MDDA fails "add top". That is, if you add some identical honest votes ranking
A top,
that can harm A (e.g. by creating a Condorcet winner [who is not A]
who then wins, whereas previously there was a Condorcet cycle and A was the
winner
on approval counts).
Now this may not technically count as
Incidentally, Deluxe MDDA is probably even worse than un-deluxe ranked-ballot
methods
with respect to add-top failure, no-show paradoxes, and the like, because you
can
use the approval counts quite easily to set up bad scenarios where the new
voter creates (unfortunately for him) a Condorcet winn
MDDA *if* all votes are full rank orderings, is just the "Smith set"
and often yields a tied election. In fact often the Smith set is the entire
set of candidates. (In most of Australia full rank orderings - i.e. none
omitted -
are demanded by law.)
This seems a severe problem with MDDA and pr
>> wds:
>> Robla failed to mention that range voting *does* obey a weakened form of
>>the majority-winner criterion (call it "WMW"). Specifically:
>>"If a strict majority of the voters regard X as their unique favorite,
>> then
>> they, acting alone without regard to what the other voters d
>robla:
Incidentally, Range voting wouldn't have prevented slavery. Black
suffrage was a pretty important prerequisite which didn't exist back
then. Also, I don't think that a bunch of people who were willing to
secede from the union and fight a war on their own soil would express a
mild preferen
>robla:
I've seen a lot of different definitions of the "majority criterion",
but for purposes of this email, I'll describe a minimal version:
"If a strict majority of the voters rank a particular alternative as
their unique first choice, then the voting method must select that
alternative as a uni
>Yves in reply to wds's criticism of Robla's "range killing" example:
1- Sincerity doesn't exist in politic. As the vote itself, everything is
always strategic. The concept of democracy is to give the same chances to
all individuals to influence a collective decision.
--wds response:
first of al
An analysis of the constitutional question is already available within the CRV
web site
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/ConstVt.html
Also, re Robla's ludicrous "range killing example" illustrating range's
"glaring defect", let me say this. You are perfectly free in the range
system to cas
>robla statement #1:
Range is a political stillborn. This example kills it:
100 voters, two candidates, scale of 0-10:
90 voters: A=7, B=6
10 voters: A=0, B=10
A:630B:640
B wins, even though 90% of voters prefer A to B.
There is no possible way Range will ever get serious suppor
sorry, last email the long email address was truncated by
some piece of annoy-software. It was:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
that again is
votingsystemguidelines AT eac DOT gov
wds
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
To Electorama
(This is a CC of a "special notice" email sent to RangeVoting.)
I have decided to use rare "special notice" emails (which get
delivered even to those on RV who do not normally get emails) for
the purpose of very important ACTION ANNOUNCEMENTS.
That is, situations when the time has
is ICA the same thing as Smith//Approval? And if not, what is the matter with
ICA?
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
To recount some recent history. I at first had this idea that all
Condorcet methods would lead to 2-party domination.
I in fact produced a "proof" of that (well, a proof of a related statement,
anyhow)
and put it on the CRV web site. Then one of the attacks on my proof (by Adam
Tarr) was that
m
>On 9/2/05, Andrew Myers <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I thought the folks on this list would find it interesting to see
> some actual empirical data on how often cycles happen. I have data on
> 99 CIVS elections that have been run in which more than 10 voters
> participated (max was 1749) and in wh
>robla: Warren, we don't agree. I said there is NO systematic, fair way of
measuring utility. I didn't say it's hard, I said it's impossible.
Ergo, for purposes of studying electoral systems, it might as well not
exist.
Using Bayesian regret on numeric utilities is begging the question. By
stat
>robla: The problem with placing paramount importance on "utility" in voting
methods is not that it doesn't exist, it's that there's no systematic,
fair way of measuring utility.
--WDS: EXACTLY GOOD!!!
However, Heitzig has repeatedly and clearly stated that it "does not exist."
I have repeat
n is that the rest of you simply accept this as settled and
obviously true.
It then will be possible to proceed from there to have a genuine debate about
voting methods.
I am not going to debate voting methods with people who refuse to accept
probability theory,
believe that the sun revolves aro
seems to depend on having an exact tie. Therefore, this
counterexample is not as impressive as I thought.
wds
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
The original general-purpose 19-voter FBC example from the Center for Range
Voting web page
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/IncentToExagg.html:
8:B>C>A
6:C>A>B
5:A>B>C
B wins under Condorcet Voting [Ranked Pairs variant, winning votes,
equality-ranking permitted] according to Eric Gorr's calculat
do you have a counterexample showing favorite betrayal for
Condorcet (winning vote, equality-rankings permitted, partial orders not
permitted)
?
