Thanks a lot, Jim!
Thomas.
On Tue, 10 Oct 2006 04:54:47 +0200, Jim Piat <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Folks,
For those interested in Peirce's contributions to experimental
psychology and its connection to the work of Fechner this looks like an
excellent reference. The book is called The Wave
I am very sorry to hear that.
Thomas.
On Sat, 30 Sep 2006 08:08:53 +0200, John Collier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
All,
I have not been subscribed to the Peirce-L list since my university
changed my email address to fit its corporate image. I was getting
reports regularly from my student
remark: Why should Peirce in prominent, even decisive, places and
definitely not in a "set theoretic" or "numerical" context present
elaborate
versions of this not so very easy to understand proof?
In the "Prolegomena" he uses it to show "how an Icon can exhib
Thanks for your response and interest, Jerry.
You do of course touch the most subtle and perhaps difficult to understand
point
in Peirce's conception of logic.
What concerns the "grounding" or perhaps "foundation", I would say it has
no
foundation in the sense you probably mean. I has none
uot;. I simply don't know a
better way
to say it and perhaps it is better so to say it, instead that it is lost
for
further use. In other words: this might be a good field for a research
project,
Arnold;-)
Again, analysing Peirce's proof, keep categorial structure in mind!
Cheers,
On Mon, 13 Mar 2006 19:37:14 +0100, Marc Lombardo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Thomas,
If you don't mind my asking, what's wrong with the "nonstandard analysis"
approach to illustrating continuum, so long as that approach is VERY
nonstandard? I was quite convinced by Hilary Putnam's introductio
Peirce's version of the proof for Cantor's theorem can be mapped in a quite
straightforward way to the structure of the New List of 1867. At the same
time
the proof of Cantor's theorem can be extended by continued diagonalization
(which latter, by the way, Peirce discovered not later than 1867
Ben, Wilfred,
as a logician/mathematician you virtually have two knobs in front of you.
One is
labeled: wild dreams. On the other you read: self-control. As a
logician/mathematician you turn them _both_ to "maximum power". That's the
trick, if there is any trick. Artistry then is a matter of d
What concerns general transitivity:
Perhaps one might say: Otherness is an Icon of Thirdness.
I'd better stop this now.
Ciao, Ben.
Thomas.
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
If you want to have a proof, please have a look at CP 3.523:
"Professor Schroeder's Iconic Solution of x -< phi x".
[Had to transcribe the greek letter; thomas]
The first formula on page 332 is the formula for general transitivity,
which is a restrictive expansion of normal transitivity (well,
t
Can you imagine now why I claimed that the "Peicean Cut" is an asymmetric,
quasi-periodic tiling of the plane?
I hope I am wrong somehow.
Otherwise that would be a revolution in the most iconic sense of the word
Iconicity.
You see?! Do you know what Peirce left over of the Kantian list of
cat
On Sun, 05 Mar 2006 09:28:56 +0100, Benjamin Udell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Dear Thomas,
As regards the structure of the Peirce Continuum, perhaps you've seen
this, where Peirce says that all Cantor's alephs are multitudes and that
true continua are greater and are not multitudes. I wis
Dear Ben,
thanks for your reply, I'll respond as soon as possible in detail. The
transitivity is not so much of an issue. I can explain that. Asymmetry then
isn't a problem either. The difficulty was, to find out what the true
(logical)
nature of quasi-periodicity is. I can show that Peirce's n
fers.
Thanks,
Steven
Thomas Riese wrote:
Letter Peirce to Marquand, L 269, 30 December 1886 in W5, p.422,423
Thomas.
On Sat, 04 Mar 2006 21:30:30 +0100, Steven Ericsson Zenith
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Dear List,
There is a very nice and copyright free bio of Peirce from N
On Sat, 04 Mar 2006 17:14:53 +0100, Frances Kelly
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
To the extent
therefore that some consciousness is interpretable and translatable,
then it is all conceivably and probably an objective logical
construct. Indeed, all of subjectivity would then fall under this
phenome
Letter Peirce to Marquand, L 269, 30 December 1886 in W5, p.422,423
Thomas.
On Sat, 04 Mar 2006 21:30:30 +0100, Steven Ericsson Zenith
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Dear List,
There is a very nice and copyright free bio of Peirce from NOAA that I
have copied into Panopedia for reference he
Frances: "It would seem that objective logic must hence allow and admit
some
degree of psychologistic subjectivism after all."
and
Frances: "Human logic according to Peirce is thus seemingly an obstinate
and
degenerate form of pure logic that thinkers discover. What is likely found
however
On Wed, 01 Mar 2006 19:43:58 +0100, Frances Catherine Kelly
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Frances to Gary...
It does seem that Peirce did not, in his available writings to us, use
the term "intermediate" in any formal or categorical manner. To use
the term "intermediate" informally or casually a
"The necessity for a sign directly monstrative of the connection of
premiss and conclusion is susceptible of proof. The proof is as follows.
