Re: Re: Endianness of IPv6 and payloads

2006-09-14 Thread Tim Enos
>From: Iljitsch van Beijnum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Date: 2006/09/14 Thu PM 02:26:39 CDT >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Cc: IETF IPv6 Mailing List >Subject: Re: Endianness of IPv6 and payloads >On 13-sep-2006, at 20:15, Bob Hinden wrote: > >> In my personal view, while this is a nice theoretical problem, n

features of IPv6

2006-09-14 Thread Kayumba .H Thierry
hi to all how to test the features and the perfomance of IPv6 ?   Regards. IETF IPv6 working group mailing list ipv6@ietf.org Administrative Requests: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6

Re: Endianness of IPv6 and payloads

2006-09-14 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 13-sep-2006, at 20:15, Bob Hinden wrote: In my personal view, while this is a nice theoretical problem, no evidence has been presented that anyone building an implementation is confused about it. For example, were there ever any interoperability problems because someone did this wrong?

Re : MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread Kayumba .H Thierry
hello all, 1.can you help me with theoritical concepts and terminology related to IPv6?   2.can you also help me with configuration's notes of transtions strategies (dual stack and tunneling ) Cheers   - Message d'origine De : Elwyn Davies <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>À : [EMAIL PROTECTED]Cc : [EMAI

Re: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread Elwyn Davies
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi all, as we all know Link Local addresses and communicating through them are a must in an IPv6 environment. Without it Neighbor Discovery will not work and so address resolution. Our system enables one to set an MTU for and IPv6 address. So it is very much possible

RE: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread sasson_shuki
Thanks for your answer! Shuki -Original Message- From: Templin, Fred L [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 12:00 PM To: Suresh Krishnan; sasson, shuki Cc: harris, arthur; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; viswanadha, kamakshi; ipv6@ietf.org; nathanson, daphna Subject: RE: MTU o

RE: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread Templin, Fred L
> I wonder if the grouping together devices with the same MTU/MRU > capabilities into different on-link prefixes, and then having a > per-prefix MTU would overcome some of the per-neighbour MTU issues > identified at that time. Well, fe80::/10 is an on-link prefix and in some use-cases there might

RE: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread Templin, Fred L
Don't forget though that tunnels are also links with link-local addresses and there may be arbitrary physical link technologies (with heterogeneous MTUs) on the paths between tunnel endpoints. All links are required to support a minimum MTU of 1280 bytes for IPv6, and this is no different for tunn

Re: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread Mark Smith
On Thu, 14 Sep 2006 10:41:34 -0400 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Hi Mark, the setting of MTU to 1280 will not block larger packets from > coming in (this will be limited by the physical device capability) but > will force the packets sent through that IP to be fragmented to a > maximum of 1280 size p

RES: [SAVA] Re: [Int-area] Call For Participation andInterest:Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA)

2006-09-14 Thread Robson Oliveira
The safe seems to be more expensive than gold pot. Why nobody steals the on-line banks daily? Perhaps its operational systems are safer than others. I suggest to fix the operational systems vunerabilities on the end. -Mensagem original- De: Gunter Van de Velde (gvandeve) [mailto:[EMAIL PRO

Re: [SAVA] Re: [Int-area] Call For Participation and Interest:SourceAddress Validation Architecture (SAVA)

2006-09-14 Thread Jun Bi
Hi Ijitsch and Gunter, I fully agree that DDoS avoidance is a very important issue, if SAVA can successfully resolve the problem of source address (based on existing mechanisms and some new mechanisms) then other WG can work on top of SAVA to resolve DDoS, to design trust identifier (based on t

Re: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread Suresh Krishnan
Hi Sasson, It should be 2. the MTU of the NIC device on the link (assuming it is properly configured). You can certainly use 1280 bytes as an MTU but if you link can support substantially larger MTU, it is inefficient to use 1280. Cheers Suresh [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi all, as we all k

RE: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread sasson_shuki
Thanks! Shuki -Original Message- From: Suresh Krishnan [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 11:02 AM To: sasson, shuki Cc: ipv6@ietf.org; harris, arthur; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; viswanadha, kamakshi; nathanson, daphna Subject: Re: MTU on a Link Local Address. Hi Sasso

RE: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread sasson_shuki
Hi Mark, the setting of MTU to 1280 will not block larger packets from coming in (this will be limited by the physical device capability) but will force the packets sent through that IP to be fragmented to a maximum of 1280 size packets. The only issue is that we are loosing performance by setting

Re: MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread Mark Smith
On Thu, 14 Sep 2006 10:02:02 -0400 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Hi all, as we all know Link Local addresses and communicating through them > are a must in an IPv6 environment. Without it Neighbor Discovery will not > work and so address resolution. > Our system enables one to set an MTU for and IP

MTU on a Link Local Address.

2006-09-14 Thread sasson_shuki
Hi all, as we all know Link Local addresses and communicating through them are a must in an IPv6 environment. Without it Neighbor Discovery will not work and so address resolution. Our system enables one to set an MTU for and IPv6 address. So it is very much possible to set the MTU also for the

RE: [SAVA] Re: [Int-area] Call For Participation and Interest:Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA)

2006-09-14 Thread Gunter Van de Velde \(gvandeve\)
DDOS avoidance is quite high up my list of priority also... I would be additionally interrested in a mechanism that would identify the attacker or identify sources of SPAM. G/ -Original Message- From: Iljitsch van Beijnum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, September 14, 2006 3:56

Re: [SAVA] Re: [Int-area] Call For Participation and Interest: Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA)

2006-09-14 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 12-sep-2006, at 16:31, Jun Bi wrote: DDoS attacks is a cross-layer problems, so the DDoS prevention is out of SAVA's scope. So what's the use then? Non-DoS related source address spoofing is easily thwarted by doing a return routability check that contains a hard-to-guess nonce. The

Re: [Int-area] Call For Participation and Interest: Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA)

2006-09-14 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 12-sep-2006, at 11:25, Pekka Savola wrote: Ingress filtering is definitely to be recommended, and uRPF filtering certainly does have its uses, but, at least in the current state of the Internet, they are insufficient as a protection for the routing infrastructure. If this refers to ens