(And if you do not, isn't that a good reason NOT to prefer DMC?)
wds
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for l
is actually quite pleasant. Try the demo at
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/quickdemo/PresRadio.html
(and let me know if there are any browser problems. I have heard a rumor
there is a bug in early versions of netscape which may cause this
demo to be unattractive...)
wds
Election-methods
>> Re your "Weinstein" idea that you would vote for candidates above the median
>> with
> approval voting, since you do not believe in utility, I ask you to consider
> A. Josef Stalin
> B. Adolf Hitler
> C. Genghis Khan
> D. Jacques Chirac
> where (say) ADepends on the priors. When th
To Suter:
I agree we cannot *really* tell if Condorcet would lead to 2-party domination
until we try
it in several coutnries for 100 years. But short of that we have to try to
reason,
and I consider the case in
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/IncentToExagg.html
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/
It is nice to hear from F. Simmons that DMC is the greatest and resolves
all those nasty Condorcet contentious issues, while unifying
all the Condorcet methods. And also, I agree DMC is a simpler method than all
or almost all of the methods it unifies.
I am glad I recently joined EM just in time t
Actually now I think about it, Benham was talking more about
noiseproof[strat2-revote] rather than cloneproof[strat2-revote]
but the same remakrs should hold, basically.
wds
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
cloneproof[strat2-revote]
A voting method hereby is "cloneproof[strat2-revote]" if W'=W when:
1. We hold an election with strategic voters, electing winner W.
2. we add clones (perhaps multiple clones) of some subset of the candidates.
3. The voters re-vote in the new election, again acting strate
I do not agree these two things are equivalent, although they are related.
If a method exhibits "favorite betrayal" but only rarely then third
parties might be able to flourish. For example Coombs' IRV-like
method exhibits favorite betrayal. Would it lead to 2-party domination?
Really 2-part
Incidentlally, since you claim because you cannot explain the precise meaning
of a range vote
of 64 versus 65, therefore range voting is somehow horribel and inexplicable...
and you like DMC... I ask "explain to me the precise meaning of
`I approve of Bush.'"
Pretty difficult, isn't it? And al
>> --Also, now that I understand DMC has two kinds of monotonicity property, I
> must report my admiration.
>Heitzig: Why? Many Approval/Condorcet-hybrids are monotonic in both senses.
--fine. However, I had not seen any such methods previously,
I am ignorant. You also mentioned your "favor
I regard A=B as a declaration of knowledge on the part of the voter.
he is saying "I understand A and B and I think they have the same utility."
I regard A?B as a declaration of ignorance from the voter. he is saying
"I do not know whether A>B or B>A, I really am clueless on this matter."
In som
>Do you suggest the election system should rather declare one of the
candidates which are not approved by anyone the winner than to demand a
new election because of lack of approved candidates. (I certainly don't
agree to that.)
--yes I do. The job of a single-winner election system is to produc
>>6. Robustness against "noise" candidates.. cloneproof...
> --also true of range.
Could you say more precisely what you mean here?
--Range voting is immune to clones in the sense that any number of cloned
candidates, all of whom get the same rangevote scores, can be added to the
scene,
and the
>>2. Immunity from second place complaints. Unlike in MinMax and
>>Beatpath, the DMC winner always defeats the candidate which would win
>> if the winner were not present.
> --nice. Also true of range.
I'm sorry you're wrong here: If ballots are
voters A points B points
60 60
I suspect DMC will lead to 2-party domination.
See
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/IncentToExagg.html
and consider this same example under DMC.
If the top-1, top-2, none, or all-3 of
the candidates are approved by all (I do not care which,
so long as you are consistent about it)
then B wins.
T
You continued:
> In the Hitler/Stalin/Harding example, the voter is satisfied with
> nobody. It is clearly stupid for the voter to say that honestly.
>No, it's not. First of all, whereever such an example as the above is
possible, there are much more serious problems than the choice between
thos
Here is another question - will DMC lead to 2-party domination, or
not? To really answer this, it would help to understand optimal
voting strategy in DMC, which is probably beyond reach.
However, you may be able to just think about 3-candidate DMC elections
and thereby answer the question with a
OK, Now that I finally understand the DMC voting system (which is quite
interesting),
I have a few comments and questions...
