At 05:28 PM 10/4/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
I've seen a lot of different definitions of the "majority criterion",
but for purposes of this email, I'll describe a minimal version:
"If a strict majority of the voters rank a particular alternative as
their unique first choice, then the voting method
At 04:26 PM 10/4/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
we did a range voting poll in 2004 - discussed
in http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/PsEl04.html
and found that MOST votes were non-strategic.
In a *poll*, Mr. Smith. People may very well vote differently if, as
you have been fond of pointing out, they
At 12:31 AM 10/4/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Normalization only works if there's not a third candidate forcing the
distortion (e.g. candidate "C"):
That is correct. Range Voting requires the same kind of strategic
consideration as Approval Voting, a vote is diluted if cast at less than 100%
9
At 11:34 PM 10/3/2005, Paul Kislanko wrote:
If you think B "should" win, the point is made that Range voting won't pass.
Anybody who loses 90-10 in plurality but wins in another system is just an
argument against the other system.
This argument has been pretty well demolished by Mr. Smith, I th
At 07:53 AM 9/29/2005, Stephen Turner wrote:
This is an interesting worldwide survey carried out by
the BBC and Gallup about:
(i) is your country governed by the will of the
people?
(ii) are your elections free and fair?
About 65% of people answer "No" to the first.
Interesting.
What is the "
At 08:08 PM 9/27/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
In the recent message quted below there are two questions.
1. What should we call the Approval method that allows an extra
mark to identfy the favorite candidate, thus satisfying the Approval
voter's urge to give more moal support to Favorite than
Perhaps there is a name for what I'm going to describe here, and
someone will kindly inform me.
I have suggested in the past that Approval elections include an extra
position for each candidate to mark "Preferred," even if this mark is
not used to determine the winner, because it would answer
At 10:49 PM 9/20/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Even if I am my favorite candidate (and wish to be elected), there
is no guarantee
that sending myself to the completion convention is my best move. My
presence in
this convention could alter the winner undesirably from my perspective.
Of course, and
At 04:56 PM 9/13/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
>Kevin may have talked me out of Condorcet entirely (unless truncation
>is better handled, and unless there is a decent consideration of
>approval cutoff.)
Truncated candidates are
At 03:40 AM 9/12/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Approval has the singular advantage of requiring no ballot changes,
> only a tweak of the election rules: simply stop discarding
overvoted ballots.
Not much advantage, for even this requires reprogramming. Better to
go for more good with the progr
At 06:44 PM 9/11/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I thought about this a bit. Consider this election:
49 A
24 B>E
27 C>D>B>E
C has 3 wins, and is the only Copeland winner.
Let's look at this. C is not just the Copeland winner, C is the
Condorcet winner, because in all the pairwise elections, A has
At 01:52 AM 9/12/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
As Abd alluded to in at least one email, it's possible to have a revised
version of Copeland that works differently. For example, it could be
possible to not credit a candidate with a victory if they don't receive
majority support (called "Copeland Majo
At 10:52 AM 9/9/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I couldn't support Copeland unless you use a tiebreaker that satisfies
minimal defense. Otherwise:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
A could be elected, for instance with a plurality tiebreaker.
It is one thing to use an example like this for discussion purposes
on t
At 10:58 AM 9/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving
full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the
best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination.
It is interesting that this claim is made, not only by Mr. Laa
e other candidates suitable for
vote reassignment. In which case you belong to a *very* minor party,
so to speak).
I have one specific quibble below about something Abd said.
On 8/30/05, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote:
For full PR, Ass
At 10:44 PM 8/30/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
**Second, I am concerned about "Favorite Betrayal" and "2-party domination."
Earlier on EM I basically constructed a mathematical proof that all
Condorcet methods lead to 2-party domination. (It may be seen at
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/CondStratPf
At 05:56 PM 8/30/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> --They understand the system fine. Range voting is very easy to
understand, easier than
> DMC in fact. What they do not understand, is utility values!
I guess that's because you cannot easily understand what doesn't exist.
Utility values exist;
At 03:54 PM 8/30/2005, Adam Tarr wrote:
Just a random thought I had the other day for a PR system that would
work using only single-winner districts.
