Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, 2009/3/15 Bruno Marchal > > > Hi Günther, > > > > > Hi Bruno, > > > > thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. > > > >> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In > >> case > >> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Günther, > > Hi Bruno, > > thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. > >> course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In >> case >> you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a >> state where you "know" you are immortal, bec

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, thanks for your interesting answer, I have some questions though. > course, as I said, this will depend of what you mean by "you". In case > you accept the idea of surviving with amnesia, you can even get to a > state where you "know" you are immortal, because your immortality is a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Günther, >> 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, >> themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of >> computations going trough their corresponding states. >> Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is >> already a continuum of sto

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Gunther wrote: "...assuming that _every_ computation is conscious qua computation? " brings up in my mind: thinking in comp (at least: in numbers) translates 'conscious' into 'computed' ?? (That would imply an elevation from the binary embryonic contraption as our "computer" into more sophisti

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, > 1-OM, (by step 7, correspond to infinity (aleph_zero) of 3-OMs, > themselves embedded in bigger infinities (2^aleph_zero) of > computations going trough their corresponding states. > Between you-in-the-living room, and you-in-the-kitchen there is > already a continuum of storie

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 11 Mar 2009, at 02:25, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Hi Bruno, > >>> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have >>> successors >>> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded >>> in >>> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmet

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, >> The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have >> successors >> (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in >> numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic >> is >> consistent). > > Hmmm (Not to clear for me, I

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno, - again the bartender... * Initial remark: I like Gunther's parenthetical condition of arithmetic consistency - which I find not assured in DIFFERENT universes. As I said axioms (2+2=4) are in my opinion *thought - conditions* to make one's theory workable and so they are conditioned by the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:09, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Hi Bruno, > >>> With COMP it is not so clear. >> >> explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt; >> the >> "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next >> instant or in a successor state is already

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 06 Mar 2009, at 18:06, Günther Greindl wrote: > The idea was that the numbers encode moments which don't have > successors > (the guy who transports), that's why there exist alien-OMs encoded in > numbers which destroy all the machines (if we assume that arithmetic > is > consistent).

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Bruno, >> With COMP it is not so clear. > > explicit appeal to self-consistency (= the move from Bp to Bp & Dt; the > "Dt" suppresses the cul-de-sac). With comp, to believe in a next > instant or in a successor state is already based on an act of faith. Please bear in mind that I have not

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno, >> My idea was rather that the instantiations would not correspond to >> numbers in the first place > > But that would violate the comp assumption. No, you still misunderstand me ;-) not correspond in the sense of non-existing, not in the sense of existing but not number. >> - that is

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal : >> >>> Sure. But note that "a lot of things happens", including the white >>> rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence >>> explains why those aberrant histories a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Thu, Mar 05, 2009 at 04:10:15PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Of course keyboard-dragon types of transformations are utterly NOT > verifiable, even in the ironical first person way of quantum or comp > suicide. If you decide to kill yourself until your keyboard transforms > itself into

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 05 Mar 2009, at 12:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal : > >> Sure. But note that "a lot of things happens", including the white >> rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence >> explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare. > > Could

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/5 Bruno Marchal : > Sure. But note that "a lot of things happens", including the white > rabbits and aberrant histories. Quantum intefrence and decoherence > explains why those aberrant histories are relatively rare. Could it be that some things which seem physically possible, like the ma

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Le 05-mars-09, à 11:15, Günther Greindl a écrit : > > Hi Stathis, > >>> It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is >>> me >>> could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the >>> following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map >>> to

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Le 05-mars-09, à 11:10, Günther Greindl a écrit : > > HI Bruno, > Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! >>> The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond >>> to non-existent numbers, like, say, the nat

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Stathis, >> It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me >> could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the >> following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to >> the emergent class of "me, being conscious." Then I would be dead

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

HI Bruno, >>> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another >>> number. Even a God cannot do that! >> The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond >> to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and >> 4. > > I am not sure I unders

