on a detail Saturday, I will try to do better tonight.
This SODA is a possibility for improving Approval.
I remain a Condorcet backer:
. What it offers is valuable to voters seeing the value of
ranking in voting.
. Approval voting is doable within Condorcet (and having
2011/6/6
> - Original Message -
> From: Jameson Quinn
>
> > 2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
> >
> > > I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson
> > calls SODA. It
> > > gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet
> > compliance. I offer
> > > what I claim is a true summa
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
> 2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
>
> > I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson
> calls SODA. It
> > gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet
> compliance. I offer
> > what I claim is a true summary of what I would call smart
2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
> I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson calls SODA. It
> gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet compliance. I offer
> what I claim is a true summary of what I would call smart Approval. What I
> see:
> . Candidates each offer draft
I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson calls SODA.
It gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet
compliance. I offer what I claim is a true summary of what I would
call smart Approval. What I see:
. Candidates each offer draft Approval votes which voters
om: Jameson Quinn
> To: EM
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> Message-ID:
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Message contents:
> Section 1. When *isn't* SODA "more condorcet compliant than condorcet
> methods"
> Se
Message contents:
Section 1. When *isn't* SODA "more condorcet compliant than condorcet
methods"
Section 2. Smoke-filled rooms?
Section 3. What are we looking for, anyway? (in this thread)
*Section 1. When isn't SODA "more condorcet compliant than condorcet
methods"*
2011/6/4
> For the benefit
On Jun 4, 2011, at 3:16 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jun 3, 2011, at 10:30 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
...
Ranking:
IRV ranking, learned by many, is a start, with equal ranking a
trivial addition.
Approval voting permissible and usable as valid Condorcet by
using a single rank
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Been a busy day on this thread. I will try for Condorcet, to sell that
it can be good and usable by voters without requiring much new
understanding by them.
Ranking:
IRV ranking, learned by many, is a start, with equal ranking a
trivial addition.
Approval voti
i got distracted from finishing a sentence...
On Jun 3, 2011, at 10:30 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Been a busy day on this thread. I will try for Condorcet, to sell
that it can be good and usable by voters without requiring much new
understanding by them.
my sell for Condorcet compliant is
On Jun 3, 2011, at 10:30 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Been a busy day on this thread. I will try for Condorcet, to sell
that it can be good and usable by voters without requiring much new
understanding by them.
my sell for Condorcet compliant is more of a negative: If you don't
wanna elect
Been a busy day on this thread. I will try for Condorcet, to sell
that it can be good and usable by voters without requiring much new
understanding by them.
Ranking:
IRV ranking, learned by many, is a start, with equal ranking a
trivial addition.
Approval voting permissible and u
I thought of a simpler way to explain my "safety" fix. The full system
description follows, with my new phrasing in bold.
N days before the election, all candidates (including declared write-in
candidates) rank order all other candidates (including declared write-in
candidates). These orderings ar
Kathy wrote:
> Let all the voters vote for one or two candidates.
Considering this Approval-like method on its own, without any proxy
aspects, I see problems. Capping the number of candidates that each
voter is allowed to approve at 2 destroys some of Approval's desirable
properties. First, no l
2011/6/3 Kathy Dopp
> Jameson,
>
> The number two (2) is *not* arbitrary. It is the next integer after
> the number one (1). Therefore, two is the next simplest number of
> candidates to allow voters to vote for after the number one, since we
> cannot vote for portions of candidates.
>
>
http://
ter can vote for
by at most one.
Kathy
On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 4:48 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>
> 2011/6/3 Kathy Dopp
>>
>> > From: Jameson Quinn
>> > To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
>> > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
>> > Subject:
2011/6/3 Kathy Dopp
> > From: Jameson Quinn
> > To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
> > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> > Message-ID:
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> >
>
> &g
I think that this provision is even better than Forest realized:
> To rule out the smoke-filled-room scenario, candidates' Approval ballots
> must be consistent with their
> rankings of the candidates, which they are required to publish at least a
> three (?) days before the voting
> takes place.
