Matt- I suggest you read Peirce in the original and not secondary musings about
him in Margolis.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2015 3:00 AM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
Regarding what I was
Regarding what I was trying to say about the relation between Thirdness
and Secondness, I was drawing on my memory of the following. (All
italicizing is as copied from Margolis's article.)
Joseph Margolis, in The Passing of Peirce’s Realism.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320422
"Peirce is v
- the experience of 'being bothered' could be done within a flash of
Firstness. And Firstness is not a 'being'.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 11:17 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-
Matt Faunce <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 9:13 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
On 10/16/15 8:38 PM,
s with the
Peircean categorical modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
There is no comparison; they are not the same thing.
- Original Message -----
From: Matt Faunce
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 9:13 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRC
ay is what I referred to as its form. You can call it mode, whatever.
Matt
- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Friday,
?)
And Thirdness does not have a FORM - it is a mode of organization, not a
specific Form.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 8:32 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
m:* Matt Faunce <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 7:46 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
Holy crap! I was never said an
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 7:46 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
Holy crap! I was never said anything about abstracting particles from
generals, or counting particles. You gave everything I said the wrong
interpretation. We have a serious communication breakdown
:
- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
*Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Mo
-L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 6:24 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
On 10/16/15 6:04 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second within that third
need not be two existing things.
Correction: No law needs to be instantia
Matt- see my replies below:
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 6:04 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
Edwina,
This gets at something that's been bugging me for a long
On 10/16/15 6:04 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second within that
third need not be two existing things.
Correction: No law needs to be instantiated, which means the second
within that third need not be an existent thing. But yeah, nor two
existing thin
vity actually organizes how matter
functions. So - I'll conclude that gravity is a mode of Thirdness.
Edwina
- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>
*To:* Edwina Taborsky <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> ; Peirce-L
<mailto:peirce-
s law, this gravity actually
organizes how matter functions. So - I'll conclude that gravity is a mode of
Thirdness.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 2:10 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A
On 10/16/15 12:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Matt- the 'precognitive' physical world functions in all three modes:
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. After all, the habits of
formation of a molecule of water are an example of Thirdness and an
example, according to Peirce, of the operation of
tionable. Gravity is a natural force; an ideology about a god(s) is
imagined by man.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 12:13 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
Edwina,
By "we" I
Edwina,
By "we" I means 'the widest collective of creative agents.' By "we
chose" I meant 'we chose to construct this out of nothing.' In that way
we are like the Biblical God; and the real God is our construction. But
that doesn't make Him any less real than gravity. It's just that He
isn't
mankind simply 'chose one option.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Matt Faunce
To: sb ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Friday, October 16, 2015 3:18 AM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality
Stefan,
In Venn's tunneling metaphor language includes
I saw as soon as I sent this that I made two mistakes:
On 10/16/15 3:18 AM, Matt Faunce wrote:
In historicism, reality is what is here and possible from here.**
That's not right at all. Read the Venn link for an excellent explanation.
As for thinking in graphs and images, this is applied mat
Stefan,
In Venn's tunneling metaphor language includes all sign systems, so the
digging beyond the scaffolding is, I suppose, vague thinking. A
conventional sign system allows us to quickly tag ideas we come up with
so we don't lose them. These signs allow us to securely hold the general
in o
On 10/14/15 5:53 PM, sb wrote:
Matt,
ah! This makes things much clearer. And it makes my critique pretty
pointless, because i assumed you (and Margolis?) used a narrow
definition of language.
Stefan,
Venn uses the wider definition, but leaves open any determination
whether lingual sign sys
Matt,
ah! This makes things much clearer. And it makes my critique pretty pointless,
because i assumed you (and Margolis?) used a narrow definition of language.
Nevertheless discussing Peirce realism and Margolis historicism would be very
interesting, because i'm interested in all forms of soc
On 10/14/15 4:01 PM, sb wrote:
Matt,
the example in the Margolis quote is exactly what i doubt.
>snip<
To use Venns metaphor you used: In my opinion there are other sign
systems which can be used as scaffolding.
Stefan, just a side note. Venn described a broader idea of language than
what is
On 10/14/15 4:01 PM, sb wrote:
Matt,
the example in the Margolis quote is exactly what i doubt.
Stefan, I'm working on a reply. Although, I'm afraid it might have to be
overly vague. I have a feeling that tendencies to think one way or
another hinge on presuppositions about more fundamental
Matt,
the example in the Margolis quote is exactly what i doubt.
I can only give you some anecdotal evidence to make my point clear. When i
build my house i watched how the carpenter and his apprentice interacted. They
did not speak. The carpenter just took the tool out of the apprentice' hand
Hi Stefan,
Regarding /language/, I think the crux of the debate is whether thinking
in images and diagrams presupposes linguistic competence, as Joseph
Margolis says in The Unraveling of Scientism, pg. 22:
"Thinking is an activity we engage in deliberately; and where we do,
we do so lin
Matt, Clark,
thanks for your interesting exchange!
I have only two points. 1) I found the language fetishism of some social
scientists and philosophers always strange. I personally am thinking in images
and diagrams and that's why i was exited about Peirce whenni started reading
him. Therefo
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