Dear all,
the full recording (synchronized video, audio, slides and jabber room) of the
6MAN WG session at IETF 86 is available at the following URL:
http://ietf86.conf.meetecho.com/index.php/Recorded_Sessions#6MAN
In case of problems with the playout, just drop an e-mail to
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>The "SEC" part of CGA is meant to protect against a different attack, one
in which the attacker has not cracked the private key. Instead, the attacker
uses a public/private key pair of his own >choosing, and arrange for the
hash of that key to match the CGA address of the target. This "only"
requi
As you say, the attack that you mention depends on the strength of RSA or ECC.
In fact, pretty much all of public key cryptography depends on that strength.
It is generally assumed that cracking a long enough RSA or ECC key is nearly
impossible.
The "SEC" part of CGA is meant to protect against
Hi Christian,
> But can y toou explain why you believe that retrieving the private key
from the public key and a clear text/encrypted text pair is easier than
breaking a hash?
Here we do not use any encryption and decryption and we just sign the
message using private key and verify the mes
It is very clear that if the attacker finds the private key, the size of the
hash does not matter. But can you explain why you believe that retrieving the
private key from the public key and a clear text/encrypted text pair is easier
than breaking a hash? Did you somehow crack RSA?
From: ipv6-b
Hello,
There was a discussion during my presentation about security considerations
regarding the use of my algorithm compared with those of the use of CGA. A
big mistake that is made when considering CGA security is that the sec value
plays an important role and that an attacker will need to do br