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Günther, On 05 Mar 2009, at 00:50, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Bruno, > >> Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another >> number. Even a God cannot do that! > > The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond > to non-existent numbers, like, say, the n

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/5 Johnathan Corgan : > It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me > could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the > following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to > the emergent class of "me, being conscious."  Then I w

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno, > Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another > number. Even a God cannot do that! The idea would be rather that some continuations would correspond to non-existent numbers, like, say, the natural number between 3 and 4. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~---

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Imagine the sequence: >> >> Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute > The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some > means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is > probably no such means, no matter how advanced t

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Wed, 2009-03-04 at 12:25 +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some > > means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is > > probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens. > > Indeed, that would be like if a n

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal : > >> That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who >> misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to >> kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through >> a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 04 Mar 2009, at 07:13, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/3/4 Günther Greindl : > >> Imagine the sequence: >> >> Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute >> >> Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears >> before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to >> have a big dis

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/4 Günther Greindl : > Imagine the sequence: > > Scan - Annihilate - Signal - Reconstitute > > Now consider that the Signal travels for 100 000 lightyears > before it hits the reconstitution chamber (just to > have a big distance, the concern is causal disconnection in spacetime). > > Now,

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/4 Bruno Marchal : > That is why the B people made a law, for helping those who > misunderstand the probability. If you decide (before duplication) to > kill the copy, the choice of victim/torturer is still decided through > a throw of a fair coin. This makes the decision unbiased by fake >

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, > better: this is just the "usual" comp-suicide self-selection (assuming > of course we can really kill the copies, which is in itself not an > obvious proposition). I have been thinking along these lines lately, in a somewhat different context: the teleportation with annihilation exper

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 03 Mar 2009, at 13:40, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal : > >> I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run, along >> three classes: >> >> A: majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of >> "individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution afte

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis This was mentioned in the TNG technical manual. I do not recall, right, now, which post TOS episodes mentioned it. Ronald On Mar 2, 8:42 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/3/2 ronaldheld : > > > > > Maybe the terminology does not fit

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal : > I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along > three classes: > > A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of > "individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to > self-infliction. In case of accidental or except

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/3 Bruno Marchal : > I think that comp practitioners will divide, in the long run,  along > three classes: > > A:  majority. Accept teleportation but disallow overlap of > "individuals": annihilation first, reconstitution after. No right to > self-infliction. In case of accidental or except

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

To have strict continuity you would certainly need the state, but not at the quantum level, see Tegmark's paper. But you could probably do without most of the state information if you were willing to accept a gap - as in anesthesia. Brent ronaldheld wrote: > Maybe the terminology does not f

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 01 Mar 2009, at 23:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal : > >> All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in >> "your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can >> you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big dea

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/2 ronaldheld : > > Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, > wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at > one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term). The question is what level of resolution is needed in order to copy the m

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain, wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term). Ronald On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/2/24 Brent Me

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/3/2 Bruno Marchal : > All right, I understand. The question now is: are you sure it is in > "your" interest to be that selfish. It is not a moral question: can > you be coherent, take the full piece of botter "dead is not big deal" > of the midazolam argument, and keep that sort of selfishne

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis, Bruno, >> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture >> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of >> course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule >> with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does not wa

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 01 Mar 2009, at 09:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal : > >> It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to >> torture >> their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of >> course not without their consent, given that the golden eth

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/28 Bruno Marchal : > It leads to a very complex question: should we allow people to torture > their doppelganger, for example as a ritual or sexual practice? Of > course not without their consent, given that the golden ethical rule > with comp is "don't do to the other what the other does

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 28 Feb 2009, at 03:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl : > >> The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten >> years >> old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply >> the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/2/28 Günther Greindl : > > >> The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years >> old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply >> the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years >> we often