> From: Jameson Quinn
> To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> Message-ID:
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>
> I'd add my "safety" fix to the near-clone problem,
2011/6/3 Kathy Dopp
> Forest,
>
> While I love the complement of "great idea", I still am not 100% sure
> if the method is well-defined. I.e. under what condition do all the
> Asset voters (the candidates) get to cast their 2nd choice votes for
> the voters? To be fair, wouldn't all candidates w
om: fsimm...@pcc.edu
> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Remember Toby
> Message-ID:
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> Dear Kathy,
>
> Great idea! Why didn't I think of that? As you indicated, it could be done
> with an o
2011/6/3
> Dear Kathy,
>
> Great idea! Why didn't I think of that? As you indicated, it could be
> done with an ordinary Plurality
> ballot, and would amount to a simplified version of DYN:
>
> If a voter "bullet" votes, then the ballot is interpreted as submission of
> a replicate of the Appro
Dear Kathy,
Great idea! Why didn't I think of that? As you indicated, it could be done
with an ordinary Plurality
ballot, and would amount to a simplified version of DYN:
If a voter "bullet" votes, then the ballot is interpreted as submission of a
replicate of the Approval ballot
that the m
> Date: Thu, 02 Jun 2011 19:14:12 + (GMT)
> From: fsimm...@pcc.edu
> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Is DYN too complicated? If so, we are stuck with ordinary Approval or
> ordinary Asset Voting. They are
> the only choices simpler than DYN that dominate Plurality.
>
>
Great an
On Jun 2, 2011, at 9:34 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Asset deserves a bit of study - the candidate you vote for can be
part of deciding who gets elected ...
that sorta smacks of smoke-filled room to me. a general election
should be decided purely by the electorate according to rules set
fort
Here we get led down a path of rejecting methods for being worse than
plurality in some way, without considering whether they may be better
in other important ways.
Agreed that Approval is better - and very little different.
Asset deserves a bit of study - the candidate you vote for can be p
On Jun 2, 2011, at 12:14 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
>
> In the Asset voting case, consider that when you trust your Favorite
> candidate’s ranking of the other
> candidates, you can mark you favorite and not worry about Plurality strategy.
> It appears that between
> eighty and ninety perce
There are only two single winner methods that are uniformly better than
Plurality, i.e. that are better in
some ways and worse in none. These two methods make use of Plurality style
ballots, and those voters
who want to use Plurality strategy (marking only their preferred of the two
frontrunn
On Jun 1, 2011, at 2:26 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum
On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
Date: Wednesday, June 1, 2011 11:27 am
Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
To: Dave Ketchum
Cc: Kristofer Munsterhjelm , election-methods@lists.electorama.com,
fsimm...@pcc.edu
> 2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum
>
> > On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 A
On Jun 1, 2011, at 11:38 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
I agree with everything you've said here re. simplicity etc.
Condorcet with Approval to break Condorcet cycles would be great.
Simple to explain, precinct-summable with the use of an NxN matrix,
with N= # candidates and the matrix diagonal availabl
2011/6/1 Dave Ketchum
> On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>
>> fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
>>
>>> It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
>>> and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
>>> There are several Condorcet methods t
I agree with everything you've said here re. simplicity etc.
Condorcet with Approval to break Condorcet cycles would be great.
Simple to explain, precinct-summable with the use of an NxN matrix,
with N= # candidates and the matrix diagonal available for other data.
(such as the total number of bal
On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
monotonic without b
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Mer 1.6.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> > I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one,
> else elect the
> > candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the
> greatest number of ballots" is plenty simple, and is much
> > more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in
On 1.6.2011, at 5.46, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one, else elect the
> candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the greatest number of ballots" is
> plenty simple, and is much
> more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other respects.
In w
robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On May 31, 2011, at 10:46 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It has been averred many times on this list that in Australia, where
partial rankings are considered
spoiled ballots,
that sure makes little sense. is this related to the mandatory voting
laws for Aussies
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
monotonic without being too complicated.
