On Wed, 01 Mar 2006 19:43:58 +0100, Frances Catherine Kelly
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Frances to Gary...
It does seem that Peirce did not, in his available writings to us, use
the term "intermediate" in any formal or categorical manner. To use
the term "intermediate" informally or casually as a thirdness as he
often did, in regard to say continuity and synechism as you noted,
would however perhaps defeat the term "mediate" as an alternate for
thirdness; but so be it.
(CP1.550) On a New List of Categories; 1867, ยง6. "The facts now collected
afford
the basis for a systematic method of searching out whatever universal
elementary
conceptions there may be intermediate between the manifold of substance
and the
unity of being."
"I do not say that the Principle of Excluded Middle is downright _false_;
but I
do say that in every field of thought whatsoever there is an intermediate
ground
between _positive_assertion_ and _positive_negation_ which is just as Real
as
they." (L 224, Letter to William James, 1909 Feb 26.)
In regard to the inner state of "desire" among semioticians or
logicians, in their wishing or willing or wanting to seek truth in the
first place, it might be held as an innate inclined trait; and thus
aligned as habitual tendency, along with obstinate stubborn tenacity,
and ruling authority. These methods of arriving at proof and truth,
aside from any "desire" to attain them, are however not empirical; yet
some senseless and illogical "desire" for them seems ever present.
This "desire" for humans to be rational and reasonable is certainly a
drive in the intellectual and scientific process, probably the outcome
of evolution, but it seemingly cannot be accounted for by logic on its
own solely alone. It would seem that objective logic must hence allow
and admit some degree of psychologistic subjectivism after all. This
may go to explaining why abduction is best located as an immediate or
initial kind of inferred judgement, before empirical induction and
eventual deduction. The "desire" might of course also be neatly
aligned with "direct" monstration in finding logical proof.
"to seek truth" for me would mean "learning".
Learning means "changing habits".
"some degree of psychologistic subjectivism after all"
Yes. Sure. It's dirty work.
Thomas.
P.S.
"directly monstrative" is certainly a carefully crafted allusion
to "demonstrative" while at the same time more forceful and less
insistent than "demonstrative". It (the proof) simply manages to
show what cannot possibly be described in the same way as
"directly monstrative" expresses what cannot possibly be said
here (namely: "demonstrative").
But what do you do with "to see the force" of something?
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
