On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:09, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not
enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal
machine, it
will look like a special moment
On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical
On 12 June 2012 17:36, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Yes, but the expression from the current state of any universal
machine (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
particular machine.
But is
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simultaneously true, because
On 6/11/2012 6:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say
On 11 June 2012 16:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states.
If you introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function
of the theory.
Well, I'm referring to Hoyle's idea, which explicitly introduces
On 09 Jun 2012, at 15:42, David Nyman wrote:
On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list)
can also be
used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that
personal
identity is a relative illusory
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to say that
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some time, and can
only be used as
On 08 Jun 2012, at 19:30, Johnathan Corgan wrote:
On Fri, Jun 8, 2012 at 12:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the
(absence of)
first person view?
I think this is actually the point--calculations of expected future
On Saturday, June 9, 2012 12:27:43 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of
On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote:
On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Nick,
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
of) first person view?
I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of
someone observing
On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be
used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal
identity is a relative illusory notion. We might be a God playing a
trick to
On 6/9/2012 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to maximize your
annihilation probability. Then it might be that your probability of surviving in a world
where you are just not deciding to kill yourself is bigger than surviving from
On Jun 9, 11:17 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote:
On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Nick,
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
of) first person view?
I've drawn
Hi Nick,
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
of) first person view?
Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send
someone in the amnesic arithmetical heaven, as illustrated by some
drugs, I am not sure we should worry about QM
On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi Nick,
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
of) first person view?
I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of
someone observing us over time - i.e. we are schrodingers cat! So
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am
not sure about the equation of unconsciousness with death. Why
On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am
not sure about the equation of
I’ve just read the following paper :
http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt%20final.pdf
which argues that it is possible to avoid the descent into decrepitude
that seems to follow from the quantum theory of immortality (QTI).
Aranyosi argues that this is plausible on the
Oops - so the new branching diagrams came out wrong. OK they should
read
U to U or D or C and C to C or U.
On Jun 8, 12:11 am, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@gmail.com wrote:
I’ve just read the following paper :
http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt%20final.pdf
which
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