On 11/24/10 10:44 PM, Douglas Otis wrote:
> On 11/24/10 11:38 AM, Mark Delany wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 10:57:58AM -0800, Douglas Otis allegedly wrote:
>>> On 11/24/10 9:01 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote:
On 11/23/2010 3:14 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
> Actually, they're complementary. In pl
On 11/24/10 11:38 AM, Mark Delany wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 10:57:58AM -0800, Douglas Otis allegedly wrote:
>> On 11/24/10 9:01 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote:
>>> On 11/23/2010 3:14 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
Actually, they're complementary. In places where DKIM fails
(mailing lists rewriti
On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 10:57:58AM -0800, Douglas Otis allegedly wrote:
> On 11/24/10 9:01 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote:
> >
> > On 11/23/2010 3:14 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
> > > Actually, they're complementary. In places where DKIM fails
> > > (mailing lists rewriting messages), SPF can succeed. And in p
On 11/24/10 9:01 AM, Dave CROCKER wrote:
>
> On 11/23/2010 3:14 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
> > Actually, they're complementary. In places where DKIM fails
> > (mailing lists rewriting messages), SPF can succeed. And in places
> > where SPF fails (message forwarding), DKIM can succeed.
>
> This assert
On 24/11/10 16:02, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
> +1. For different reasons, both ADSP and SPF seem to need a revision.
> Is there an opportunity to be taken here?
Not in this WG with this charter.
Let's get done with out work items.
S.
___
NOTE WELL:
On 11/23/2010 5:50 AM, Tony Hansen wrote:
> Instead of using failed DKIM signatures as a way to blacklist messages
> and potentially discard them, I suggest you concentrate on ways to use
> verified DKIM signatures along with reputation mechanisms in order to
> whitelist messages.
+10
d/
--
On 11/23/2010 3:14 AM, Ian Eiloart wrote:
> Actually, they're complementary. In places where DKIM fails (mailing lists
> rewriting messages), SPF can succeed. And in places where SPF fails
> (message forwarding), DKIM can succeed.
This assertion of facts is almost certainly incorrect.
Please s
--On 24 November 2010 10:42:01 -0500 "John R. Levine"
wrote:
> This really does need to be a FAQ.
>
>>> DKIM works just dandy, when lists sign their mail like this one does.
>
>> Unless the intermediary co-operates by re-signing, mailing lists can
>> break DKIM signatures.
>
> Quite true. Bu
Let's not do this on this list.
On 24/11/10 15:42, John R. Levine wrote:
> This really does need to be a FAQ.
>
>>> DKIM works just dandy, when lists sign their mail like this one does.
>
>> Unless the intermediary co-operates by re-signing, mailing lists can break
>> DKIM signatures.
>
> Qui
On 24/Nov/10 16:46, Ian Eiloart wrote:
> DKIM and SPF both permit the use of domain based reputation
> databases. Unfortunately, both have problems with various paths
> that emails may take. Fortunately, the problematic paths are
> different - mailing lists are problematic for one, and forwarding
--On 24 November 2010 09:53:41 -0500 Wietse Venema
wrote:
> Ian Eiloart:
>> Unless the intermediary co-operates by re-signing, mailing lists can
>> break DKIM signatures. Since mailing lists generally use their own
>> rfc5321 return paths, SPF failures should not result. Of course, a
>> brok
This really does need to be a FAQ.
>> DKIM works just dandy, when lists sign their mail like this one does.
> Unless the intermediary co-operates by re-signing, mailing lists can break
> DKIM signatures.
Quite true. But broken signatures are only a problem in a mutant version
of DKIM unlike t
Ian Eiloart:
> Unless the intermediary co-operates by re-signing, mailing lists can break
> DKIM signatures. Since mailing lists generally use their own rfc5321 return
> paths, SPF failures should not result. Of course, a broken DKIM signature
> is equivalent to none at all. You should not rejec
--On 23 November 2010 12:18:44 -0500 "John R. Levine"
wrote:
>> Actually, they're complementary. In places where DKIM fails (mailing
>> lists rewriting messages), SPF can succeed.
>
> Haven't we been over this a hundred times already? It's ADSP, not DKIM,
> that fails on mailing list mail.
>
>
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