John, I don't think I have any significant disagreement with much of what you've had to say concerning Peirce's commitment to the external element in experience. I am curious though as to whether you believe you experience external minds, and if so, whether you would count them as physical? I feel as though asking this question might be somehow perceived as obnoxious, but I confess that I have a sincere desire to understand how you think about it; since what you've had to say seems to imply, so far as I can tell, that you would probably admit that you experience external minds (like my mind), but that you also have to admit that you think of the experience of my mind as of something physical, not mental (i.e., not referring to illusions, dreams, etc.), since it is something external to you. Have I ascertained your point of view rightly on this, or am I guilty of warping your meaning in some unfortunate way?
-- Franklin On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 9:04 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Dear Franklin, List members: > > > > I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out > now. It is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit > subtle. I left it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce > scholars It appears in several places in slightly different forms in > Peirce’s writings. I would argue that it is very difficult if not > impossible to accept many of Peirce’s more systematic ideas without > accepting this argument I lay out. > > > > Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to > something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or > we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to > Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the > objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has > to be given up. Now that there are experiences, including mental > experiences, is objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to > mental experiences alone without making it depend on psychology rather than > objective conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for > objectivity in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred > to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see > to have a propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an > external aspect in order to support objective differences in meaning. > Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of experiences that are of > external things. The child, he says, learns to recognize that not all > things are under his control, but must be at least in part caused by > external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of the > external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this > class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just > identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are > illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and > dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples – > though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but > Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere > possibility – a “defeater” in terms of contemporary pragmatist > epistemology), but the basic way to check membership is whether or not they > are at least in part not under our control. This needs to be tested, as we > can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in general (or we violate the > defeater requirement). > > > > Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of > definitions floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine > defines the physical as that which is accessible through the senses (not > what physics tells us is physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me) > since there are the afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics > tells us is physical is a good place to start, but of course physics has > been wrong, so this is more of a control than a criterion. I think it is > safe to say, though, that everything that science has been able to study > effectively so far has a physical basis. I would think that the physical > has a number of signs, and that there is a consilience that eventually > leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce was, in fact, a kind of > idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there is presumably no > contradiction between his views about experience, and the physical, and at > least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, but that is > neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument that I have > reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or mental > experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical, > mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least. > In order to make our ideas clear we need to make reference to this external > component, on pain of subjectivism, psychologism, and making distinctions > in thoughts that have no distinction in their objects. So Peirce’s > prope-postivism also takes us back to the Pragmatic Maxim, that thought is > all in signs, and his notion of the basis of experience. > > > > Obviously there are some assumptions here, and one could reject any one of > them (accept subjectivism, or psychologism, or other forms of antirealism, > as examples), which many philosophers do. But the assumptions are made > deeply in Peirce’s philosophy. I think he was right about this. > > > > I could give a bunch of references to Peirce’s writings that support my > interpretation, but this is long enough already and I have to go shopping. > I hope it is at least close to sufficient to respond to your worry. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier >
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