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/28 Günther Greindl : > The issue that we are very reluctant to die if our backup is ten years > old but need not worry so much if we backed up one hour ago is simply > the heuristic that in one hour we don't change so much, but in ten years > we often change so much that we indeed become a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Fri, Feb 27, 2009 at 08:34:48PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal : > > > Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I > > will be dead too? Less dead? > > This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for > personal ide

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

> John Mikes wrote: >> Brent: >> who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? It is only a thought experiment to make clear what we care about regarding personal identity. And if computationalism is true, this thought experiment will be practically quite relevant in the near(?) fu

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

John Mikes wrote: > Brent: > who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? Ask Bruno, he's the one who brought it up. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To p

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis, List, > if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I) > will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there As Bruno said in a previous post, what we should care about in personal survival is not concrete memories (although memories are essential

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno, List, > in awaked state. Yet I do distinguish dying and forgetting. Let us say that we have a measure of continuation (of psychological) identity from 1 to 0, where 1=full continuation and 0=death, and we apply this measure from one OM to the next. Then forgetting would be everything be

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 15:57, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal > > On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. > > I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to > surviving. Personal identi

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Brent: who is making that 'backup' or 'replica' of you? and why? you people take it for granted that a (supernatural???) authority has nothing else to do except making replicas of members of the Everything List. And you observe, how good - or bad - "its" work is. Some teleological view of pantheism

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal > > On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. > > > I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. > Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories. > B

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal : > Gosh!  And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I > will be dead too? Less dead? This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me if a backup was made an hou

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal >>> > The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it cou

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: > >> Hi, >> >>> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. >>> Here >>> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me >>> conceive that indeed there is only one person playin

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 27 Feb 2009, at 01:57, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Hi, > >> Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. >> Here >> I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me >> conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to >> itself. >> Li

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:32, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal >> > >>> >>> >>> >>>The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you >>> even in >>>

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 26 Feb 2009, at 18:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > There is no identity without memories... makes no sense to me. I take it as a superficial part of identity, with respect to surviving. Personal identity, I think is more and less than personal memories. By loosing memory "I" would be wounde

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, > Personal identity and memory could be a useful fiction for living. Here > I was alluding to possible deeper sense of the self, which makes me > conceive that indeed there is only one person playing a trick to itself. > Like if our bodies where just disconnected windows giving to that uni

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi, 2009/2/26 Bruno Marchal > > On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal > >> >> >> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in >> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got >> new memories, including f

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> >> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> >> >> >> >> The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in >> the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he g

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

On 21 Feb 2009, at 07:35, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Stephen Paul King wrote: >> Hi Stathis, >> >>A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological >> criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and, >> by your >> statement below, used by a predominance of me

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

On 22 Feb 2009, at 23:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/23 John Mikes : >> Stathis, >> >> I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: >> >>> "...What I find incoherent is the idea >> that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but >> neverthel

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 17:15, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal > > > The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in > the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got > new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/26 Brent Meeker : > If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream > of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly > it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that > case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com : > > >> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me. It would seem to imply that >> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our >> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memorie

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

russell standish wrote: > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: > >> I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely >> been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though >> probably not Stathis) were unco

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 03:39, russell standish wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com > wrote: >> On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal >> wrote: >>> Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led >>> to fusion of first perso

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/25 meekerdb @dslextreme.com : > It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that > after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our > "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories > belonging to Stathis and some belo

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 25 Feb 2009, at 02:51, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: > > > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker : > > > >> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential > >> compon

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009/2/25 John Mikes : > to your #1 reply: are you equating mind and soul? That would solve a lot of > problems (without making sense for many). Yes. I am hoping someone can explain to me how soul might be something over and above mind, if that is indeed what people who believe in souls think.