>(15+3 reasons to love DMC from J.Heitzig & F.Simmons)
> 1. Allows to distinguish important from minor preferences.
--range does too, only better.
> 2. Immunity from se
so each vote consists of BOTH a rank-ordering, AND a
set of "approved" candidates (is there any requirement that
these two be compatible)? Is the rank-ordering permitted
to include equalities or be a partial order?
wds
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list inf
The "graph partitioning" problem is NP-complete:
problem ND14 in Garey & Johnson: Comnputers and Intractibility, a guide
to the theory of NP completeness, freeman 1978.
Thus even if the country is to be divided into only 2 districts we have
NP-hardness.
It is conceivable this could be escaped b
I believe the brute force approach of just solving the NP-hard redistricting
problem
perfectly, is not feasible. There are probably ten-thousands of census blocks
and exponential runtimes with that much input just do not happen, even with
all the computer power on the planet on your side.
Occa
range with L levels chew up L slots? - other ideas by Lomax & me
It is actually possible to do range with L levels on plurality voting machines
with
only chewing up log[base2](L) slots per candidate, not L.
This is a huge improvement: L=512 becomes 9.
Unfortunately, it requires the voters to t
range and borda really alike? not.
>Scott Ritchie:
>Range voting is just a Borda count with a bunch of throwaway candidates
--WDS REPLY:
Range voting and Borda indeed have a lot of similarities,
but they also have some extremely crucial differences. In fact I would
say that range voting keeps a
>Scott Ritchie:
>Indicating a ranked ballot on a machine not designed for it is no more
>difficult than indicating a ranged ballot. This follows naturally from
>the fact that you can do a one-way transformation on a ranged ballot to
>a ranked ballot.
>There's a great picture of an old New York le
As was recently pointed out, it is correct that with range ballots
run on ordinary plurality voting machines, slots (e.g. "levers" on
NY-style machines) get "chewed up" 10 times faster than
with plain plurality voting. Assuming 10 levels.
With L levels, L times faster.
Consequently if enough el
Dave K:
> Range voting is very robustly the best among about 30 systems tried including
> a couple condorcet systems according to my giant
> comparative Bayesian regret study in 2000. OK, maybe you can attack that.
> Maybe you can say I did not put in your favorite system or favorite
> voting str
> >Rob Lanphier re the Center for Range Voting:
>If you had the kind of backing that CVD has, I might believe you.
However, in terms of popular voting reforms, only CVD can make the claim
that they've got the political organization and the momentum to follow
through right now. CAV/AAV is making
>robla: Condorcet has zero chance in 2005. It has a small chance in 2010, and
better than even odds in 2050. That's assuming we ignore your advice
and actually continue our work.
--what is your strategic plan? One can make statistical estimates of "chances"
based on polls and one can estimate c
But if you do consider 2-party system to be democracy, then
if you like 2-party domnation state, why bother to consider any
voting system other than plurality at all?
I mean, plurality (1) maximally leads to the situation (2 parties)
you like, and (2) if there are only 2 candidates, then plurality
In fact let me elaborate. Although my critics claim it
is not clear I have really shown Condorcet methods must lead
to 2-party domination (I think it is clear, except I admit
that the winning-votes + equalities-permitted enhancements of condorcet
seem to permit Condorcet to perhaps escape from su
I disagree with the claim they are. Democracy is about
choice by the voters. 2 choices is not enough choice.
Furthermore in the contemporary USA, 98% of the time
incumbents are re-elected if try. So really it is a 1-choice
system. Congressmen are more likely to
die in office than to lose an el
In some sense the range versus Condorcet debate is a red herring
since Condorcet methods have, I think, no chance of actual adoption
by governments. And range does have a chance. So for practical purposes,
forget Condorcet. Why do I say that?
Well, in our real-world-voter study of range & appro
It was recently claimed on EM that condorcet had "simpler rules" than
range. I dispute that. I challenge people to write computer
programs to perform condorcet and range elections. I have so
far never encountered anybody who produced a shorter program for condorcet.
Not even close.
For any con
OK, I can see I'm hitting a wall of opposition here. This whole issue is
a red herring (i.e. distraction from my main point) so let us not be
too distracted by it. The central issue which we had started from is the
question of which is better - range voting or Condorcet methods?
So instead of
On the probability that insincerely ranking the two frontrunners max and min, is
optimal voter-strategy in an IRV (Instant Runoff Votng) election.
