Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jerry C., List: What would be some examples of medad Rhemes that are not Propositions? If there are any, why did Peirce explicitly affirm (at least twice) that a medad Rheme *is *a Proposition? Or is there an important distinction between a Rheme and a rhema that I am overlooking? Thanks, Jon

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

JAS, List > On Jul 5, 2018, at 4:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > According as the number of blanks in a rheme is 0, 1, 2, 3, etc., it may be > termed a medad (from {méden}, nothing), monad, dyad, triad, etc., rheme. (CP > 2.272, EP 2:299; 1903) > > The first sentence requires at least one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Gary F., List: Do you happen to know whether that definition of "signification" appeared in the 1901-2 version of Baldwin's *Dictionary*, or only the 1911 version? Notice that it never once mentions the Interpretant, but it does include the statement, "The ‘signification’ of a term is all the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

I mean that signs are prior to language and thus are closer to reality and thus transcend in that sense. Peirce seems to place emphasis of the amorphousness, vagueness and essential independence of signs untol they are named in which case we have entered the picture and created signs. I suppose

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List, Stephen > On Jul 5, 2018, at 2:59 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote: > > One good reason for semiotics is its transcending of language. Are you placing the cart before the horse? Historically, the opposite appears to be the case. The very constrained meaning of any sign motivates the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Sounds a bit like semantic populism. One good reason for semiotics is its transcending of language. But there is no cure for our individual insistence on knowing what we are seeing, reading or hearing. I think Peirce was best at insisting on some form of communal assent to truth at which point he

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List: It may be of interest to some to look at the meaning of speculative grammar from two other views, Commens quote and the Modistae. IN particular, the concept of the “mirror” is critical to the art of scientific representations / representamens. > On Jul 5, 2018, at 9:30 AM,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List, Gary…. > On Jul 5, 2018, at 9:30 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Jerry, > > Peirce always insisted that the analysis of propositions or of their meanings > should not be based on linguistic grammar, i.e. on the ‘parts of speech’ > involved, because the linguistic structure of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jerry, Peirce always insisted that the analysis of propositions or of their meanings should not be based on linguistic grammar, i.e. on the ‘parts of speech’ involved, because the linguistic structure of the sentences that represent propositions varies from language to language, and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

List: > On Jul 5, 2018, at 7:38 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > In your other post, you wrote, “A Rheme not only must have at least one blank > empty, but also at least one blank filled; it must have either breadth or > depth, just not both.” I don’t know where you get this idea … A rheme

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's late classification of signs

Jon, It is probably true that Peirce did not explicitly talk about a “signified interpretant” before 1906, but that usage is a natural extension of the concept of signification and of depth as opposed to breadth, which did not change in Peirce’s mind. Have a look at Peirce’s entry on