When we contemplate the premiss, we mentally perceive that that being true
the conclusion is true. I say we _perceive_ it, because clear knowledge
follow
systematic)
assertion of his "Basic Relation" as "the recognition of similarity" in
semeiosis (in LSotW), if you accept that premise and conclusion present
a tautology.
With respect,
Steven
Gary Richmond wrote:
Thomas Riese wrote:
On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 15:23:55 +0100, Gary
reader to "think in order to see" he is asking that the
proof become indubitable to him as well. No other proof than that of
perception/observation/experience is to be had.
cheers,
Martin Lefebvre
On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 15:37:58 +0100, Gary Richmond
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Th
On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 15:37:58 +0100, Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Thomas Riese wrote:
On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 15:23:55 +0100, Gary Richmond
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Thomas Riese wrote:
"The necessity for a sign directly monstrative of the
connecti
On Thu, 23 Feb 2006 15:23:55 +0100, Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
Thomas Riese wrote:
"The necessity for a sign directly monstrative of the
connection of premiss and conclusion is susceptible of proof.
The proof is as follows. When we contemplate the premiss,
"The necessity for a sign directly monstrative of the
connection of premiss and conclusion is susceptible of proof.
The proof is as follows. When we contemplate the premiss,
we mentally perceive that that being true the conclusion is
true. I say we _perceive_ it, because clear knowledge follows
co
in response to Benjamin Udell's message On Fri, 17 Feb 2006 22:31:19 +0100
Ben,
thanks for your response. You write:
I read about his Three Worlds picture in an earlier book of his, one
which I understood only middlingly well. I once read a whole book
explaining Goedel's incompleteness proof
Gary,
perhaps I have here something more that might be of interest for you:
Logic requires us, with reference to each question we have in hand, to
hope some
definite answer to it may be true. That *hope* with reference to *each
case* as
it comes up is, by a *saltus*, stated by logicians as
Joe,
I propose, to fix our ideas, that we try our hands at the following:
(from Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism; 1906)
[CP 4.546]
Let us begin with the question of Universes. It is rather a question of an
advisable point of view than of the truth of a doctrine. A logical
universe is
ilosophical journal founded by Papini in 1903."
Voila. This should be very much to Peirce's taste ;-)
Thomas Riese.
On Tue, 07 Feb 2006 22:01:53 +0100, martin lefebvre
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Listers-,
In "What Pragmatism is", Peirce mentions with disaprov
Ben, list,
this thread on "The New Elements of Mathematics" started with Charles
Peirce writing:
"None of them approved of my book, because it put perspective before
metrical geometry, and topical
geometry before either."
Even today if one would consider to engage in the project of writin
erent enough to be understandable. I hope this sheds some more
light
on the problems you address. If you would challenge me, I certainly could
"elaborate" things in far greater detail. It's partly already in what I
recently
sent to you under the heading "How to grow an onion and catch a fly". I
have been
away over the weekend to Berlin (this town always inspires me) to distract
myself a bit in order to get new ideas and as it so happens I have made
another
substantial step ahead in my understanding of the structure of the New
List. I
now have found the "missing link" between the New List and Existential
Graphs
(as soon as one considers the structure of the New List as consisting in
"three Thirds"). But that's another story.
Thomas Riese.
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
it. The IT of it.
This can be experimentally tested! It is open for doubt now!
This is my guess at the riddle.
Yours
Thomas Riese.
P.S. Do you know Erwin Schroedinger's ���What is Life?��� ?
The universe is quite communicative.
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
Gary,
in my original posting I did not indend to say something about
teleological logic. I only wanted to show something about the categorial
structure of the sign relation. Nevertheless final causation is of course
involved: the sign process might be called an "indirect utilization
appro
Bernard, Gary,
ah, I forgot to say that I am very often outdoors preying on birds with my
binoculars;-)
Thomas.
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
On Mon, 06 Feb 2006 19:01:01 +0100, Bernard Morand
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
In case of trains of thought, I think that we use also something like a
"replay" and "backward" functions which do not require hypostatic
abstractions every time.
Bernard,
sure with the replay button pushed we
Sun, 05 Feb 2006 19:11:17 +0100, Bernard Morand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
a ecrit:
(originally in response to Charles Rudder, here taken out of context):
Now, I have questions about your idea that "the interpretant represents
the sign as the same sign that it replicates". In fact, the replica is
th
ty, 1889-1899. Decennial Celebration", Science
11 (1900),
p. 620; reprinted in P. P. Wiener, ed., Charles S. Peirce: Selected
Writings.
(Values in a Universe of Chance), Dover, New York, 1966, p. 332.
Regards
Thomas Riese.
P.S.
If you accept that ¨¨love consists in striving to fu
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