Perhaps, but not to the extent that
On May 31, 2011, at 10:46 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are
of the exact counting rules. There are several Condorcet methods
that are clone proof and monotonic
without being too complicated
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> To: S Sosnick
> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com,
> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> S Sosnick wrote:
> > On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho
>
S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives >95% of the advantage vs. plurality of the
theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the best. And besides, if we try to get
Hi Jameson,
--- En date de : Lun 30.5.11, Jameson Quinn a écrit :
If ballot design considerations limited the number of ranks available for
Condorcet/Approval, one could still use equal ranking to approve an unlimited
number of candidates. I agree that an explicit "unapproved" ranking, though
Hi Kathy,
--- En date de : Lun 30.5.11, Kathy Dopp a écrit :
> Thanks Kevin, I like the simplicity of that plan --
> Condorcet/Approval.
>
> Have you thought about only counting the first two rank
> ballot choices
> of voters if the Approval step becomes necessary due to a
> Condorcet
> cycle?
2011/5/30 Kathy Dopp
> > Date: Sun, 29 May 2011 23:41:47 +0100 (BST)
> > From: Kevin Venzke
> > To: election-meth...@electorama.com
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Remember toby KD
> >> Kevin,
> >>
> >> Could you please explain in fairly simple terms
> Date: Sun, 29 May 2011 23:41:47 +0100 (BST)
> From: Kevin Venzke
> To: election-meth...@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember toby KD
>> Kevin,
>>
>> Could you please explain in fairly simple terms how
>> Condorcet/Approval works?
>>
>
>
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 29.5.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> This is
> why I suggest that
> > you had better force voters to rank everyone in a
> margins method.
>
> In som sense margins does this. Vote "B" gives the same
> result as half vote "B>A>C" and half vote
> "B>C>A" together. Or statis
Hi Kathy,
--- En date de : Dim 29.5.11, Kathy Dopp a écrit :
> > In the "easy to explain/solve but still Condorcet"
> category, I am okay
> > with Minmax(WV) but I think Condorcet//Approval (with
> implied approval)
> > is preferable because you don't need a defeat strength
> concept at all,
> >
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Dim 29.5.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> > I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better
> and easier to defend.
>
> Kevin Venzke referred to the number of disappointed voters
> on the winning side (that will be overruled in the case of a
> top cycle). That's one concern
> Date: Sun, 29 May 2011 02:42:44 +0100 (BST)
> From: Kevin Venzke
> To: election-meth...@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember toby
>
> In the "easy to explain/solve but still Condorcet" category, I am okay
> with Minmax(WV) but I think Condorcet//Approv
On 29.5.2011, at 5.07, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Juho,
>
> --- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
>>> Margins elects A here:
>>> 35 A>B
>>> 25 B
>>> 40 C
>>>
>>> Is this going to be defensible when this method is
>> proposed? Can you
>>> argue a case for A without mindreading off of
On 29.5.2011, at 3.53, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> I agree with Kevin. Winning Votes is much better and easier to defend.
Kevin Venzke referred to the number of disappointed voters on the winning side
(that will be overruled in the case of a top cycle). That's one concern. I have
some problems f
Hi Juho,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, Juho Laatu a écrit :
> > Margins elects A here:
> > 35 A>B
> > 25 B
> > 40 C
> >
> > Is this going to be defensible when this method is
> proposed? Can you
> > argue a case for A without mindreading off of the
> blank areas of the
> > ballots?
>
> I guess
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> From simplest to less simple but still simple enough:
>
> 1. Asset Voting
> 2. Approval
> 3. DYN
> 4. MCA
> 5. The Bucklin Variant of Venzke and Benham
If by #5 you mean IBIFA, I can't take any credit for that.
I did make a
lin Variant of Venzke and Benham
> From: Kevin Venzke
> To: robert bristow-johnson
> Cc: election-meth...@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Remember Toby
> Message-ID: <952900.12451...@web29609.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
&g
On 29.5.2011, at 1.33, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Margins elects A here:
> 35 A>B
> 25 B
> 40 C
>
> Is this going to be defensible when this method is proposed? Can you
> argue a case for A without mindreading off of the blank areas of the
> ballots?
I guess the common assumption is that the unranke
Hi Robert,
--- En date de : Sam 28.5.11, robert bristow-johnson
a écrit :
> will minimax of margins decide differently than ranked
> pairs? if the cycle has only three candidates, it
> seems to me that it must be equivalent to ranked pairs.
It is the same with three.
> is there any good reas
On 28.5.2011, at 23.16, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
> On May 28, 2011, at 3:41 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
>
>>
>> On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If
>> minimax is twice as likely
>> to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives >95% of the advantage vs.
