Hello Kevin,
On Sep 9, 2005, at 00:29, Kevin Venzke wrote:
But I'm also not very worried since the real (stronger, meaningful)
reasons for 2-party domination are elsewhere, not in Condorcet or
other
slightly big party favouring rules (e.g. d'Hondt method).
I'm confused.
I'm sorry for givi
Hi,
On Sep 8, 2005, at 22:14, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:58 AM 9/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving
full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the
best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination.
It
Juho,
--- Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Thanks for the reminder. I try to be careful in writing about the FBC.
> Or maybe I should write about any harm done to the favourite small
> party candidate (which could lead to 2-party domination) in a more
> general sense. In range voti
At 10:58 AM 9/8/2005, Juho Laatu wrote:
In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving
full points both to the favourite small party candidate (A) and the
best big party candidate (B) could move us towards 2-party domination.
It is interesting that this claim is made, not only by Mr. Laa
Hello Kevin,
Thanks for the reminder. I try to be careful in writing about the FBC.
Or maybe I should write about any harm done to the favourite small
party candidate (which could lead to 2-party domination) in a more
general sense. In range voting the Approval style strategy of giving
fu
Juho,
--- Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On point 3. I have also an extra comment. If sincere range voting
> preferences are A:100, B:80, C:0 and the voter strategically votes
> A:100, B:100, C:0, isn't that also one type of favourite betrayal that
> weakens the position of the (sma
On Sep 6, 2005, at 04:47, Warren Smith wrote:
So. from the point of view of US third parties,
1. all Condorcet methods plausibly lead
to 2-party domination, though we cannot be sure,
2. all are more complicated
than range voting, and
3. range voting apparently does NOT lead to 2-party dominatio
At 09:47 PM 9/5/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
So. from the point of view of US third parties,
1. all Condorcet methods plausibly lead
to 2-party domination, though we cannot be sure,
2. all are more complicated
than range voting, and
3. range voting apparently does NOT lead to 2-party domination.
T
To recount some recent history. I at first had this idea that all
Condorcet methods would lead to 2-party domination.
I in fact produced a "proof" of that (well, a proof of a related statement,
anyhow)
and put it on the CRV web site. Then one of the attacks on my proof (by Adam
Tarr) was that
m
