Le 10-déc.-06, à 00:33, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 04-déc.-06, à 08:34, Tom Caylor wrote :
>>> The existence of a personal God who is not silent answers the
>>> questions
>>> in a way that an impersonal god or reality does not...
>>
>> I certainly have a methodologica
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory.
!!
--~--~-~--~~~-
1Z wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> > Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> > current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory.
>
> !!
To expand a bit, both
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
> > In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
> > by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of
> > evil is solved or even really addressed with comp. This is because
> > comp cannot define evil corre
Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> 1Z wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
>>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
>>> current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory.
>>
Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> >>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> >>> current theories of e
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >>> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
> >>> Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
> >>> current theories of everyth
Le 12-déc.-06, à 11:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
>
>>> In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
>>> by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of
>>> evil is solved or even really addressed
Le 12-déc.-06, à 13:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>>
>> Le 12-déc.-06, à 03:58, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1Z wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem
> of
> Good) is interesting. Of
Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> Le 12-déc.-06, à 11:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
> >
> >>> In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
> >>> by a problem: the problem of evil. I don't think the real problem of
>
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > I don't see how it's such a big problem. Consciousness exists,
> > therefore feelings exist,
> > and some of these feelings are unpleasant ones. Explaining
> > consciousness is difficult,
> > but once granted, you don't need an extra theory for every different
> > ty
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
> >
> > Le 12-déc.-06, à 11:16, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting Tom Caylor):
> > >
> > >>> In my view, your motivation is not large enough. I am also motivated
> > >>> by a problem: the problem o
Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> OK, but the point is that the basic definition of "bad" is arbitrary.
Perhaps, but honestly I am not sure. In acomp, we can define a (very
platonist) notion of "bad". The simpler and stronger one is just the
falsity "f". Then Bf, BBf, B
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > It might seem
> > that there would be some consensus, for example that torturing
> > innocent people
> > is an example of "bad", but it is possible to assert without fear of
> > logical or
> > empirical contradiction that torturing innocent people is good.
>
> I disagree
his Papaioannou
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
> Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2006 05:10:43 -0800
>
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > B
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> > OK, but the point is that the basic definition of "bad" is arbitrary.
>
>
> Perhaps, but honestly I am not sure. In acomp, we can define a (very
> platonist) notion of "bad". The simpler and stronger one is j
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter,
>
> We can discuss any subject rationally if we agree on axioms, but the problem
> is that
> in matters of value, those axioms are ultimately arbitrary.
So you say. I don't agree.
> I believe that capital
> punishment is wrong; not because it is not a good
Le 14-déc.-06, à 11:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> But there is no true/false in saying that torture is bad, unless there
> is another
> hidden assumption such as "causing gratuitous suffering is bad", in
> which case
> the question becomes, why is causing gratuitous suffering bad?
> Ultima
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Peter,
>
> We can discuss any subject rationally if we agree on axioms, but the problem
> is that
> in matters of value, those axioms are ultimately arbitrary. I believe that
> capital
> punishment is wrong; not because it is not a good deterrent, or because it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>> OK, but the point is that the basic definition of "bad" is arbitrary.
>>
>> Perhaps, but honestly I am not sure. In acomp, we can define a (very
>> platonist) notion of "bad".
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>> OK, but the point is that the basic definition of "bad" is arbitrary.
>>
>> Perhaps, but honestly I am not sure. In acomp, we can define a (very
>> platonist) notion of "bad".
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
> Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2006 05:52:59 -0800
>
>
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
Bruno Marchal writes:
> >> Not in any normative sense. But once we bet on a theory (like comp),
> >> then we get mathematical tools which can provide general explanation
> >> of
> >> what is bad, and also explain why such definition cannot be normative,
> >> making the bad/good distinctions an
Brent Meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > Peter,
> >
> > We can discuss any subject rationally if we agree on axioms, but the
> > problem is that
> > in matters of value, those axioms are ultimately arbitrary. I believe that
> > capital
> > punishment is wrong; not because
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> > There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics
> > on
> > the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other. One
> > is
> > that you can bet that any sentient species would arrive at exactly the same
> > ru
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
>
>>> There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics
>>> on
>>> the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other. One
>>> is
>>> that you can bet that any sentient species would a
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
> >>> There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics
> >>> on
> >>> the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other.
