On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I think his exploration of
> the constraints on our actions in "Freedom Evolves" is pretty much on
> the money.
So I can't comment on Freedom Evolves, as I haven't read it. But I
have read some of his articles and seen him debate and give
in
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>>> change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
>>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>>> successive capsules thro
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker
>
>
>>> I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
>>> but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
>>> postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
>>> and hence in principl
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker :
>> And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
>> change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
>> within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
>> successive capsules through time, and then we're either
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker
> > I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
> > but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
> > postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
> > and hence in principle implementable by any phys
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>> There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
>> not analyzable in terms of physics.
>>
>
> Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
> present is very odd in the face of either the f
On 28 Aug, 21:30, John Mikes wrote:
> *Is the 'hard problem' and 'outside' factor? Maybe, for the closed inventory
> we have in today's conventional sciences. Our interpretations are temporary,
> as I call it (after Colin H) our "perceived reality" (of today), but
> different from the ancient fo
David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>>> If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
>>> it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
>>> would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
>>> it or refute
On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
> time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
> anythign more for the specious present than a "snapshop" some of
> which is out of date?
Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
character of such snapshots, one m
Dear Bruno,
I am waiting for your explanatory post(s) and anxiously read some several
thousand pages with related topics.
Unfortunately the technical examples and discussing their solutions are not
much help.
I cannot extract the now-and-then interlaced text-explanations, even if I
find them, they
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
> There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
> not analyzable in terms of physics.
Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
present is very odd in the face of either the flux or block view of
time in physics. Int
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on
the
basis of that assumption. If you pref
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > David Nyman wrote:
>> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>> >>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>> >>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the comp
On 1 Sep, 18:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
> How did we get from a hypothetical that "I am virtualised" to something
> being *forced*? This is like saying "I might be virtualised" entails "I
> must be virtualised".
CTM postulates that "my mind is a computation". The standard rider is
"...of my brai
On 1 Sep, 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
> First, as I understand it, MGA shows that computation realizing
> consciousness could be instantiated with almost zero physical
> component. Since a reductio argument only entails that something in the
> inferences or premises is wrong, it is not shown tha
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
>
>
>
>
> > David Nyman wrote:
> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
> >>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
> >>> physics.
>
> >> It m
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>
>> By comp, mainly by Church thesis only, you (in the third person
>> sense)
>> are implemented in the mathematical UD. OK?
>
>
> The mathemaitcal UD doesn't exist.
Do you agree that it exist
On 01 Sep 2009, at 19:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the
>>> computability of
>>> physics.
>>>
>>
>> It may be easy to lose sight,
On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion wrote:
> > If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
> > it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
> > would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
> > it or refute it with precise counter-ar
David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
> on:
>
>
>> OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
>> specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
>> physically and not theref
On 31 Aug, 21:31, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:31, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Aug, 16:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 28 Aug 2009, at 14:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker :
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
>>> physics.
>>>
>>
>> It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
>> physics.
>>
>
> It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
> argument is against CTM
David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
>>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
>>> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
>>> "real reality", fair enough,
On 31 Aug, 19:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 19:15, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> >> When discussing fundamental science, no use of the word "exist"
> >> should
> >> be taken literally.
>
> > Fine. Then I am not literally being simulated by an immateial UD.
>
> If you want. But my po
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
> >>> ontological
> >>> commitment.
>
> >>
On 1 Sep, 17:29, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
> on:
>
> > OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
> > specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
> > physica
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
> OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
> specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
> physically and not therefore part of the HP and not
> theref
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>> That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
>>> ontological
>>> commitment.
>>
>> No, it is the same arithmetical truth, but fro
Ouh la la ... Mirek,
You may be right, but I am not sure. You may verify if this was not in
a intuitionist context. Without the excluded middle principle, you may
have to use countable choice in some situation where classical logic
does not, but I am not sure.
I know that in intuitionist ma
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
> Bruno wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
Not at all. This definitely convinces me that you have not even try to
begin to read the proof.
Ontically you can say there is a bottom. 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, (that is
0 and the succ
On 1 Sep, 16:55, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> That is th
On 1 Sep, 16:32, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> > wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> > If there is nothing at the bottom
> > of the stack, there are no virtualisations runnin
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> That is the point. I should s
On 01 Sep 2009, at 17:46, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> That is the point. I should say that my starting p
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:52, David Nyman wrote:
>
> 2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>> Bruno hasn't
>>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
>>> on some such basis is actually untenable.
>>
>>
>> I don't think I have ever said that.
>
> No, you're right. However I was r
On 1 Sep, 16:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> before encountering Bruno's views was agains
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> That is the point. I should say that my starting position
>> befor
On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion wrote:
> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> If there is nothing at the bottom
> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
Yes, it sounds logically compelling
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>>
That is the point. I should say that my starting position
before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of
CTM on
the basis of
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
> it is standard practice for lecturers to ask for quesitons when they
> have
> finished. They do that because it works -- it clears up
> misudnerstandings.