>> pl
On May 28, 2011, at 3:41 PM, S Sosnick wrote:
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho Laatu].
If minimax is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives >95% of the advantage
vs. plurality of the
theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the be
On 27-May-2011, Jameson Quinn, wrote, "I agree [with Juho Laatu]. If minimax
is twice as likely
to be adopted, because it's simpler, and gives >95% of the advantage vs.
plurality of the
theoretically-best Condorcet methods, then it *is* the best. And besides, if
we try to get
consensus on w
>
>
> If you are looking for simplicity then maybe also minmax should be
> considered since it (the margins version) simply measures the number of
> required additional voters to beat all others.
I agree. If minimax is twice as likely to be adopted, because it's simpler,
and gives >95% of the adv
On the mathematical-exploration side of things:
2011/5/26
>
>
> > From: Kevin Venzke
> > To: election-meth...@electorama.com
> > Subject: Re: [EM] remember Toby Nixon? FS
> > Message-ID: <404845.50771...@web29613.mail.ird.yahoo.com>
> > Content-Type:
> From: Kevin Venzke
> To: election-meth...@electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] remember Toby Nixon? FS
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> Hi Forest,
>
> --- En date de?: Mer 25.
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Mer 25.5.11, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> The main problem is determining (through the disinformation
> noise) who the front runners really are.
> Suppose the zero-information front runners to be candidates
> A and B, but that the media created front
> runners are C
On 26.5.2011, at 4.35, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> being that they choose the same winner in the case that there are only 3
> candidates in the cycle, i would recommend Tideman over Schulze (sorry
> Marcus) for the simplicity of explanation. while getting a Condorcet cycle
> is expected to
On 26.5.2011, at 7.10, matt welland wrote:
> On Thu, 2011-05-26 at 01:07 +, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
>> matt welland wrote ...
>>
>>> The only strategy in
>>> approval is to hold your nose and check off the front runner you
>>> despise because you don't want the other front runner you despise
On Thu, 2011-05-26 at 01:07 +, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> matt welland wrote ...
>
> > The only strategy in
> > approval is to hold your nose and check off the front runner you
> > despise because you don't want the other front runner you despise
> > more to win.
>
> The main problem is dete
On May 25, 2011, at 9:17 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Being who I am, I would either pick Ranked Pairs or CSSD
(Beatpath,
Schulze): the former if it's more important that it can be
explained
easily, the latter if precedence is more im
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Date: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 11:31 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] remember Toby Nixon?
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
> > About six years ago Toby Nixon asked the members of this E
matt welland wrote ...
> The only strategy in
> approval is to hold your nose and check off the front runner you
> despise because you don't want the other front runner you despise
> more to win.
The main problem is determining (through the disinformation noise) who the
front runners really a
2011 4:41 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] remember Toby Nixon?
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> I think DYN is my new favorite practical proposal. It's simple
> and it would
> work beautifully.
>
> The one downside of that system would be the possibility o
On May 25, 2011, at 2:07 AM, Andrew Myers wrote:
On 7/22/64 11:59 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 24, 2011, at 6:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
About six years ago Toby Nixon asked the members of this EM list
for a
advice on what election method
to try propose in the Washington State Legisla
For a legislature one could use also multi-winner and proportional methods, but
I think the question was what single-winner method to recommend. (I'd probably
recommend proportional methods for most multi-winner elections, unless the
community explicitly wants to have a two-party system.)
James
matt welland wrote:
On Tue, 2011-05-24 at 22:42 +, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
On the other hand Approval requires reliable polling information for
informed strategy. This fact makes Approval vulnerable to
>> manipulation by disinformation.
Is this a generally accepted truth? I don't think I
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
About six years ago Toby Nixon asked the members of this EM list for a advice on what election method
to try propose in the Washington State Legislature. He finally settled on CSSD beatpath. As near as I
know nothing came of it. What would we propose if we had another
On 7/22/64 11:59 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 24, 2011, at 6:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
About six years ago Toby Nixon asked the members of this EM list for a
advice on what election method
to try propose in the Washington State Legislature. He finally settled
on CSSD beatpath. As near as
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