Dear Mara, Garys, lists -
A good summary.
But I do not think neutral objects are confined to human being Umwelt only. It
is correct that Uexküll sometimes said things in that direction, just as, other
times, he said the opposite.
But we have no reason to assume that mammals or birds, e.g., have a
Mara, Gary F. Lists,
Thank you for your recent, exhilarating and insightful dialogue on several
key issues taken up in Chapter 5 as it helped clarify much which I just
couldn't seem to get my head around regarding the dorsal stream and how
Frederik employs the logical lessons which Hurford draws f
Mara, that’s a very good question you’ve raised. I’ll insert my responses below.
From: Mara Woods [mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com]
Sent: 14-Nov-14 3:45 PM
All,
In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the “Adaptation to Rationality” hypothesis
in conjunction with the issue of "logical constan
Mara, thanks for this! Damasio is one of the neuroscientists who have developed
in great detail our understanding of perception as part of a functional cycle.
He’s not the only one, of course; I’ve cited several others in my book Turning
Signs, especially in Chapter 9
(http://www.gnusystems.ca/
Very interesting, Gary F.
Damasio's view of the mapping of body states are already loaded with
interpretation and, as you suggest, underlie self-control. First, they are
indexes of particular physiological states that can be influenced by
further action in the environment. For example, blood sugar
Lists,
Two quotations, one from NP and one from Damasio’s Self Comes to Mind, which I
think make an interesting juxtaposition:
Minds are a subtle, flowing combination of actual images and recalled images,
in ever-changing proportions. The mind’s images tend to be logically
interrelated,
All,
In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the “Adaptation to Rationality”
hypothesis in conjunction with the issue of "logical constants" so
problematic in Hurford's account. The logical constants problem is mostly a
consequence of Hurford's limited view that reference to a dynamic object
require
rpretant
(splitting of tree).
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'peirce List'
Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2014 10:14 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7393] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5 :
Ventral-Dorsal split
Mara, lists,
Mara, your excellent summary and especially your questions at the end point
toward a research program that is beyond me (perhaps beyond any one person?) to
pursue. All I can do at this point is take a step back and present a simplified
version of the connection I see between the
Hello everyone,
Now we move on to the heart of Chapter 5: that the ventral-dorsal split of
the visual perception system corresponds to the double function of the
Dicisign. Recall that, according to Stjernfelt, this similarity between the
syntax of the Dicisign and that of the functions of these tw
-
From: "Howard Pattee"
To: "'Peirce List'" ;
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 4:45 PM
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7361] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 5
At 02:40 PM 11/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
It seems to me that you're in danger here o
At 02:40 PM 11/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
It seems to me that you're in danger here of falling into the trap
that Howard sometimes falls into, of thinking that the existence of
discontinuities or "punctuations" refutes the reality of continuity.
HP: I have never said or implied anything lik
was
to refer" etc.).
Best, Ben
gary f.
*From:*Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
*Sent:* 4-Nov-14 1:04 PM
*To:* 'Peirce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
Gary F., Mara, Clark, lists,
In your quote from "Mr. Peterson
t that sentence very
closely resembles the definition of “experience” that Peirce gives elsewhere
(EP2:435, for instance).
gary f.
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: 4-Nov-14 1:04 PM
To: 'Peirce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Prop
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 2:40 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
Edwina, a brief reply …
ET: I think that experience has to consist of more than Secondness.
GF: I agree. Secondness is one of three kinds of elements of experience. I
just didn’t
rce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
A few comments, Gary F; thanks for the long post and for Damasio's excellent
selection:
I think that experience has to consist of more than Secondness. Certainly,
Secondness is basic, for it se
Gary F., Mara, Clark, lists,
In your quote from "Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion" (_The Monist_ v.
XVI n. 1, January 1906, pages 147-151,
http://books.google.com/books?id=3KoLIAAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147),
Peirce discusses not one but two conceptions that need names other than
that of exper
down to the physico-chemical.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: 'Peirce List' ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 11:27 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
Mara, Clark, lists,
Clark quoted so
> On Nov 4, 2014, at 9:27 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>
> I place these here because I see a number of parallels between Damasio’s
> psychobiological approach to cognitive development and Peirce’s
> logical-semiotic approach.
I’d noticed years ago when I’d first encountered Damasio how much his a
Mara, Clark, lists,
Clark quoted some very interesting passages in a post on Chapter 4, and
following up on one of them led me to another that seems relevant to the idea
of “adaptation to rationality”, so I’m addressing it here in connection with
Chapter 5.
Here again is the passage Clar
Hello everyone,
Chapter 5 is a first step to applying the doctrine of Dicisigns to
cognition. Let's begin with the Adaptation to Rationality hypothesis. We'll
move into the ventral-dorsal split and its relation to Dicisigns in a few
days.
Stjernfelt focuses on the promising work of linguist James
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