> >>> One is
> >>> that you can bet that any sentient species would arrive at exactly the
Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good?
I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were bad.
Who says this? All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly rich
to prove elementary theorems in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
>
> There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics
> on
> the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other.
> One is
> that you can bet that any senti
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> > Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good?
>
> I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were bad.
>
> Who says this? All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly r
Le 16-déc.-06, à 03:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>>> Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good?
>>
>> I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were
>> bad.
>>
>>
>>> Democratic system are
> >> more
> >> efficient to explore the political landscape and thus more efficient
> >> in
> >> probability to satisfy "soul's natural attraction" toward the "good".
> >
> > The soul's natural attraction towards the good might be compared to
> > the body's
> > natura
Le 17-déc.-06, à 03:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
Democratic system are
more
efficient to explore the political landscape and thus more efficient
in
probability to satisfy "soul's natural attraction" toward the
"good".
>>>
>>> The soul's natural attraction
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
>> Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
>> ethical principles or commandments from God:
>
>
> With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
> (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in
> the name of
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > The analogous statements are:
> >
> > a1. umbrellas keep you dry
> > a2. feeding the poor reduces their suffering
> >
> > We can agree on the definition of the words and on the facts asserted.
> > If
> > there is disagreement on the definition, for example if you were
Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ...
>>> Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
>>> ethical principles or commandments from God:
>>
>>
>> With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
>> (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) w
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> ...
Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
ethical principles or commandments from God:
>>>
>>> With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
>>> (
Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my
methodology
to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
"famous" for its many paradoxical thoughts.
It is certainly not a reductio against comp
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology
to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
"famous" for its many paradoxical thoughts.
It is certainly not a
Le 20-déc.-06, à 19:06, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my
methodology
to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
"famous" for its
Bruno marchal writes:
> Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept that
> because of feelings of empathy for others.
OK. Note that such an "empathy" is hard wired in our biological
constitution. Many mammals seems to have it at some degree. Some form
of autism are d
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian "interpretation" of the hypostases. There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
on t
Tom Caylor writes:
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian "interpretation" of the hypostases. There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses
Le 23-déc.-06, à 15:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno marchal writes:
> Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept
that > because of feelings of empathy for others.
OK. Note that such an "empathy" is hard wired in our biological
constitution. Many mammals seem
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian "interpretation" of the hypostases. There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by
Le 24-déc.-06, à 11:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an
objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that
when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement:
either I do feel it or I am ly
On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
> Bruno,
> I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
> Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
> and the Christian "interpretation" of the hypostas
It looks like I might have timed out. Hopefully this doesn't appear
two times.
On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> Bruno,
> ...
> I believe the answer to the question, "What is Truth?" which Pilate asked
> Jesus, was stan
Thanks for the explanations. I am astonished about all children being
psychopathic: I guess you mean very young one?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
To be fair that term isn't normally used for children due to its pejorative
connotations, but I think it is close to the truth. Inf
Bruno Marchal writes:
> I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an
> objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that
> when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement:
> either I do feel it or I am lying. Also, there is an o
Tom Caylor writes:
On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
> > Bruno,
>
> > I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
> > Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
> > and the Christi
Tom Caylor writes:
It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he
said he was "one with the Father" and "before Abraham was, I AM", for
"no one can say that they are God". the mistake is the missing
phrase at the end: "...except God".
Yes, but what if Jesus was n
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
> > Bruno,
>
> > I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts
on the
> > Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he
said he was "one with the Father" and "before Abraham was, I AM", for
"no one can say that they are God". the mistake is the missing
phrase at the end: "...except God".
Brent Meeker wrote:
That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's
true? Of course in general we don't know what's true and we
never know it with certainity. But we do know some things,
in the scientific, provisional sense. And we also have
certain values which, as Jef says,
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
It looks like I might have timed out. Hopefully this doesn't appear
two times.
On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> Bruno,
> ...
> I believe the answer to the question, "Wha
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> The "crux" is that he is not symbolic...
