Introduction to Univalent Foundations of Mathematics with Agda

*Introduction to Univalent Foundations of Mathematics with Agd*a (4 March 2019, version of 18 December 2019) Martín Hötzel Escardó https://cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/HoTT-UF-in-Agda-Lecture-Notes/HoTT-UF-Agda.html @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google

Re: Combinators 1 (Introduction)

> On 17 Sep 2018, at 05:55, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 5, 2018 at 2:05 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > Hi Jason, > > >> On 5 Aug 2018, at 05:24, Jason Resch > > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jul 28, 2018 at 2:19 PM Bruno

Re: Combinators 1 (Introduction)

On Sun, Aug 5, 2018 at 2:05 PM Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Jason, > > > On 5 Aug 2018, at 05:24, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sat, Jul 28, 2018 at 2:19 PM Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Hi Jason, people, >> >> > Hi Bruno, > > Thank you for this. I've been trying to digest it over the past few days.

Re: Combinators 1 (Introduction)

Hi Jason, > On 5 Aug 2018, at 05:24, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sat, Jul 28, 2018 at 2:19 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > Hi Jason, people, > > > Hi Bruno, > > Thank you for this. I've been trying to digest it over the past few days. No problem. It was hard to

Re: Combinators 1 (Introduction)

On Sat, Jul 28, 2018 at 2:19 PM Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Jason, people, > > Hi Bruno, Thank you for this. I've been trying to digest it over the past few days. > > I will send my post on the Church-Turing thesis and incompleteness later. > It is too long. > > So, let us proceed with the

Combinators 1 (Introduction)

Hi Jason, people, I will send my post on the Church-Turing thesis and incompleteness later. It is too long. So, let us proceed with the combinators. Two seconds of historical motivation. During the crisis in set theory, Moses Schoenfinkel publishes, in 1924, an attempt to found mathematics

Introduction

Hello, I just joined here and I am excited to explore the world of knowledge of everything and nothing, I am 22 years old and a computer science graduate and I recently had a psychotic episode where I realised that everything is a computation driven by some kind of force called mathematical

Re: Introduction

Hi, On 06 Jun 2011, at 11:31, whitespectre wrote: Hello, I just joined here and I am excited to explore the world of knowledge of everything and nothing, I am 22 years old and a computer science graduate and I recently had a psychotic episode where I realised that everything is a computation

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, 2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be Hi Günther, Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Günther, Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Günther, 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by you. In case you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a state where you know you are immortal, because your immortality is a past

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Gunther wrote: ...assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? brings up in my mind: thinking in comp (at least: in numbers) translates 'conscious' into 'computed' ?? (That would imply an elevation from the binary embryonic contraption as our computer into more

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 11 Mar 2009, at 02:25, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of computations going trough their corresponding states. Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is already a continuum of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent). Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I guess I miss

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno, - again the bartender... * Initial remark: I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are in my opinion *thought - conditions* to make one's theory workable and so they are conditioned by

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote: The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have successors (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic is consistent).

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:09, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi Bruno, With COMP it is not so clear. explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno, My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to numbers in the first place But that would violate the comp assumption. No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number. - that is why the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, With COMP it is not so clear. explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp Dt; the Dt suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith. Please bear in mind that I have not yet

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Günther, On 05 Mar 2009, at 00:50, Günther Greindl wrote: Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

HI Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4. I am not sure I understand. If the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Le 05-mars-09, à 11:10, Günther Greindl a écrit : HI Bruno, Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Le 05-mars-09, à 11:15, Günther Greindl a écrit : Hi Stathis, It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to the emergent

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Sure. But note that a lot of things happens, including the white rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare.

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:13, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/4 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to have

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Wed, 2009-03-04 at 12:25 +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens. Indeed, that would be like if a number

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Imagine the sequence: Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along three classes: A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along three classes: A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to self-infliction. In case of accidental

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis This was mentioned in the TNG technical manual. I do not recall, right, now, which post TOS episodes mentioned it. Ronald On Mar 2, 8:42 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com:

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 03 Mar 2009, at 13:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along three classes: A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of individuals: annihilation first, reconstitution

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, better: this is just the usual comp-suicide self-selection (assuming of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an obvious proposition). I have been thinking along these lines lately, in a somewhat different context: the teleportation with annihilation

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). Ronald On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/2 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com: Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to quantum resolution (TNG transporter term). The question is what level of resolution is needed in

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

To have strict continuity you would certainly need the state, but not at the quantum level, see Tegmark's paper. But you could probably do without most of the state information if you were willing to accept a gap - as in anesthesia. Brent ronaldheld wrote: Maybe the terminology does not

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 01 Mar 2009, at 09:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis, Bruno, It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule with comp is don't do to the other what the other does not want you

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in your interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can you be coherent, take the full piece of botter dead is not big deal of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 28 Feb 2009, at 03:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? you people take it for granted that a (supernatural???) authority has nothing else to do except making replicas of members of the Everything List. And you observe, how good - or bad - its work is. Some teleological view of pantheism

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno, List, in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting. Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological) identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we apply this measure from one OM to the next. Then forgetting would be everything

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis, List, if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

John Mikes wrote: Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about regarding personal identity. And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be practically quite relevant in the near(?) future

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 08:34:48PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years we often change so much

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that case why couldn't B3 also

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, 2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that unique

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. Like if our

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: Hi, Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com meeke...@dslextreme.com: It is the potential fusion that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our closest continuations might be mixtures, each having some memories belonging to

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

russell standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led to fusion of first persons. And given that there is (or should be) a notion

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 6:39 PM, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time. So an

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the movie the prestige, your brother can be

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got new memories, including false souvenirs. But

Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

- Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] Quentin Anciaux wrote: If the copy has

Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stephen Paul King wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] Quentin

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/24 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like observer moments and continuity. Almost all my memories are not being remembered at an given time.