--Warren D. Smith Aug 2005--
MATHEMATICAL MODEL: 3-candidate V-voter IRV elections
with random vo
On the probability that insincerely ranking the two frontrunners max and min, is
optimal voter-strategy in a Condorcet election.
--Warren D. Smith Aug 2005--
MATHEMATICAL MODEL: 3-candidate V-voter Condorcet elections
with random voters (all 3!=6
1. condorcet.org definitions page:
"Name: Condorcet Criterion
Application: Ranked Ballots
Definition:
If an alternative pairwise beats every other alternative, this alternative must
win the election.
Pass: Black, Borda-Elimination, Dodgson, Kemeny-Young, Minmax, Nanson
(original), Pairwise-E
>Adam Tarr: I'll now respond to Warren's earlier message.
>I don't debate that the "more-favored front runner first, less-favored
>front runner last" strategy is useful (often optimal) in Borda, but I
>can't easily imagine a scenario where it is useful in Condorcet.
>WDS: I did not say it was th
>Robla: I think your studies show that instituting a Condorcet method means that
the accompanying education effort should be vigorous. It means warning
people, "hey, if you try any funny stuff, you're likely to get burnt".
But part of what makes democracy is that people learn enough to govern
them
> WDS: ...
> If [the Condorcet winner criterion] means (2a) "if we redid the same
> election but using a DIFFERENT election system, namely majority vote,
> and demanding votes `logically consistent' with the originally-cast
> votes, then A would win"
>Robla: This is what it means. I'm quite confi
possible ranking. Everyone else, give them the lowest
possible ranking. No information about what other voters are doing is
needed.
REPLY BY WARREN SMITH:
I was right and you are wrong. Here is
a counterexample. Let the other voters create a tie for first among A and B,
*or* a tie among B and C
>Robla: As I recall from discussions on this list, there are plenty of
simulations that show that IRV elections tend to resolve to two clusters
away from the political center (i.e. two-party system) thus not bucking
Duverger's Law any better than plurality. The fact that this happens in
the real
> If [the Condorcet winner criterion] means (2a) "if we redid the same
> election but using a DIFFERENT election system, namely majority vote,
> and demanding votes `logically consistent' with the originally-cast
> votes, then A would win"
This is what it means. I'm quite confident that the lite
>Robla: Rob Lanphier wrote:
>> Hi Warren,
>> I'm interested in Range Voting, since it appears to be popular among
>> many electoral reform advocates here.
>>
> I too get the impression that it is generally considered among the
> best voting method possible, BUT for one truly fatal flaw. It
>
>Robla: However, the Condorcet winner criterion is quite easily and
unambiguously applied to Range Voting ballots, since a ranked ballot can
be easily derived from a Range Voting ballot.
--that isn't fair because a range voting ballot cannot be derived from
a ranked ballot. This is a one-way noni
>As someone who has a rather bad habit of calling simple and honest
mistakes "lying", I can sympathize with your reaction. Either way,
though, range voting isn't Condorcet compliant, as Condorcet is defined
by the concept of pairwise victories, which do simplify to the mere
greater than or less th
>Robla:
>Breaking up the definition into two sections as though both are
completely accurate and equal definitions of the Condorcet winner
criterion makes it appear as though the Condorcet winner criterion is
poorly defined. Do you believe that the Condorcet winner criterion is
poorly defined?
-
>> robla:
>> My point was Condorcet only considered <,>,= relations WITHOUT numerical
>> magnitudes,
>> just yes of no, as votes, hence the distinction between my 1st + 2nd
>> defintions of the Condorcet concept, dd not occur in his mind.
>
>That would be /the/ definition of the Condorcet winner.
> Well, according to that definition, Range Voting is a Condorcet
> method, since if you erase all candidates and all numerical votes for
> them in all range votes - except for two candidates A and B - then A
> will beat B in the resulting 2-choice election if and only if he beat
> B in the origina
it (for the moment) is located at
http://math.temple.edu/~wds/crv/RangeVoting.html
please check it out. Any help in constructing and improving this web page
will be appreciated. You can add new content by emailing me files.
You can improve the presentation of old content by grabbing, editing
Can anybody tell me whther any interesting voting methods are mentioned in the
Bible?
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hello. This email is an invitation to join
the "range voting" email group and save the world.
Range voting is an improved voting
method related to "approval voting". It will vastly
improve those governments which adopt it. The improvement is huge
and the cost is near zero. Many defects of the
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