On 15/11/22 23:30, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
On Mon 14/Nov/2022 19:29:10 +0100 Evan Burke wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 8:03 AM Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>
>>> The exception is a standardised mechanism to allow a sender/signer to
>>> indicate the [approximate] number of intended recipients,
On 15/11/22 23:10, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
On Mon 14/Nov/2022 18:54:33 +0100 Wei Chuang wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 8:03 AM Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>
>> BTW, we all know that mailing lists send one message at a time, doing
>> VERP for each subscriber. They can more easily include the
On 15/11/22 03:01, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> The exception is a standardised mechanism to allow a sender/signer to
> indicate the [approximate] number of intended recipients, with which
> receivers might make fact-based decisions about when to recognise an
> instance of this particular attack
On November 16, 2022 4:11:27 AM UTC, Roland Turner
wrote:
>On 15/11/22 23:29, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>
>> Wei might argue that their signature means "We attest that this passed
>> through us, and we did our best to make sure it was legitimate before it
>> went out", than the more
On 14/11/22 22:12, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
On Mon 14/Nov/2022 01:26:29 +0100 Scott Kitterman wrote:
>
>> Because of DKIM’s broad deployment, compatibility with existing
>> deployments will be a critical factor, and it is unlikely that proposals
>> that lack compatibility will proceed to
On November 15, 2022 3:12:22 PM UTC, Barry Leiba
wrote:
>On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 11:03 AM Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>>
>> On Mon 14/Nov/2022 05:50:42 +0100 Roland Turner wrote:
>> > I'd point out that all but one of those things is either redundant (vs. say
>> > ARC), unacceptably harmful (we
On 15/11/22 23:29, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
Wei might argue that their signature means "We attest that this passed
through us, and we did our best to make sure it was legitimate before
it went out", than the more absolute "We claim this is legitimate and
we are willing to stake our
On 14/11/22 22:03, Laura Atkins wrote:
Does it make sense to add in a brief discussion of ‘responsibility for
the message'? As I see it, responsibility implies able to do something
against the originator of the message or act to stop the message if it
turns out to be a problem. If it’s your
On 14/11/22 20:38, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 12:26 AM Scott Kitterman
wrote:
Is compatibility with DKIM sufficient for the charter or should
there be
broader language about compatibility with existing email
architecture? I'm
inclined to say
On 14/11/22 20:34, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
On Sat, Nov 12, 2022 at 7:32 AM Roland Turner
wrote:
On 11/11/22 23:09, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
More concerning to me: The IETF has previously taken the position
that the market will figure out spam and phishing, and therefore
On 14/11/22 20:07, Wei Chuang wrote:
On Sun, Nov 13, 2022 at 8:50 PM Roland Turner
wrote:
On 13/11/22 03:05, Wei Chuang wrote:
On Fri, Nov 11, 2022 at 11:17 PM Roland Turner
wrote:
1. Unless one or more of the larger receivers (a) has a
useful tool to
On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 11:03 AM Alessandro Vesely wrote:
>
> On Mon 14/Nov/2022 05:50:42 +0100 Roland Turner wrote:
> > I'd point out that all but one of those things is either redundant (vs. say
> > ARC), unacceptably harmful (we use DKIM *in the first place* to facilitate
> > forwarding
On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 11:04 AM Laura Atkins
wrote:
> Does it make sense to add in a brief discussion of ‘responsibility for the
> message'? As I see it, responsibility implies able to do something against
> the originator of the message or act to stop the message if it turns out to
> be a
On Mon 14/Nov/2022 18:54:33 +0100 Wei Chuang wrote:
On Mon, Nov 14, 2022 at 8:03 AM Alessandro Vesely wrote:
BTW, we all know that mailing lists send one message at a time, doing
VERP for each subscriber. They can more easily include the recipient in
the ARC signature. However, any spammer
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