The scheme, as described, achieves proportionality by awarding
victory to some candidates who had only weak support in the districts
from which
At 02:38 PM 8/30/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
It's fixed now, and the IP is blocked.
Wikis which enjoy a large number of technically sophisticated users
who can monitor and fix such problems (and perhaps pursue the
spammers) can afford, perhaps, to leave access completely open. Open
access *may
At 01:37 PM 8/30/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
PS. Although approval voting does not involve favorite betrayal, there is some
reason to suspect it will lead to 2-party domination. See
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/NurseryEffect.html
and note that range voting seems a lot less likely than AV to
At 11:21 AM 8/30/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
>Interesting experience, quite opposite to mine. May I ask you how
they do it without having
>to know the difference between 64 and 65 points as you suggested above?
Warren is correct. People know how to use rating systems. Or at least
they think the
At 08:49 PM 8/29/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
>Do you suggest the election system should rather declare one of the
candidates which are not approved by anyone the winner than to demand a
new election because of lack of approved candidates. (I certainly don't
agree to that.)
--yes I do. The job of
Well, it has happened.
The electorama wiki home page has been replaced by a list of spam links.
Happened to me within about a week when I started the wiki for
BeyondPolitics.org. To avoid it, I went to a replacement wiki
(TikiWiki) that had user security: to write, users must log in and to
ge
At 01:04 PM 8/22/2005, Adam Tarr wrote:
I want to clear up a couple things, and further comment on
"algorithmic" or "automated" disctricting solutions.
I don't usually post "I agree" posts, I consider them redundant at best.
But I'm making an exception here. Mr. Tarr has done, I think, a brill
At 05:52 PM 8/21/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
I believe the brute force approach of just solving the NP-hard
redistricting problem
perfectly, is not feasible. There are probably ten-thousands of census blocks
and exponential runtimes with that much input just do not happen, even with
all the compu
At 03:00 PM 8/19/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No. There are no second votes by the electoral college, nor
does it meet as a national body.
Oops! Well, I'm only about 200 years out of date How embarassing!
I've been affected by the original vision of the Electoral College, which
was a gr
At 10:26 AM 8/19/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
Second, it is *false* that you can do IRV on totalizing machines
such as New York's lever mechanical-counter machines (which involve
a lot of binary levers on the front, and there are counters you can read on
the back). There could indeed be a way for a
At 02:31 AM 8/19/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
US presidential elections are a strange case. I have never really
understood why one elects several people (slate) although the intention is
to give all votes of a state to one candidate. It would be so easy to
elect proportionally n candidates from one
At 09:05 PM 8/18/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
As was recently pointed out, it is correct that with range ballots
run on ordinary plurality voting machines, slots (e.g. "levers" on
NY-style machines) get "chewed up" 10 times faster than
with plain plurality voting. Assuming 10 levels.
With L levels,
At 03:01 PM 8/7/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Abd ulRahman Lomax writes:
> In my opinion, however, Robert's Rules is only of
> peripheral interest on this list.
The discussion during the past week has strengthened my
view of the relevance of Robert's Rules for this list. To anyone
who has becom
At 10:54 AM 8/7/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
Can anybody tell me whther any interesting voting methods are mentioned in
the Bible?
Well, I can't think of anything, someone else may. But I can say that there
is a hint in the Qur'an.
I don't have the text in front of me at the moment, and I don't
There is a technique of debate which consists of pointing out apparent
inconsistencies or contradictions in what another writes, and then
inferring from these some major flaw in the other's argument. Yet often
such apparent inconsistencies are just that: apparent and not real.
One who wants to
At 06:55 PM 8/4/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Some questions you need to answer. (1) assuming that Lomax is
more familiar with RONR than Suter, does that disqualify Suter
from commenting on RONR? That's what you seem to imply.
I didn't see any such implication.
