Re: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

>> >> > Because as processors get faster, the relative amount of work remains > constant at 2^59, but the absolute amount of processing time per > operation decreases for both attacker and defender. So the absolute > amount of time required to mount a successful attack also decreases over > the l

RE: RE: RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

i'; 'Ray Hunter' Subject: Re: RE: RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas Christian Huitema 写于 2013-03-25 12:33:40: > > What is the pointing of adding sec since the ratio of effor > required by  attacker and user is alwa

Re: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

> Sujing Zhou > 25 March 2013 06:54 > > Christian Huitema 写于 2013-03-25 12:33:40: > > > > What is the pointing of adding sec since the ratio of effor > > required by attacker and user is always 2^59, as Jari argued. > > > > 2^59 is a rather large number. Everything

Re: RE: RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

Christian Huitema 写于 2013-03-25 12:33:40: > > What is the pointing of adding sec since the ratio of effor > required by attacker and user is always 2^59, as Jari argued. > > 2^59 is a rather large number. Everything else being equal, another > 1 second of computation at the user translates i

RE: RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

> What is the pointing of adding sec since the ratio of effor required by   > attacker and user is always 2^59, as Jari argued. 2^59 is a rather large number. Everything else being equal, another 1 second of computation at the user translates into another 18 billion years at the attacker. -- C

Re: RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

ge- > From: Hosnieh Rafiee [mailto:i...@rozanak.com] > Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 4:08 PM > To: 'Jari Arkko' > Cc: 'Santosh Chokhani'; ipv6@ietf.org; s...@ietf.org; 'Ray Hunter'; > Christian Huitema; 'Erik Nordmark'; zhou.suj...@zte.co

Re: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

In your previous mail you wrote: > => I strongly disagree: the use of those SHAx steps is the way to extend the > search space and until SHAx pre-images are broken for the worst case (i.e., > no attack better than brute force). > > Be patient please. It takes time to prepare a response beca

RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

Francis, => I strongly disagree: the use of those SHAx steps is the way to extend the search space and until SHAx pre-images are broken for the worst case (i.e., no attack better than brute force). Be patient please. It takes time to prepare a response because I will need to work on code to bre

Re: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

In your previous mail you wrote: > > What changes from RFC 3972 to your draft in this high-level analysis? > > The difference between my draft and that of RFC 3972 is that I make use of > the public key in the IP address directly. => this is IMHO a bad idea because it limits the search spac

RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

snieh Rafiee [mailto:i...@rozanak.com] Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2013 4:08 PM To: 'Jari Arkko' Cc: 'Santosh Chokhani'; ipv6@ietf.org; s...@ietf.org; 'Ray Hunter'; Christian Huitema; 'Erik Nordmark'; zhou.suj...@zte.com.cn; 'Jeffrey Hutzelman' Sub

RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - I-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

Jari, > What changes from RFC 3972 to your draft in this high-level analysis? The difference between my draft and that of RFC 3972 is that I make use of the public key in the IP address directly. Doing it the way I have explained in my draft eliminates the need for the use of those SHAx steps be