I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
evidences for the idea that "Jesus" is "truth", nor can I be sure of
any cle
I regard the idea of "believing" to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a "single
self" that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different "ways to think"
in which different assertions
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief)
Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2006 14:59:17 -0800
I regard the idea of "believing" to be unsound, because it is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his in the form of a tautology.
On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
I regard the idea of "believing" to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a "single
self" that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching a
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> But our main criterion for what to believe should be
> what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his i
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no
discoverable truth, then how can
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no
dis
Le 26-déc.-06, à 23:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I regard the idea of "believing" to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a "single
self" that maintains beliefs.
Is this not a bit self-defeating? It has the form of a belief. Now I
can sti
Le 27-déc.-06, à 01:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true,
right? We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should
always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever
we fancy.
This is a key state
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would expre
Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit :
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> The "crux" is that he is not symbolic...
I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
evidences for the idea that
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or someth
Jef Allbright wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunder
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
>
>> Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
>> of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
>> no truth that we can discover. B
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
All meaning is necessarily within context.
OK, but all context could make sense only to
some universal meaning. I mean I don't know,
it is difficult.
But this can be seen in a very consistent way. The significance of
Jef Allbright writes:
> I said "might" because there is one case where I am certain
> of the truth, which is that I am having the present
> experience.
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
> I said "might" because there is one case where I am certain > of the
truth, which is that I am having the present > experience.
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you clai
Le 27-déc.-06, à 20:11, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transpare
Brent Meeker writes:
> It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more
> certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things
> which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour.
Yet this seems understandable. The psychotic person is believin
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give
you his reasons for his belief:
[...]
This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite
evidence in support
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious
convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a
point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence
is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief.
On 12/28/06, Johnathan Corgan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person
will give
> you his reasons for his belief:
[...]
> This is very similar to the arguments of people w
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and
immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can
you claim that it actually is real?
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,
imo, of Descartes "diagonal argument": it is the
fixed point of doubt. If we de
Jef Allbright wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can
you claim that it actually is real?
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,
imo, of Descartes "diagonal argument": it is the
fixed p
Brent Meeker wrote:
Jef Allbright wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Although we all share the illusion of a direct
and immediate sense of consciousness, on what
basis can you claim that it actually is real?
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,
imo, of Descartes "diagonal argume
Brent Meeker writes:
> This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious
> convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a
> point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence
> is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief
Le 27-déc.-06, à 23:40, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
All meaning is necessarily within context.
OK, but all context could make sense only to
some universal meaning. I mean I don't know,
it is difficult.
But this can be se
Jef Allbright writes:
My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit :
>
> On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL P
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
[TC]
> > My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
> > we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
> > absence of hope.
[BM]
> Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
> yo
Hi Jef,
Please, don't hesitate to skip the remarks you could find a bit too
technical, but which could help others who know perhaps a bit more on G
and G*, which are theories which I use to tackle many questions in this
list. You can come back on those remarks if ever
you got time and motiva
Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : (to Jef)
I think "objective" should just be understood as denoting subjective
agreement from different viewpoints.
Curiosuly enough perhaps I could agree if you were saying "physically
objective" can be understood as denoting subjective agree
Bruno -
It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level
epistemology.
But I don't know much about your "comp" so I'll begin reading.
- Jef
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values
> increasingly resemble principles of the
Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:57, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.
No problem, Tom. In fact I will print your post and read it comfo
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
My personal experience is that there's no paradox
at all if one is willing to fully accept that within
any framework of description there is absolutely
no difference at all between a person and a
zombie, but even the most philosophically cogn
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there
could not be any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and
excited with this discovery, and ran around trying to explain
it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember).
It seemed to me just another i
Thanks Bruno. Much of your terminology at this point escapes me.
I do see that a small part of our differences below are simply due to the
imprecision of language (and my somewhat sloppy writing.)
I also sense that at the core of much of this discussion is the idea that, although we are
subj
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically co
Tom Caylor wrote:
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit :
>
> On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bru
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
[TC]
> > My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
> > we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
> > absence of hope.
[BM]
> Here Stathis already give a genuine comment
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
>
> I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
> something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
> me to address, just bring it back up.
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a cri
1 - 100 of 118 matches
Mail list logo