Sometimes, amazingly often, rea
At 01:01 PM 8/4/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I will comment one more time in response to Mr. Lomax's
defense of Robert's Rules. At the end of his remarks posted
yesterday, he states (quoting me):
>> The fact that none of them has yet become as widely
>>accepted doesn't mean they aren't better
At 11:44 AM 8/2/2005, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I have to challenge Dave's recommendation of Rober'ts Rules
of Order. While I don't doubt that it is the result of a lot of thought
and contains a lot of worthwhile advice about how to conduct
meetings, it also has major weaknesses that its advocates
Warning, this post is long -- big surprise! :-) -- but it does actually
stay on the topic of election methods, how to implement election methods,
how to get from here to there, and evidence regarding these ideas.
At 03:51 PM 7/28/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
From his remarks below I think that
At 10:13 PM 7/28/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
Use an unbiased random sample of the voters at the front end of the
election as a "voter jury" style panel for the purpose of getting true
polls of the right type, etc. This official voter panel (where every
voter has an equal chance of being chos
At 10:16 PM 7/27/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ok, we are debating the meaning of words, and I am getting a headache:
my condolences may your explanations not be a burden to you.
In the IRV example IRV clearly ignores the 27 votes for Nader for they are
masked by the 27 for Buchanan.
In the
At 06:44 PM 7/27/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> It's a question of election philosophy.
I don't agree with your perception. I don't believe an election method can
find the candidate who is "most widely approved" unless we really do
assume that
voters are sincere, and use the same definition of "
At 01:40 PM 7/20/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
And we reach the key point! Paper ballot is the only true one
counted. The terminal is merely an assistant.
The paper ballot is the only one that *counts* in the long run, since it
was verified by the voter, but the machine counts might be tra
At 07:25 AM 7/20/2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Hi folks,
Here's a rough idea for a paper rank/approval cutoff ballot.
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/rank-cutoff-ballot.htm
Any comments?
Eight candidates, sixteen positions, one-of-sixteen per candidate.
Tran
At 12:34 AM 7/20/2005, Anguo wrote:
As you know, I've recently re-opened my own
Approval/Condorcet forum.
Actually, I don't know. Where is it?
Yet I feel better election
methods, however important I feel they are, are not the
way that would have the quickest and best positive effect
on the
At 05:28 AM 6/29/2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Yes, this is interesting. However, I suggest that ER-Bucklin(whole) should
perhaps be tallied in a different way. In the second example, you assume
for tally purposes that D is in 2nd place on the A=B>D ballots. However, I
suggest that we should
I'm responding to this because Mr. Ossipoff said something that is not
commonly said. He acknowledged that "Direct Democracy, with delegable
proxy, is what we should have." This, of course, is what I'm saying.
He has, however, completely misunderstood my comments about election
methods. He som
At 03:55 AM 6/24/2005, Russ Paielli wrote:
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Abdul says:
I intend to set a filter for Mr. Ossipoff, I'd rather not expose myself
routinely to the temptation to comment again on his writing
I comment:
That's good news. An idiot considerate enough
When this mail came back at me, I noticed an error.
At 02:42 PM 6/23/2005, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
[...]
I consider that it has been a mistake for me to discuss persons on this
list (and I did not in this thread, in spite of an assertion that I was).
[...]
This was incorrect. I did discuss
At 12:47 PM 6/23/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
On 22 Jun 2005 at 16:48 UTC-0700, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> I'd recommend that anyone who wants to personally keep a copy of a
> page put up on a wiki keep a copy themselves, offline.
Very wise recommendations, but one might assum
At 03:46 AM 6/23/2005, Alex Small wrote:
Anyway, those are my thoughts. I wonder if concepts of physics and phase
transitions might yield insight on surprising properties of seemingly
neutral redistricting algorithms.
I don't think the results of Mr. Small's preliminary analysis are at all
At 05:37 PM 6/22/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
A wiki is for discussion and consensus, not for Pronouncements from On
High Written For All Eternity Upon Stone.
However, there is nothing that says that a wiki page can't refer to another
page located somewhere else which is secure from beiing
It's a known thing that answers can depend on questions. :-)
This is why in deliberative bodies, the form of what is going to be voted
upon is subject to discussion and amendment prior to actually being put to
the question.
So, first of all, to come up with a truly useful poll, the form of th
Warning: this post is not about election methods but about events
transpiring on this list, and specifically about the behavior of Mr.
