List, John: On Dec 6, 2015, at 8:04 AM, John Collier wrote:
> Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to > something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or > we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to > Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity > test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given > up. Now that there are experiences, including mental experiences, is > objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to mental experiences > alone without making it depend on psychology rather than objective > conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for objectivity > in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred to has to be > of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see to have a > propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an external aspect > in order to support objective differences in meaning. Peirce resolves this by > setting aside a class of experiences that are of external things. The child, > he says, learns to recognize that not all things are under his control, but > must be at least in part caused by external influences, so some experience is > composed of signs of the external. This is a very early and necessary > abduction. Membership in this class of supposed externally based experiences > (which Peirce often just identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further > evidence (there are illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most > extreme case – and dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ > examples – though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, > but Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere > possibility – Well said! While several phases are open to refinement, the paragraph captures several of CSP's philosophical positions in a rhetorical sense. The units of thought which ground CSP's trichotomy are readily categorized from the assertion: Meaning has to be referenced to something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given up . Roughly speaking, the external objectivity test (thing - representation - form) was the then nascent science of chemistry. Like mathematics, chemistry used highly abstract symbols to relate invisible objects to one-another, but the logical meaning of chemical symbols was obscure in 19 th Century. CSP was aware that certain mathematical indices were EXACT physical representations of physical measurements and that broad classes of such mathematical calculations were consistent with one-another. (Today, we refer to the logical terms of molecular weight and molecular formula. These are generic terms, that can be applied to any chemical identity.) One of the big "open questions" that CSP studied throughout his life was the question: What is a molecule? Clearly, each chemical element is a relative of every other chemical element. As a collection, the concept of "table of elements" was used to express the relatedness of all elements. The relatedness of all elements was a fact based on analysis of molecules and the difference in the quali-signs of molecules and the fact that certain molecules (Water, Carbon Monoxide, Carbon Dioxide, Methane, Ammonia) could be made from elements. Thus, CSP sought to develop a logic of relatives that was consistent with his knowledge of mathematical calculations of molecular weight and molecular formula, the chemical table of elements, and the diagram as he understood it as a molecular formula. In CSP 3.416, "A relation is a fact about a number of things" is a wide-ranging assertion about his beliefs about his objectivity of facts. It should (must) be contrast with the definitions of relations as variables or as sets. Sections 3.415-3.424 deserve careful reading in this context of his objectivity. Section 3.468-3.483 shows directly the role of chemical relatives, taken as objective facts of chemical relations, are extended into his logic of relatives and his notion of graph theory. Can one conclude that CSP referenced the meaning of objectivity, the meaning of objects and meaning of logic to the nascent generalizations of the consequences of physical measurements expressed in chemical symbols? The union of these units of thought give a unity to a substantial fraction of CSP's claims for realism and the objectivity of the sciences. The three trichotomies, which ground his system of signs, offer substantial support for a recursive system of objective logic consistent with chemical relatives and chemical relations. The critical bridging terms for this interpretation are the indices (molecular weight and molecular formula (as medads)) and the rhema (analogs of chemical radicals.) Hilbert, many years later, proposed that mathematical relations are based on consistency, completeness and decidability. The union of the units of thoughts of objectivity, chemical relative/relations, logical objects, and graph theory give coherence to CSP's ratiocinations. What fails in the CSP objective world view, in my opinion, is the criteria of decidability. The proposed logical scheme of the three trichotomies as a propositional logic for the sciences fails to show an path between premises and conclusions. In the absence of pragmatic criteria for decidability, the scientific community sought and found alternative logical schema. Looking backward from stance of logic today, the absence of decidability is a consequence of the vast complexity of chemical logic (molecular biology/molecular medicine) relative to the narrow scope of objective chemical premisses available to CSP. More specifically, the logic of chemistry as electricity particles lacked the exact logic of the atomic numbers. This post is far to long and summaries far to many thoughts. Perhaps some readers will find some coherence in this message, but it is far to technical for most, I fear. But, the essential message is that John's paragraph captures many facets of CSP's thought in a fruitful and meaningful form. I have tried to show that it is useful in interpreting the origins of the logic of relatives and relations. Cheers Jerry
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