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 07:00:39PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: > > I think I am often *not* self-aware. But aside from that, I have definitely > been unconscious several times in my life and I'm sure other people (though > probably not Stathis) were unconscious at the same time. So a

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 6:39 PM, russell standish wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led > > > to fusion of first pe

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 05:51:49PM -0800, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote: > On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Exactly (assuming comp). That is even the reason why amnesia can led > > to fusion of first persons. > > And given that there is (or should be) a notion of first p

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2009 at 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker : > > > >> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential > >> component of > >> personal identity. But that also raises a problem with i

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

Sorry, Stathis: to your #1 reply: are you equating mind and soul? That would solve a lot of problems (without making sense for many). to your #2 reply: artifact free choice of whatever seems 'best'. You might be yearning for being a much 'better' person in many respects. Makes no sense. John M

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 03:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker : > >> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential >> component of >> personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like >> "observer moments" and "continuity". Almost all my memori

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 24 Feb 2009, at 13:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal : > From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for many reasons to the doctor. The copy will not even behave as you. The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zomb

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009/2/24 John Mikes : > Stathis: > two questions. > > 1. > Why are you breaking your head HOW to copy something we don't believe > 'exists' at all? If it aint, don't copy it. Copy what? Copy the mind, by whatever process it takes. > 2. Are you "most of the matter" in your "body"(??) or is there

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/24 Bruno Marchal : >>> From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for >>> many reasons to the doctor. >>> The copy will not even behave as you. >>> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. >>> The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousne

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/24 Brent Meeker : > I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of > personal identity. But that also raises a problem with ideas like > "observer moments" and "continuity". Almost all my memories are not > being remembered at an given time. Some I may not reca

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

Stathis: two questions. 1. Why are you breaking your head HOW to copy something we don't believe 'exists' at all? If it aint, don't copy it. Copy what? 2. Are *you* "most of the matter" in your "body"(??) or is there something more to it? This is exactly my point: if SOMEBODY SOMEHOW is indeed co

Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Stephen Paul King wrote: > - Original Message - > From: "Brent Meeker" > To: > Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM > Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A > Brief Introduction] > > > >> Quentin Anci

Re: Personal Identity and Memory [was Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

- Original Message - From: "Brent Meeker" To: Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> If the "copy" has no memory

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> > > > > The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in > the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got > new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it i

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal > > > The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in > the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got > new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the > movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This p

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

On 23 Feb 2009, at 00:39, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal : > >> From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for >> many reasons to the doctor. >> The copy will not even behave as you. >> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. >> The copy

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

Hi Stathis, Bruno, List, >> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up >> to the unspeakable "you = ONE"). >> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable. >> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much >> more precise. >

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal : > From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for > many reasons to the doctor. > The copy will not even behave as you. > The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie. > The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but >

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009/2/23 John Mikes : > Stathis, > > I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: > >>"...What I find incoherent is the idea > that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but > nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul > cannot be

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

cal Reviews >> >> 2009-02-26 : View this Review Online >> <http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=15326> : View Other NDPR Reviews >> <http://ndpr.nd.edu/> >> >> David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief >> Introduction/, >> Broad

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

Stathis, I usually appreciate the wisdom in your posts. Now I have a retort: >"...What I find incoherent is the idea that the psychological properties might be able to be duplicated but nevertheless there is no continuity of identity because the soul cannot be duplicated."< If you accept the top

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

Stephen Paul King wrote: > Hi Stathis, > > A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological > criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and, by your > statement below, used by a predominance of members of this list is one that > treats conscious self-awa

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

2009/2/21 Stephen Paul King : > > Hi Stathis, > >A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological > criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and, by your > statement below, used by a predominance of members of this list is one that > treats conscious self-

Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

age - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" To: Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 8:01 AM Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction] > > 2009/2/20 Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> Review of a book that may be of interest to the list.

Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

?id=15326> : View Other NDPR Reviews > <http://ndpr.nd.edu/> > > David Shoemaker, /Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction/, > Broadview Press, 2009, 296pp., $26.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551118826. > > *Reviewed by Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College* Thank-you for al

[Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

metaphysics of personal identity, Shoemaker's /Personal Identity and Ethics/ is the first book I know to tackle in such an extended way the question of the relationship between personal identity and our practical concerns. It is a very welcome addition to the philosophical literature. While ev