On 25/4/22 11:37, kekronbekron wrote:
What about code that does CPU instruction set specific things.
How likely is the success of its compilation on s390x with minimal work.
About 100% likely. Linux is Linux is Linux. IBM have ported all the
compiler tool-chains such a GCC, LLVM/Clang etc. In
Okay, maybe I'm mixing things up.
So 'tainers are doable, assuming the program can first compile to s390x?
What about code that does CPU instruction set specific things.
How likely is the success of its compilation on s390x with minimal work.
If it's "easy", why is the IBM Z and LinuxOne Open
On 23/4/22 14:10, kekronbekron wrote:
Building the s390x containers is straight forward.
Again, really? (honest question).
Are there any public examples for reference?
You know, small enough that it isn't 50 million lines of code or something.
I don't want to speak for Matt but building
That’s what threw my off it didn’t abend in the routine with bakr/pr
It abended in in the IARV64
And I missed this note
• When retry is from an FRR, the value can reflect entries caused by a PC
instruction. All other times, the
value can reflect only entries caused by a BAKR
FRR (since I
The 60D / 14 is telling you that the linkage stack created by BAKR is not
sync with the caller on retry.
https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/zos/2.2.0?topic=recovery-linkage-stack-time-retry
Joe
On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 7:01 PM Joseph Reichman
wrote:
> Hi
>
> I have an SRB in which branch to a routine
Hi
I have an SRB in which branch to a routine which does a BAKR on entry and PR
on exit
My program abended from an in valid value on IARV64 REQUEST=LIST I have the
abend code DC2 and reason AA
That's not my problem my problem is doing the retry I get an abend 60D
reason X'14'
First off for
A keystroke logger on a PC can capture mainframe passwords. Highly
fragmented RACF authority on the mainframe limits exposure.
On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 3:20 PM Joe Monk wrote:
>
> "Given that a healthy percentage of successful attacks involves insiders,
> there
> is no way that z/OS is immune
Seen online is a number of sites. For those who don't know the ATO is the
Australian Taxation Office or the Australian equivalent of the IRS.
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/ato-gives-itself-two-years-to-replace-ibm-mainframe-579023
Based on some discussions friends of mine have been having
The problem is not “fishing on z”. The problem is password sync or sso. If
I have you password, I have it on most platforms. And most sites has the
same userid and internal email (use...@mycorp.com). So who cares how I got
the password?
ITschak
בתאריך יום א׳, 24 באפר׳ 2022 ב-19:06 מאת Seymour J
There are mail servers on mainframes. There are web servers on mainframes. What
prevents a user from doing something stupid?
--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3
From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] on
If an insider falls for a phish, that's something that involves an insider. If
an insider fails to reset a default password, that's something that involves an
insider. If an insider writes his passwords down, that involves an insider. It
doesn't have to be malicious to be harmful.
Ransomeware
Phishing doesn't happen on mainframes. A user who works at a company that
has a mainframe but no access cannot be a phishing threat to a mainframe.
That was my point.
Joe
On Sun, Apr 24, 2022 at 10:34 AM Gibney, Dave <
03b5261cfd78-dmarc-requ...@listserv.ua.edu> wrote:
> It is arguable
It is arguable that a successful phish involved on insider.
> -Original Message-
> From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List On
> Behalf Of Joe Monk
> Sent: Sunday, April 24, 2022 8:20 AM
> To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
> Subject: Re: IBM (IBM Z) , Lenovo, HPE and Huawei Servers Rank as Most
>
"Given that a healthy percentage of successful attacks involves insiders, there
is no way that z/OS is immune to breaches."
Umm, you may want to rethink that statement...
"Phishing and related attacks — such as smishing (phishing lures sent over
SMS messages) and business email compromise
Given that a healthy percentage of successful attacks involves insiders, there
is no way that z/OS is immune to breaches. The best that can be said is that,
properly administered, it is more secure than some other platforms.
--
Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz
http://mason.gmu.edu/~smetz3
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