Edwina, List:
ET: You, JAS, are giving us only half of the quotation that defines
'Objective Idealism'.
This is patently false, since Gary R. quoted the entire passage just a
couple of days ago, and I have quoted both parts of the relevant sentence
throughout this exchange.
ET: My interpretat
Jon, List,
The questions lead, I think, to a natural progression.
1) We seek a mathematically adequate conception of continuity for the sake of
developing a sufficiently rich conception of continuity for inquiry in logic
and semiotics.
2) In turn, we seek a logically adequate conception of
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}JAS, Helmut, list
1] Your first quote [JAS's] where you quote Peirce that god is 'a
Spirit, or Mind" does not, as I interpret, mean that God is 3ns. I've
never viewed Mind as equated with 'Spirit' but as equated w
Helmut, Edwina, List:
HR: Well, this is just out of intuition: I would say, that "pure mind" or
"disembodied spirit" is not 3ns, but 1ns ...
Okay, but that is definitely not what *Peirce* said.
CSP: Thus, He [God] is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular
Existent (meaning by an E
Jeff, List:
Thanks for your comments. I agree that the contemporary field of
mathematics still seems to be mostly wedded to the set-theoretical
approach, although I wonder if category theory offers an alternative more
conducive to Peirce's late "topological" conception of continuity; Fernando
Zal
Helmut, list
I'd agree with you - I don't see 'pure mind' or 'disembodied spirit'
as 3ns. Thirdness, in my understanding, emerges WITH Matter and is not
separate from its existence. And yes, possibility/1ns is a state and
outside of time.
With regard to the concept of a
Jon, List,
In the opening remarks of the last lecture in RLT, Peirce frames three
questions. Let me restate them in my own words.
1. What conception of continuity is needed for mathematics?
2. What conception of continuity is needed for a philosophical theory of
critical logic and the
List:
The new subject line is the title of the paper by Matthew E. Moore that I
quoted below. It turns out that there are two versions available
online--the original, delivered as a conference presentation in 2012 (
https://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/lectures_papers/mattew-moore-paper.pdf)
Jon, list,
Well, this is just out of intuition: I would say, that "pure mind" or "disembodied spirit" is not 3ns, but 1ns: Possibility. Possibility is a state, not a process, so it does not depend on time. Maybe even not on space? But a 3ns includes 2ns, reaction, and reaction is a process in
Edwina, List:
ET: You are merging 'idealism' and 'objective idealism' and the two are
not synonyms of each other.
Of course they are not synonyms; as I already explained, *objective *idealism
is one *variety *of idealism, and *subjective *idealism is another. Peirce
was distinguishing his "Sch
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}JAS, list
Again, I disagree with your interpretation. You are merging
'idealism' and 'objective idealism' and the two are not synonyms of
each other.
I disagree that Peirce sees 'Mind as more fundamental
Edwina, List:
ET: Peirce did write that "the physical law as derived and special, the
psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism" 6.24. BUT he did NOT
say that he accepted this - ie, with idealism alone as primordial; and the
physical as derived.
On the contrary, he plainly stated tha
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}JAS, list
Please define 'objective idealism'. As a 'species of idealism' [and
I'm not sure what that means] - please explain the difference between
'idealism' and 'objective idealism'. I don't object to the term o
Edwina, List:
ET: I feel that your view of Peirce, with its 'idealism' rather than
'objective idealism' is in line with your own personal theism.
I feel that your view of Peirce, with its absurd claim that objective
idealism is somehow not a species of idealism, is in line with your own
persona
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}JAS, list
I cannot find that section in 2.322 where Peirce inserts, in
brackets that, eg, 'consciousness' is [1ns]...etc - and I disagree
with such an insertion. Firstness is feeling, without consciousness -
which
Edwina, List:
ET: Simply repeating your position is not an argument.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Aug 3, 2019 at 10:09 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> JAS, list
>
> Simply repeating your position is not an argument. As I've said - you have
> failed to differentiate - and it's a crucial differentiati
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}JAS, list
Simply repeating your position is not an argument. As I've said -
you have failed to differentiate - and it's a crucial differentiation
- between 'idealism' and 'objective idealism'.
This means
John, List:
JFS: There are many philosophers and theologians of various persuasions
who agree with that equation at a "sufficiently vague" level.
Maybe so, but your claim was that it is vague enough to be *certain*, which
I continue to deny. Equating any two of those terms within a particular
Helmut, List:
On the contrary, according to Peirce, the necessary being of pure mind
(3ns) does not require time, space, or matter.
CSP: If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in
the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing, no reaction
[2ns] and no qualit
Edwina, List:
Again, Peirce's position is quite plainly stated in the text of CP
6.24-25--not dualism, neutralism, or materialism, but idealism;
specifically, objective idealism, which holds "the psychical law alone as
primordial" and "that matter is effete mind."
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Ola
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