> Assuming that miscommunication has to be the audiences fault doesn;t
> work.
> I have never seen that in a professio
On 1 Sep, 15:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> >> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> >> > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
>> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
>> > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
>> > > the basis of any consistent notion of p
On 1 Sep, 14:40, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
>
> The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
> "just".
Really?
>There is no possibility of a context-free 'objective'
> exchange of views. There
On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
>
On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion wrote:
> >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
> > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-comput
On 1 Sep, 12:04, Flammarion wrote:
> Yeah. Or you could just answer my questions.
The problem is the world of assumption contained in your use of
"just". There is no possibility of a context-free 'objective'
exchange of views. There must be some sympathetic matching of
contexts of understandi
On 01 Sep 2009, at 14:59, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>>
> Can't matter have processes?
>>
But in that
On 31 Aug, 20:51, Rex Allen wrote:
> > "If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for
> > everything."
> >--- Daniel Dennett, in Elbow Room
>
> Yeah, Dennett just redefines words in new ways so that he can say
> something like that and have it mean something entirel
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>> Can't matter have processes?
>>
>> But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
>> matter have processes. You said yourself that
On 1 Sep, 13:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:04, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Can't matter have processes?
>
> >> But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
>
2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal :
>> Bruno hasn't
>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
>> on some such basis is actually untenable.
>
>
> I don't think I have ever said that.
No, you're right. However I was referring to the fact that you
sometimes attach certain, presu
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> > 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker :
>
> >> Ok, so you want to solve the "hard problem" right at the beginning by
> >> taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
>
> > No I don't - that's
On 31 Aug, 15:38, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >>
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
> physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
argument is against CTM+PM. AFAICS nobody is claiming that the
as
The reason why I am puzzled is that I was recently told that in order to
prove that
* the union of countably many countable sets is countable
one needs to use at least the Axiom of Countable Choice (+ ZF, of
course). The same is true in order to show that
* a set A is infinite if and only if th
On 1 Sep, 12:26, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> >> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
> >> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
> >> "real real
On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:26, David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno hasn't
> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> on some such basis is actually untenable.
I don't think I have ever said that.
All what I propose is a (constructive) proof of the following
equivalent propos
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
>> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
>> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conc
Hi Mirek,
On 01 Sep 2009, at 12:25, Mirek Dobsicek wrote:
> I am puzzled by one thing. Is the Axiom of dependent choice (DC)
> assumed
> implicitly somewhere here or is it obvious that there is no need for
> it
> (so far)?
I don't see where I would have use it, and I don't think I will us
On 1 Sep, 11:19, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
> responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
> don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic.
> If such were possible,
On 1 Sep, 11:56, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > Can't matter have processes?
>
> But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
> matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
> propertyless. How something without
On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Exactly,
> if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
> is being simulated on "the level 0" of the real (if there is one).
>
> There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
> machine running on a virtual
On 01 Sep 2009, at 10:49, Flammarion wrote:
> Can't matter have processes?
But in that line of discussion, the question should be: can primary
matter have processes. You said yourself that primary matter is
propertyless. How something without property can implement processes,
with or wi
On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> >> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
> >> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
> >> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>
> > Au contraire, occam requires us to throw a
On 1 Sep, 03:52, Brent Meeker wrote:
> > For instance: Bits of matter in particular configurations "cause"
> > conscious experience. Fine. So what deeper meaning can we draw from
> > this? None.
>
> Maybe not meaning, but engineering. That's why I think the "hard problem"
> will eventually
Hi Bruno,
I am puzzled by one thing. Is the Axiom of dependent choice (DC) assumed
implicitly somewhere here or is it obvious that there is no need for it
(so far)?
Thanks!
mirek
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic.
If such were possible, I suspect it would require a great deal more
pati
Exactly,
if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
is being simulated on "the level 0" of the real (if there is one).
There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
machine running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine
running on this
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
>> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
>> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>
> Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
> that we are 1 level deep, 2
On 1 Sep, 10:58, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion :
>
> > I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
> > I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
> > incomprehensible.
>
> In that case you may wish to reconsider whether there is any point in
> you
2009/9/1 Flammarion :
> I think you should be more concerned about the long passages
> I am not commenting on. That is becuase I find them completely
> incomprehensible.
In that case you may wish to reconsider whether there is any point in
your commenting at all. I don't see how it helps anyone
On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> > That says nothing about qualia at all.
>
> It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time. Most
> of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
> provocation - as a contextual exploration of
On 1 Sep, 00:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> >> It's more an attempt to characterise our
> >> metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring,
> >> immediate, self-referential and self-relative. Actually, reflecting
> >> on exchanges with Bruno, I wonder i
On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman wrote:
> On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
>
> > I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
> > ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical propositions are
> > either true o
On 1 Sep, 01:25, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/31 Flammarion :
>
> Peter, surely you must see that in saying "abstracta are arrived at by
> ignoring irrelevant features of individual objects" you are simply
> agreeing with Quentin that "if everything is reduced to physical
> interaction then comp
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