Ossipoff. It does contain some discussion of the electorama wiki and wikis
in general. Almost nothing about election methods.
It's likely that this is that las
At 11:27 PM 6/16/2005, Russ Paielli wrote:
Forcing the parties to pay for their own primaries is perfectly
reasonable, but I think it would have the opposite effect of what you
claim (under plurality at least). The big two could afford it, but the
smaller parties might not be able to afford the
At 04:40 AM 6/17/2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
As I mentioned earlier, though, the point of the poll in my mind
wasn't
to declare a winner, but rather to gain individually interesting bits of
information from every voter's rating of every method. Hence, tally
methods for the poll it
About the sequence of options on the wiki poll:
One of the features of a wiki (though some consider it a bug) is that any
reader who seriously doesn't like some aspect of a page (in this case, of a
poll) can simply change it.
Yes, it's nice if a major change involves some discussion first, th
At 09:15 PM 6/16/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
THANK YOU - my first experience with this type of editing.
EASY to use.
Wiki, from Wiki-Wiki: "quick" or "informal" in Hawaiian
I assume politeness counts BIG - anyone can take a page out and edit it as
described below. BIG DEAL is to:
Do not
At 06:38 PM 6/16/2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
We need your participation in the method evaluation poll on
electowiki!
Just thought I'd add my comment here that this kind of activity is what I
think could really produce some useful results. Is there any kind of
consensus in this
At 02:10 PM 6/16/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
You all are missing the point of my original question.
Abd advocates allowing overvotes to instantly enable approval voting.
But sneaking approval in this way
I'm certainly not recommending "sneaking." Rather, as part of the reform
process, fi
At 11:12 AM 6/16/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Does this mean you feel a system is "unfair" unless *every* voter can
select a representative? That sounds difficult to implement.
Yes, it *seems* that way. But, in fact, this is standard practice in
corporate governance. Every shareholder can either
At 05:53 PM 6/15/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
Approval voting is a reasonable first step. But what do you do about
current top-two runoffs, or primaries in general?
In the U.S. top-two runoffs are unusual, if I am correct, most elections
award victory to the plurality winner. We've been co
At 08:25 AM 6/16/2005, Andrew Myers wrote:
> Further, in a few days, so far, of searching, there seems to be a distinct
> lack of cogent arguments for the rule in the first place. As near as I can
> tell, the reason for it is a variant on "It seemed like the thing to do at
> the time." The rule i
I find this fascinating.
At 12:45 AM 6/9/2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I was recently asked to clarify the statement on my web site that
approval voting fails independence of clones.
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/vm/define.htm#clones
This was my reply. Debate is
At 12:50 AM 6/9/2005, Russ Paielli wrote:
Abd ulRahman Lomax abd-at-lomaxdesign.com |EMlist| wrote:
So promoting Approval voting might be as simple as pointing out the
injustice of [discarding overvoted ballots]. I can't see any reason for
*preventing* a person from voting for more than one ca
At 12:39 AM 6/7/2005, Russ Paielli wrote:
On the other hand, around election time I still seem to hear a lot of
moaning by Libertarians and Greens about being ignored by the media and
being shut out of the debates -- as if the problem would go away if the
media started giving them equal coverag
At 11:01 PM 5/30/2005, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a écrit :
>
> > [...] You may
> > increase meeting efficiency by excluding minority factions, but at
the cost
> > of potentially excluding them in deliberations toward consensus.
This is not necessar
At 12:36 AM 5/29/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Seems we have TWO ideas, which I am convinced, need to be kept separate:
A delegable proxy chain, which has been the center of this
discussion, needs to have a top proxy in each chain, which becomes a
member of the body being created, and is resp
At 06:25 AM 5/27/2005, James Gilmour wrote:
Those
steeped in social choice theory believe that the purpose of a voting
system should be to maximise representation of
consensus among the electors. But there is a much older view: that the
purpose of a voting system should be to maximise
represe
At 06:45 PM 5/9/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
Some anonymous person from IP location 71.98.149.61 modified the
Definite Majority Choice page
(http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice) a couple of
days ago, changing
The least-approved candidate in the definite majority set
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