Dear Mike,
you wrote (20 March 2005):
In the _Journal of Economic Perspective_, for Winter
'85, Simson-Kramer is defined as electing the candidate
whose greatest votes for him in a pairwise comparison
is greater than any other candidate's greatest votes
for him in a pairwise comparison.
As far as I can tell from your website, with some
beating about the bush, yes. If pressed as to which
you think is the best plain ranked-ballot method for
public political elections, I gather you reccomend
using Winning Votes with either Beat Path, Ranked
Pairs or River.
Yeah, so far
James G-A replying to Russ
My first comment is that this proposal is significantly more complicated
than my (or Kevin's) Ranked Approval Voting (RAV) proposal, which
simply drops the least approved candidate until a CW is found.
Yes, I suppose the tally is harder to explain, although
Russ Paielli wrote:
What is too complicated? Nobody knows the exact answer to that question,
of course, but let me tell you what I think.
I think you can forget about any method that cannot be explained in two
or three sentences understandable by persons of average intelligence.
Maybe that can
Dear James!
I tried your example with Random Ballot from Forest's P:
3 candidates: Kerry, Dean, and Bush. 100 voters.
Sincere preferences
19: KDB
5: KDB
4: KBD
18: DKB
5: DKB
1: DBK
25: BKD
23: BDK
Kerry is a Condorcet winner.
Altered preferences
19: KDB
5: KDB
On 21 Mar 2005 at 18:46 PST, Russ Paielli wrote:
My first comment is that this proposal is significantly more complicated
than my (or Kevin's) Ranked Approval Voting (RAV) proposal, which
simply drops the least approved candidate until a CW is found.
Russ, could you please clarify this?
I
Jobst, could you please clarify below?
On Mon, 21 Mar 2005 16:56:06 -0800 (PST), Forest Simmons wrote:
On Sat, 19 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
By the way, here's a simple procedural version of the method, to be
used in meetings:
First, options may be suggested, and for every option
Here is the text for the Washington State IRV initiative that failed
to get onto last November's ballot.
Note that the text is somewhat long and complicated, since it has to
include IRV implementation details. I suspect that is why
they didn't get enough signatures -- voters here tend to
Hello Forest!
Yesterday I wondered whether under Approval Voting there
would always be some equilibrium of the following kind:
All voters specify sincere approvals in the sense that when they prefer X to
Y
they do not approve of Y without approving of X; and no group of voters can
improve
On Sun, 20 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think that
an ideal election
method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal information, and the
cardinal information should be simple approval (yes/no for each
candidate).
I would even
On Tue, 22 Mar 2005, Monkey Puzzle wrote:
Jobst, could you please clarify below?
On Mon, 21 Mar 2005 16:56:06 -0800 (PST), Forest Simmons wrote:
On Sat, 19 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
By the way, here's a simple procedural version of the method, to be
used in meetings:
First, options may
Jobst wrote:
Yesterday I wondered whether under Approval Voting there
would always be some equilibrium of the following kind:
All voters specify sincere approvals in the sense that when
they prefer X to Y they do not approve of Y without approving of
X; and no group of voters can improve
On Tue, 22 Mar 2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
James G-A replying to Forest, on the subject of cardinal-weighted pairwise
(CWP)...
I've delayed bringing this up because I didn't want to dampen your
spirits; I think that Cardinal Pairwise suffers from a bunching up near
the extremes problem
Jobst--
You wrote:
Yesterday I wondered whether under Approval Voting there
would always be some equilibrium of the following kind:
All voters specify sincere approvals in the sense that when they prefer X
to Y
they do not approve of Y without approving of X; and no group of voters can
improve
First I want to emphasize that I adoped Richard's shorter definition
believing that it would give the same answer as my definition, at least with
all proposable methods, or maybe with all methods. So, when there's a case
where the 2 definitions give different answers, it's obvious that my own
Eric Gorr eric-at-ericgorr.net |EMlist| wrote:
Russ Paielli wrote:
What is too complicated? Nobody knows the exact answer to that
question, of course, but let me tell you what I think.
I think you can forget about any method that cannot be explained in
two or three sentences understandable by
Here's Levin's Nalebuff's definition of Simpson-Kramer, as quoted by
Markus:
in that paper (Jonathan Levin, Barry Nalebuff, An
Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 3--26, Winter 1995) the
Simpson-Kramer method is described as follows:
For
Chris--
Forgive me if I didn't know that DD meant defeat-dropper due to the fact
that you'd used the term defeat-dropper.
And forgive me if I missed your precise and complete defintiion of your
Defeat-Dropper method.
Would you precisely and completely define your Defeat-Dropper method now?
You
Chris--
Forgive me if I didn't know that DD meant defeat-dropper due to the fact
that you'd used the term defeat-dropper.
And forgive me if I missed your precise and complete defintiion of your
Defeat-Dropper method.
Would you precisely and completely define your Defeat-Dropper method now?
You
Dear Forest!
You answered to me:
The point is that when all ways to fill in the ballot are admissible
strategies, there is never as group strategy equilibrium unless a
sincere CW exists. My question here was: Is there such an equilibrium
with Approval Voting when only ballots with sincere
Hello James,
Some further comments on the two tracks (= two scenarios on what mutiny
may mean in elections). Sorry that the mail is long (maybe too long and
difficult to read for those who have not followed the discussion).
Best Regards,
Juho
On Mar 19, 2005, at 04:38, James Green-Armytage
Hello All,
In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best
Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury
of sincere votes. I would appreciate your comments on this. Possible
answers could be e.g.
- one method that is best for all or most single winner
Dear election-methods fans,
Here is one possible progression for single winner elections (to decide
on representatives):
1. plurality and runoffs
2. IRV
3. CWO-IRV
4. ranked pairs(wv), with CWO
5. cardinal pairwise (with CWO?)
(Note: When I say IRV in general, this includes
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