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326 : View Other NDPR Reviews http://ndpr.nd.edu/ David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/, Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826. *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College* Thank-you

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say no for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. The copy behaves like you and as a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Stathis, Bruno, List, the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up to the unspeakable you = ONE). I talk here on the first person you. It is infinite and unnameable. Here computer science can makes those term (like unnameable) much more precise. I don't see how

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Reviews http://ndpr.nd.edu/ David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/, Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826. *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College* Thank-you for alerting us to this book. I'll pick out just one passage from

[Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/, Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826. *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College* Although there are many excellent texts dealing with the metaphysics

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Russell is right, I have been lurking. The wiki is still available and will be for the foreseeable future so you ought not worry about it disappearing without warning. Feel free to add as much content as you wish, the only reason it hasn't become more useful is that participation in article

Re: questionnaire (was: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics)

Wei Dai: I'm not sure what questionnaire Zen_Ved is referring to, but maybe it's this paragraph from the mailing list invitation: Because this mailing list attracts people from many different academic fields, and many posts have high technical content, it is suggested that after joining,

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

As to Algebraic Physics; as well as to Wei Dai's ``everything'' questionnaire: - possibly that it will be rather useful to read http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0703043 , V5 (and the first couple of pages in V1). Note also briefly: the Universe (Universes ) is/are subsets of a very specific set

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Why is the universe a subset of the set information (which I assume is defined in the article) and why can it not be formalized? On Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 1:38 AM, Zen_Ved [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: As to Algebraic Physics; as well as to Wei Dai's ``everything'' questionnaire: - possibly that

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Brian Tenneson: Why is the universe a subset of the set information (which I assume is defined in the article) and why can it not be formalized? On Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 1:38 AM, Zen_Ved [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: As to Algebraic Physics; as well as to Wei Dai's ``everything''

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Can someone obtain for me the email addresses of the authors? Thank you! Jamie Rose - Original Message From: Zen_Ved [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, July 3, 2008 4:42:46 AM Subject: Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

to: Wei Dai: Please: How can I find your 'Everything-Questionnaire'? (Not that I have the answers...) John Mikes On Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 4:51 AM, Brian Tenneson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Why is the universe a subset of the set information (which I assume is defined in the article) and why can it

questionnaire (was: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics)

: Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics to: Wei Dai: Please: How can I find your 'Everything-Questionnaire'? (Not that I have the answers...) John Mikes On Thu, Jul 3, 2008 at 4:51 AM, Brian Tenneson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Why is the universe a subset

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Dear Bruno, thanks for your respone, looking forward to the next round of stimulating discussion in July :-)) Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Le 20-mai-08, à 01:40, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, May 19, 2008 at 12:32:14PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Zombie are important in philosophy, a bit like zero is important in Number Theory, or like the empty set is important in Set Theory, I think. For

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Hi Gunther, thanks for your respone, looking forward to the next round of stimulating discussion in July :-)) With pleasure, Best, Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Zombie are important in philosophy, a bit like zero is important in Number Theory, or like the empty set is important in Set Theory, I think. For example, it is easy to show that if Bohm QM is correct, then the Everett Universal waves if full of zombies, even

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

On Mon, May 19, 2008 at 12:32:14PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Zombie are important in philosophy, a bit like zero is important in Number Theory, or like the empty set is important in Set Theory, I think. For example, it is easy to show that if Bohm QM is

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Hi Bruno, Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism' 2006 http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/strawson/rmwpep.pdf The author admits himself that his doctrine is more a form of experential/non-experiential-ist (thus dualist) doctrine. It seems to me

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Hi Gunther, On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Günther Greindl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism' 2006 http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/strawson/rmwpep.pdf The author admits himself that his doctrine is more a form of

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Le 13-mai-08, à 18:27, Brian Tenneson a écrit : I must admit to a little hand waving.  OK, maybe a lot. Actually you are not. Not necessarily so, I mean. *I* could have been wrong. Let me explain: When you said: Randomness implies consciousness. I interpreted as: Randomness causes or

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Hi Bruno, I mean logical implication and definitely -not- in the sense of production and -most definitely not- causation. I sat down for once and wrote something down and here's basically what the statement of my idea (which could easily be wrong): [+1] If x is a (Wolpert) device, then (if x is

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Oops. to finish... For all devices x, if x is complex is some sense then x is conscious in some (possibly other) sense. In other words, for all devices x, (a) -logically entails- (b): (a) there is a partition D_t of t such that T(x; R, D_t) = 1 (b) there is a partition (D_t)' of t such that

Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics

Hi Brian, Le 13-mai-08, à 02:00, Brian Tenneson a écrit : [...] To recapitulate, the statement of the idea is this: [1] Randomness implies consciousness. I don't see why, or even what this could mean. The converse appears to be false. Comp (+ Consciousness or just first person

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