Re: One subject

On 6/12/2012 4:40 PM, Pierz wrote: I didn't say that we would all turn into self-deniers concerned only to help others. I said we would achieve an optimal moral society. Such a society would always bear in mind the absolute equality of all subjects (not in the 'royal subject' sense!), with each

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/12/2012 1:06 PM, R AM wrote: On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 9:39 PM, meekerdb > wrote: I means that, in retrospect, I can't trace back to external (to me) causes, a deterministic sequence that inevitably led me to do that. Isn't that randomness? No, it's

Re: One subject

On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 4:27:29 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: >> >> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continu

Re: One subject

On Wednesday, June 13, 2012 12:14:26 AM UTC+10, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 6/11/2012 10:19 PM, Pierz wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: >> >> > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than con

Re: modal logic's meta axiom

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 08:17:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 12 Jun 2012, at 00:47, Russell Standish wrote: > > >On Thu, Jun 07, 2012 at 01:33:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >>In fact we have p/p for any p. If you were correct we would have []p > >>for any p. > > > >This is what

Re: QTI and eternal torment

On 12 June 2012 17:36, Bruno Marchal wrote: Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal >> machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes* >> the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a >> particular machine. >> > > But is that not

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 9:39 PM, meekerdb wrote: > I means that, in retrospect, I can't trace back to external (to me) > causes, a deterministic sequence that inevitably led me to do that. > Isn't that randomness? > Conceivably we could make an intelligent machine that could keep a > record

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/12/2012 11:42 AM, R AM wrote: On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:44 PM, meekerdb > wrote: Well then it seems to come down to a question of timing. If this 'same conscious state' is before the action, then I can certainly imagine changing my mind. Yes, but

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:44 PM, meekerdb wrote: > > > Why not. That's the compatibilist view of 'free will' and that's > apparently why Sam Harris disagrees with compatibilism: he defines 'free > will' to be *conscious* authorship of decisions. > I think that is what is meant by typical defende

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > No. But the gangster does not know this determination. So although at that > level he could not do otherwise, from his perspective, it still can make > genuine sense that he could have done otherwise, from our embedded pov > perspective. O

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 7:44 PM, meekerdb wrote: > > Well then it seems to come down to a question of timing. If this 'same > conscious state' is before the action, then I can certainly imagine > changing my mind. > Yes, but why would you do that? You didn't change your mind in the first situat

Re: One subject

On 12 Jun 2012, at 04:19, Pierz wrote: On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's really a > new

Re: modal logic's meta axiom

On 12 Jun 2012, at 00:47, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Jun 07, 2012 at 01:33:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: In fact we have p/p for any p. If you were correct we would have []p for any p. This is what I thought you said the "meta-axiom" stated? How else do we get p/[]p for Kripke sema

Theology & deepities

Here's a thoughtful blog on the meaning of theology. Bruno may want to comment, since his conception of theology might answer the questions put forward. http://choiceindying.com/2012/06/12/is-religion-just-a-matter-of-deepities-or-something-more/. Brent -- You received this message because

Re: free will and mathematics

On 6/12/2012 1:31 AM, R AM wrote: On Mon, Jun 11, 2012 at 6:42 PM, meekerdb > wrote: On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote: But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we

Re: inside vs outside

On 11 Jun 2012, at 20:08, Abram Demski wrote: On Sun, Jun 10, 2012 at 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2012, at 21:53, Abram Demski wrote: Bruno, Wei, I've been reading the book "saving truth from paradox" on and off, and it has convinced me of the importance of the "inside

Re: free will and mathematics

On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:45, R AM wrote: On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 5:34 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On Thu, Jun 7, 2012 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK, for the sake of the argument, let's suppose that you ate spaghetti because that's what you liked at that moment. Do you think you coul

Re: QTI and eternal torment

On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:44, Stephen P. King wrote: On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote: On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote: I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The arithmetical relations are out of time.

Re: Questions about simulations, emulations, etc.

On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:41, meekerdb wrote: On 6/11/2012 7:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Does it imply that we have an infinite number of levels between mind and physics? You can say that. Imagine yourself in front of the UD. By the invariance of the first person experience for the delays,

Re: QTI and eternal torment

On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:09, David Nyman wrote: On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote: Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it will look like a special moment is chosen out of

Re: One subject

On 6/11/2012 10:19 PM, Pierz wrote: On Monday, June 11, 2012 10:46:42 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Jun 2012, at 03:12, Pierz wrote: > I'm starting this as a new thread rather than continuing under 'QTI > and eternal torment', where this idea came up, because it's rea

Re: free will and mathematics

On Tue, Jun 12, 2012 at 12:18 AM, RMahoney wrote: > > I'm assuming you mean by exactly the same situation, every atom in it's > exact same physical state. > Not really. I mean the same conscious or subjective situation. From the free will point of view, decisions are conscious and can only be ba

Re: free will and mathematics

On Mon, Jun 11, 2012 at 6:42 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 6/11/2012 8:45 AM, R AM wrote: > >> But what I'm saying here is not ontological determinism but in fact, >> about the subjective experience. I'm defending that we cannot imagine >> ourselves in exactly the same subjective situation and still t