Jon,
Thanks for your response. Let me try to make what I was saying a little
clearer.
'Do you see that long slanting line on the face of the water? Now,
that's a reef. Moreover,
it's a bluff reef. There is a solid sand-bar under it that is nearly
as straight up and down as
the side
Jon,
Part of what you're saying:
The Object always determines the Sign.
The Sign always determines the Interpretant.
The Object always determines the Interpretant through the mediation of
the Sign.
makes sense to me if we're talking about something like the "signs" from
the Mississip
together different paints
> until the result is just right.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2
Jon,
I don't know, but your questions as to the parts of a diagram of the
possibilities of "color" and the relationships between those parts don't
seem all that problematic to me. Such a diagram might be rudimentary
categories — black, blue, brown, green, orange, purple, red, yellow, and
white —
Jon,
Pardon me from barging in, but I've been vaguely following this thread, and
your question:
"How are we relating a stop sign to a diagram when we call it red …?"
kind of broke through the haze.
I don't think the universal of Peirce's realism in this case would be the
"red" as an attribu
Jerry,
Why not just a rule of thumb like there's usually a coolness in the air
before it rains. (Here in Las Vegas there's a burst of windiness.) But
then it's just a straight-forward deduction to get to the rain.
Tom
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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or
-- Forwarded message --
From: Tom Gollier
Date: Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy,
Inquiry
To: Jon Awbrey
Jon,
Thanks for your reply.
If we take "object" in sense of an objective, why isn't &quo
Jerry,
Having been brought up on "extension" and "intension," I always assumed
"denotation" and "connotation" were more or less synonyms for them. Thus,
I was startled to learn that "denotation" is generally associated with a
definition, and thus both terms would be part of the intension. But li
Jon,
I think there's a troubling narrowness interpreting this situation as
something like:
"In this narrative we can identify the characters of the sign relation
as
follows: *coolness *is a Sign of the Object *rain*, and the
Interpretant is *the*
* thought of the rain’s likelihood*
Michael,
I've been following your recent comments with interest precisely because
Peirce does explicate iconicity in terms of the triad of images, diagrams,
and metaphors; but I'm more curious about your basis for saying there's the
"overall drift in language development is toward greater diagramm
Coming to these things via Peirce, I always thought "denotation"
corresponded to extension or what Pierce called "logical breadth."
However, perusing the internet the other day, it seems "denotation" has
come to mean the dictionary definition, while connotation refer to
associations we might make w
;denotation" are no doubt different in several ways, but their combination
is enough to establish logical relationships, on the one hand, and claims
of truth or falsity, on the other, with regard to our experience.
Tom
On Wed, Oct 15, 2014 at 8:05 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
> Tom, my respon
I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading
Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something
we all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the
signifying of the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as:
"If it [a
your quote from “Kaina
> Stoicheia” (MS 517), and it’s the standard terminology in Peircean logic.
> If we confuse denoting with signifying, we will end up confusing indices
> with icons, and then we’ll be lost when it comes to the semiotics of
> dicisigns, which must *connect* iconic with
-- Forwarded message --
From: Tom Gollier
Date: Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 2:53 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
To: Evgenii Rudnyi
Evgenii and list,
I find your example interesting in that the two kinds of denotation:
"If a sign, B, only signifies chara
Joseph, List:
I haven't seen an answer to your inquiry, but I, like you, would be
interested in what would be trivial and non-trivial when it comes to an
index.
Tom
On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 3:35 AM, Joseph Brenner
wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> I have not commented on the recent exchanges as I was awa
ample of a sign relation with any degree of
> thoroughness — as we might analyze the genome of a flatworm or roundworm
> down to the last drop of DNA — we reign in the triples of the target sign
> relation to a definite, definable collection, often but not always rather
> small.
>
&g
If propositions are diagrams, dependent on analogy, logic and "symbolic
matrices" are surely diagrams as well. Formal logic suffers from a certain
sterility, I think, precisely because it focuses exclusively on the logical
diagram itself, forgetting the analogies at it's base and not worrying all
I have to admit I'm with Jon in this discussion, at least insofar as the
statement:
"Peirce simply said that a Dicisign is a sign which is involved twice
with one and the same
object: 1) it refers to the object (P's generalization of the Subject
part of a
proposition; 2) it describes t
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