Peircers,
I think it's true that some of the difficulties of this discussion may be due to
different concepts of predicates, or different ways of using the word
"predicate"
in different applications, communities, and contexts.
If I think back to the variety of different communities of interpret
Ben, Steven, & All ...
I may have missed a few posts but I don't understand the fuss about indices.
The types of signs not in one-to-one correspondence with the types of objects.
You can refer to the same object by means of a pronoun or some other index --
for example, "Looky there!", "Voila!", o
apable of genuine denotation; but in 1906, “indices” has its precise
> semiotic meaning in Peirce, which your analysis does not reflect.
>
> Gary F.
>
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Benjamin Udell
> Sent: March-12-1
GF: Good point, Jon -- we should not neglect the element of performance art in
philosophy! :-)
GF: However I'm not sure it's right to say that the metaphysical order is more
fundamental than the
phenomenological. It doesn't seem to jibe with Peirce's classification of
the sciences, either.
sis does not reflect.
Gary F.
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf
Of Benjamin Udell
Sent: March-12-12 9:28 AM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction
Dear Steven,
Okay,
Peircers,
I retreated to my easy chair by the fireside with a stack of CPs, EPs, and NEMs
to refresh my memory of lost times in fond tomes, and it may take me a while to
bring those researches to any sort of satisfying, if provisional conclusion ...
Going by the lights of Peirce's detailed analy
ce but not combination, those which involve
combination."
"Predicaments" are predicates of predicates for Peirce, Aristotle's
"Categories."
With respect,
Steven
--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
s of Predicates" - i.e., the
> Prolegomena-categories - "is different in the different Modes of Being." And
> on those successions, he says, and remember the year is 1906, his "thoughts
> are not yet harvested." Seems unlikely indeed that the Prolegomena-categorie
e
not yet harvested." Seems unlikely indeed that the Prolegomena-categories are
the same Categories that he has been discussing since 1867.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith"
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Sunday, March
Jon,
I've been reading the section of the Minute Logic that you've been posting bits
of (i don't think i've read it before) and i'm looking forward to your way of
connecting it to the category of categories ... if that's what you're doing ...
but i agree with Gary R. and Ben that it would be ea
Peircers,
This passage from Peirce has intrigued me, too, for at least a dozen years,
just going by the first discussions that I can remember having about it,
and still find scattered about on the web. I am less concerned about
the terms of art from Aristotle -- predicables, predicaments, etc. -
nd a bunch of quotes together like Joe used to do, then in a next post
proceed to a discussion?
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 10:40 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Gary, Ben, Jon,
Gary, I think you got this just right.
Best,
Gary R.
On 3/9/12, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
> Ben, Jon and list,
>
> I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me
> that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in
> question, Peirce d
Ben, Jon and list,
I'm a little confused as to what the question is here. It seems clear to me
that in the Prolegomena of 1906, which is the source of the passage in
question, Peirce does NOT use the term "Categories" in reference to what he
elsewhere calls categories, or "elements" of the pha
Ben & All,
I see that I omitted to give my initial thoughts on
that last paragraph of yours, so let me do that now.
BU: Where else does he say that the successions of his categories are
"different in the different Modes of Being"? Where in his other
writings does he call his own categor
Ben & All,
At any rate, there is no particular hurry to come to a decision.
As I get time, I'll go back and review the passage in the context
of that paper and others. For now, let me make a first pass over
your comments and say what I can say off the cuff, subject to the
usual risk of backtrack
s not mean his own categories, and instead
> that, at most, 1st-intentional, 2nd-intentional, and 3rd-intentional
> entities, on which he says that his "thoughts are not yet harvested," will
> end up being treated by him as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds - instances or
> applicatio
Ben & All,
If there is an objective reality addressed by the statements that Peirce makes
about categories, then we have reason to pursue them in a manner more hopeful
of consensual resolution then, let us say, the purely scholastic matter of
whether all his statements reflect one and the same au
Ben & All,
We have of course discussed the bearing of Peirce's categories on his
other triads several times before, even to the point of going through
his early writings in excruciating detail. I do not think I have the
strength to do that again, but it may be possible to recover the gist
of tho
and 3rd-intentional entities,
on which he says that his "thoughts are not yet harvested," will end up being
treated by him as Firsts, Seconds, Thirds - instances or applications of his
categories.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Jon Awbrey
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI
Peircers,
Here is a passage that I think is critical for
understanding what Peirce meant by a category.
| I will now say a few words about what you have
| called Categories, but for which I prefer the
| designation Predicaments, and which you have
| explained as predicates of predicates.
|
| Tha
No, I haven't heard of these; I will check them out. I do refer to the
research of Kanneman and Taversky who applied social research on
orientations to uncertainty to economic prediction.
Thanks
-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 3:3
Hi Phyllis,
Do you know the work of Sorrentino and Roney on orientations to uncertainty?
| Sorrentino, Richard M., and Roney, Christopher J.R. (2000),
| The Uncertain Mind : Individual Differences in Facing the Unknown,
| (Essays in Social Psychology, Miles Hewstone (ed.)), Taylor and Francis,
|
during the years that her husband was posted there. They are now in Sydney.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Catherine Legg
> Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subj
-Original Message-
From: Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net]
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:48 PM
To: 'Catherine Legg'
Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction
Gary, Cathy and Listers,
I have been a Peirce-list lurker for som
intelligence, Direct thinkers also tend to make excellent
> students in many fields.
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
> Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@
Peircers,
Here are the excerpts I copied out and the notes I took on Peirce's treatment of
information and inquiry in relation to the principal types of sign relations and
the principal types of inference, all from his Lectures on the "Logic of
Science"
at Harvard (1865) and the Lowell Institute
Peircers,
Gary brings us evidence that Peirce continued to find favor with his "original
opinion"
about the "connections" of the three categories with the principal types of
signs and
the principal types of inference, even when all the second guessing and third
guessing
had settled down, and y
ion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
> Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 10:12 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
> Induction
>
> GR = Gary Richmond
> JD = Jonathan DeVo
Jon, All,
Jon, I'm glad my post was for a helpful summary for you in the matter
of at least Peirce's changing views of the three inference patterns in
relation to the categories.
Just a brief comment on your 'Subject' line. Ben and I would like to
encourage you and everyone here to follow Joe Ran
@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction,
Induction
GR = Gary Richmond
JD = Jonathan DeVore
JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
fashion. Peirce might have us recall
GR = Gary Richmond
JD = Jonathan DeVore
JD: It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to
think about 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing
fashion. Peirce might have us recall that these elements
will be differently prominent according to the phenomenon
under con
Jonathan, list,
I think your point is well taken, Jonathan.
Best,
Gary
On 3/2/12, Jonathan DeVore wrote:
> Dear List,
>
> It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about
> 3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion. Peirce might
> have us recall that these elemen
Dear List,
It might be useful to bear in mind that we don't have to think about
3rdnss, 2ndnss, 1stnss in an all-or-nothing fashion. Peirce might
have us recall that these elements will be differently prominent
according to the phenomenon under consideration--without being
mutually exclu
Thanks, Gary, this is a very helpful summary.
Jon
cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List
Gary Richmond wrote:
Cathy, Stephen, list,
Cathy, you wrote: "I don't see how one might interpret induction as
secondness though.Though a *misplaced* induction may well lead to the
secondness of surprise due to
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