On 24-May-2007, at 17:07, Joe Abley wrote:
I've identified the following areas in which 00 might be modified,
based on traffic in this list and a small handful of private mail.
Please comment on the following, and point out any other
outstanding issues that I missed.
I have made some edi
Hi Markku,
The following is a quote RFC2460.
The Option Type identifiers are internally encoded such that their
highest-order two bits specify the action that must be taken if the
processing IPv6 node does not recognize the Option Type:
O
O
O
10 - discard the packet and, re
On Mon, 28 May 2007, Vishwas Manral wrote:
I am not sure if RPF can catch it all.
Its not the same as bombarding the source itself. With the attack I
mention, we can actually send one packet (which goes to all members of
the multicast group). This will cause all the members of the multicast
grou
Hi Vishwas,
The multicast RPF algorithm allows a multicast router to accept
a multicast datagram only on the interface where it would send a unicast
datagram to the source of that datagram. The first multicast router
receiving this specific spoofed source datagram will notice that the
packe
Hi Pekka,
I am not sure if RPF can catch it all.
Its not the same as bombarding the source itself. With the attack I
mention, we can actually send one packet (which goes to all members of
the multicast group). This will cause all the members of the multicast
group to send a reply to one source.
On Mon, 28 May 2007, Vishwas Manral wrote:
I noticed one more security issue like the Destination options header
attack. A packet is sent by using a destination header as a Multicast
Group address, and source address of the machine to be attacked. A
random Option type is added to the destination
The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'IP Version 6 over PPP '
as a Draft Standard
This document is the product of the IP Version 6 Working Group Working
Group.
The IESG contact persons are Jari Arkko and Mark Townsley.
A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/intern
Hi,
I noticed one more security issue like the Destination options header
attack. A packet is sent by using a destination header as a Multicast
Group address, and source address of the machine to be attacked. A
random Option type is added to the destination Options header, which
has the highest o
