Dear participants,
I wrote to Mike Ossipoff (19 March 2005):
I can only comment on how you motivated wv at the EM
mailing list. Here, you used GMC from the very beginning.
And GMC was one of your main arguments for using wv.
Mike Ossipoff wrote to me (20 March 2005):
I introduced and
Dear Mike,
you wrote (20 March 2005):
In the _Journal of Economic Perspective_, for Winter
'85, Simson-Kramer is defined as electing the candidate
whose greatest votes for him in a pairwise comparison
is greater than any other candidate's greatest votes
for him in a pairwise comparison.
Hi Chris,
Some replies follow...
46 abc
44 bca (sincere is bac)
05 cab
05 cba
So the obvious question I ask you is this: Why then
do you reccomend
methods that elect B?
Do I? First of all, my recommendation of winning votes methods is
tenuous. Second, I suggest that this would
James G-A,
Referring to this example,
46 abc
44 bca (sincere is bac)
05 cab
05 cba
I asked you why you reccomend methods that elect b,
and you replied (Mon.Mar.21):
Do I?
As far as I can tell from your website, with some
beating about the bush, yes. If pressed as to which
you think is the
On 20 Mar 2005 at 01:38 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think that
[Russ Paielli wrote earlier:]
an ideal election method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal
information, and the cardinal information should be simple
Dear Chris and James!
James answered to Chris:
46 abc
44 bca (sincere is bac)
05 cab
05 cba
So the obvious question I ask you is this: Why then do you
reccomend methods that elect B?
Do I? First of all, my recommendation of winning votes methods is
tenuous. Second, I suggest that
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
First point: High Approval score indicates broad consent that the
candidate is minimally acceptable. But it doesn't indicate highest
preference.
Agreed.
The main effect of Approval in DMC is to use it to discount the
pairwise defeats of candidates with less widespread
On 21 Mar 2005 at 12:52 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Second point: In the USA, at least, it may be more desirable for the
pairwise winner to have lower approval. This seems paradoxical, but
it tends to keep the winner from making overly radical changes.
Sorry, but I think some radical changes
Ted, it looks like most list members prefer ordinal ballots with approval
cutoffs to graded ballots. Perhaps those of us who like graded ballots are
not vocal enough.
I like graded ballots, and I think that (for public proposal) the standard
A,B,C,D,F scale is sufficient, with C as the default
On Mon, 21 Mar 2005 15:30:39 -0800 (PST), Forest Simmons wrote:
Ted, it looks like most list members prefer ordinal ballots with approval
cutoffs to graded ballots. Perhaps those of us who like graded ballots are
not vocal enough.
Hmm, did I miss something? Or is it just a majority of those
At the risk of both complicating the discussion and (again) showing some
ignorance, I think the analogies are not quite precise and possibly not as
intuitive as it may seem.
Everybody understands the concept of grades, but in the classroom situation
all alternatives are in the same category and
On Mon, 21 Mar 2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
At the risk of both complicating the discussion and (again) showing some
ignorance, I think the analogies are not quite precise and possibly not as
intuitive as it may seem.
Everybody understands the concept of grades, but in the classroom situation
all
On Sat, 19 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
...
However, one could make a minor modification which would only seldom be
used: Determine P, and as long as all of P is beaten by a candidate
outside P, add the most approved such candidate to P. I will try to
prove its monotonicity...
That would be nice
On Sun, 20 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think that
an ideal election
method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal information, and the
cardinal information should be simple approval (yes/no for each
candidate).
I would even
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Russ wrote:
Your method is interesting, and it may have good properties. However, I
don't like the idea of dropping defeats. I think dropping candidates
based on approval scores is much easier to explain to the public and is
perfectly legitimate. But at this point that's just my opinion.
James
Hello,
I've done some work investigating the particular circumstances under
which CDTT methods (i.e., methods which elect the CDTT set member
who comes first in a ranking generated by a method satisfying LNHarm,
such as FPP, MMPO, or Random Ballot) fail LNHarm when there are four
candidates.
Hello,
I wanted an opportunity to mention this, and Chris brings it up:
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
46 abc
44 bca (sincere is bac)
05 cab
05 cba
I agree that in a public political election with
reasonably well-informed voters and truncation
allowed, this is an
Markus--
You said:
Well, in that paper (Jonathan Levin, Barry Nalebuff, An
Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 3--26, Winter 1995) the
Simpson-Kramer method is described as follows:
For our purposes, we assume that voters rank all the
Chris--
I'd said:
Remember that it's been shown that every nonrandom
method gives some kind of incentive for strategic
voting.
You reply:
CB: Yes, but not in the zero-info. case. I don't think
that DD(WV)'s 0-info. incentives combined with its
vulnerability to Burying and defection is the best
Folks,
You may recall that I posted a message a couple of weeks ago regarding
the public acceptability of election methods. I would like to return to
that topic.
As I wrote then, I don't believe that complicated methods will ever be
considered acceptable for major public elections, at least
Chris--
You wrote:
I've cast not vulnerable to Burying into a formal
criterion/property:
Burial Resistance: If candidate x wins, and
afterwards some ballots that rank any y above x and
any z are changed so that z's ranking relative to x is
raised while keeping y ranked above both; then if
there
Russ,
Ok, let me consider CDTT methods in this context.
--- Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What is too complicated? Nobody knows the exact answer to that question,
of course, but let me tell you what I think.
I think you can forget about any method that cannot be explained in two
Hello,
VFA is a simple method where the voter votes for one candidate
and against one candidate. The candidate with the most for votes
wins, unless that candidate has more than half of the against
votes, in which case the candidate with the second-most for
votes wins.
At least in the
Kevin,
First, did I really write publicly acceptability in the title? I
always seem to manage to goof up something.
Kevin Venzke stepjak-at-yahoo.fr |EMlist| wrote:
Russ,
Ok, let me consider CDTT methods in this context.
--- Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What is too complicated? Nobody
Russ,
--- Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Kevin,
First, did I really write publicly acceptability in the title?
Yes. I just copied your mistake.
Suppose there are no majority-strength cycles. Those are supposed to be
rare, right? So say there are none.
Then CDTT,FPP can be
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