On Wed, 9 Jun 2004 23:49:17 +0100 James Gilmour wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
To anyone else reading, my claim is:
With the Condorcet method(s), the voter ranks all candidates
liked better than "last" (optionally including ranking "last").
I asked:
Is it necessary for a voter to rank ALL cand
Jan's posting prompted me to post something that I've meant to post. Another
name for Approval could be Set Voting.
The voter can can vote any set over any other set. Of course that's done by
voting a particular set over everyone else.
While Plurality lets you vote one candidate over everyone e
Some of us have posted many examples of how IRV eliminates a middle CW and
jumps to an extremist as the winner. IRV errs toward the extremes.
Approval, when it errs, tends instead to err toward the middle. Middle in
the sense of inbetween.
Say it's Favorite, Middle, & Worst.
Middle is the CW. W
>From my definition of weighted pairwise:
>>Tally:
>>1. Pairwise tally, using the ranked ballots only. Elect the Condorcet
>>winner if one exists.
>
David wrote:
>
>So in the examples:
>45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0
>10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0
>5 B 100 > C 70> A 0
>40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
>
>45 A 100 > B 10 > C
On Wed, 9 Jun 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You wrote:
Tally:
1. Pairwise tally, using the ranked ballots only. Elect the Condorcet
winner if one exists.
So in the examples:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 70> A 0
40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 90
(The line-format of this message may be messed-up, because it didn't post
here the first time I sent it, and so I'm sending it from a copy stored
elsewhere)
Kevin--
Equalling votes may well lose Approval's summability. When I posted
about
equalling votes yesterday, I didn't realilze how unfinis
> >Dave Ketchum wrote:
> >> To anyone else reading, my claim is:
> >>With the Condorcet method(s), the voter ranks all candidates
> >> liked better than "last" (optionally including ranking "last").
I asked:
> >Is it necessary for a voter to rank ALL candidates?
Eric replied:
> No.
I
At 11:37 PM +0100 6/9/04, James Gilmour wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
To anyone else reading, my claim is:
With the Condorcet method(s), the voter ranks all
candidates liked better than "last" (optionally including ranking "last").
Is it necessary for a voter to rank ALL candidates?
No.
Does
Dave Ketchum wrote:
> To anyone else reading, my claim is:
> With the Condorcet method(s), the voter ranks all
> candidates liked better than "last" (optionally including ranking "last").
Is it necessary for a voter to rank ALL candidates? Does it cease to be "a Condorcet
method" if
voter
We ain't communicating, so, ENOUGH!
To anyone else reading, my claim is:
With the Condorcet method(s), the voter ranks all candidates liked
better than "last" (optionally including ranking "last").
There is no other voter activity such as a rating or grading of
candidates - methods incl
Hello James
You wrote:
>Tally:
>1. Pairwise tally, using the ranked ballots only. Elect the Condorcet
>winner if one exists.
So in the examples:
45 A 100 > B 70 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 70 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 70> A 0
40 C 100 > B 70 > A 0
45 A 100 > B 10 > C 0
10 B 100 > A 90 > C 0
5 B 100 > C 90
On Wed, 9 Jun 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Jun 2004 09:56:24 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 9 Jun 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> >
> >
> >>On Tue, 8 Jun 2004 14:06:19 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>If I understand correctly, Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, MinMax,
On Wed, 9 Jun 2004 09:56:24 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
On Wed, 9 Jun 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Tue, 8 Jun 2004 14:06:19 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
If I understand correctly, Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, MinMax, and all of the
other serious Condorcet methods are in agreement (except f
James,
>the ratings should be scaled and maximised among the members of the
>Schwartz set,
>between steps 2 and 3.
Sorry, Chris, what exactly do you mean by "scaled and maximized"? Is that
like raising the highest candidate to 100 and the lowest to 0?
CB: I should have written "maximis
You really should try out Wikipedia; all of this sounds like a duplication of
effort.
On Sat, Jun 05, 2004 at 09:36:26PM -0400, James Green-Armytage wrote:
> - Old versions of the dictionary will still exist in the archives, so if
> some malevolent person deletes a definition or two, they can
I suggest this alternative description of Approval Voting:
Voters are asked to "approve" or "disapprove" each candidate. Voters
may approve more than one candidate for an office. Whoever gets the
most approval votes wins.
The reasons for proposing this are:
1. I have twice received this objec
On Wed, 9 Jun 2004, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> On Tue, 8 Jun 2004 14:06:19 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> > If I understand correctly, Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, MinMax, and all of the
> > other serious Condorcet methods are in agreement (except for the
> > margins/wv debate) when there are only
Dear election methods fans,
I believe that I was overly terse when I stated the definition of the
methods I proposed yesterday. I think that I made it pretty easy to
misunderstand. So I'm trying to rewrite the central part where I actually
define the method. How about this...?
Weighted
On Tue, 8 Jun 2004 14:06:19 -0700 (PDT) Forest Simmons wrote:
If I understand correctly, Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, MinMax, and all of the
other serious Condorcet methods are in agreement (except for the
margins/wv debate) when there are only three candidates: if one of them
beats each of the others
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