List, John:
3.418. "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to
a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under
which it suits our purposes to state the fact."
On Dec 6, 2015, at 6:26 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 4, 2015
Hello Edwina, List,
Thank you for offering some examples drawn from other texts.
It looks to me like Peirce, in this part of the 1903 Lowell Lectures, is being
more fine grained in his analysis than you are being in your quick explanation.
Two quick observations. First, Peirce is
Jerry, List:
I believe my metaphysics are those of C.S. Peirce. Peirce's pope-positivism is
also assumed explicitly in our book, Every Thing Must Go, which does take
modern physics as a starting point. So perhaps I have made my ideas clear, and
the resulting argument is pretty
Dear Franklin, List members:
I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out now. It
is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit subtle. I left
it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce scholars It appears
in several places in
Jeffrey, list - I think the differentiation between 2-2 and 2-1 as modal
categories refers to their functioning within an interaction (Relation) as
independent or dependent.
So, a Relation in a mode of pure Secondness acknowledges the separate
existential reality of the two 'nodes' - the wind
Jeffrey- you wrote:
"the first distinction between forms of seconds is based on the character of
the relations the objects (or subjects) stand in, and the second distinction
between forms of secondness is based on the character of the relationships
themselves--considered in abstraction from
Hi Gary R., Gary F., (and Nathan and Ben if you reading this), List,
My aim is to see how the methods for attaining the three grades of clarity
about the conceptions of relative, relationship and relation might give us
insight into the phenomenological account of the categories in their more
John,
You said:
The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference
> in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with
> Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it
> that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no
Helmut, you ask,
Have I understood correctly:
--Embodiment means, that it is a complete triadic sign, eg.:
(1), qualisign, is not embodied, (1.1), iconic qualisign, is not completely
embodied either, but (1.1.1), rhematic iconic qualisign, is embodied?
No, that can’t be it, because any
Jeff,
I see that the list has been busy while I’ve been off doing other things, so it
might take me awhile to catch up, starting with this message of yours.
I too would like to learn more about the way Peirce is drawing on the
phenomenological categories as he categorizes different kinds
List, John:
On Dec 6, 2015, at 8:04 AM, John Collier wrote:
> Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to
> something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or
> we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to
>
John,
I don't think I have any significant disagreement with much of what you've
had to say concerning Peirce's commitment to the external element in
experience. I am curious though as to whether you believe you experience
external minds, and if so, whether you would count them as physical? I
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