Try telling a rape victim that these medications are just "trivial" and,
therefore, she can't get coverage, or that whether she uses emergency
contraception is any business of her large, corporate employer.
The " trivial " burden in fact is the burden on a for-profit employer who is
governe
It's been several years since I commented here, but this thread called to
mind an everyday example of current federal policy protecting
communications made by both religious and secular persons to "clergy" of
many different faiths in one particular setting.
While this example surely raises myriad
I’m genuinely curious: Do we have any idea which denominations impose a duty
on their clergy to preserve confidentiality? Every Sunday I read in the Style
section of the Times of couples who are married by someone who has been
licensed by the Universal Church (I think it’s called) to perform w
No question. They can be helped just as believers might not be! But that is
separate from whether, as a legal matter, a privilege attaches.
Marci A. Hamilton
Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
(212) 790-
That is now how the courts have read it.
Marci A. Hamilton
Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
(212) 790-0215
http://sol-reform.com
-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene
To: Law & Religio
I don’t know how it is in other states, but Cal. Evid Code
1030-1034 absolutely covers any “communication made in confidence, in the
presence of no third person so far as the penitent is aware, to a member of the
clergy who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the cler
Sandy and Marci,
I agree my conversations were not and should not have been privileged. But it
is not the case that non-believers cannot be helped by priests either in a
priest/pentitent setting or less formally.
Steve
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Directo
Steve-- That may be true in your experience, but it doesn't make those
discussions "confessional" for purposes of the clergy-penitent privilege. It
typically requires a showing that the
discussion was not counseling, therapy, or simply an exchange of information.
Rather, it must be for salvati
I have no doubt that Steve is accurately reporting his own experience, but I
still don't see why it should add up to a confidentiality privilege.
sandy
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 201
I disagree with Eugene on this — as a non-religious athiest, I have met many
ministers and priests with whom I have had excellent conversations, some even
“confessional” or at least very candid and have been given advice, even by
priests, which was insightful and helpful and respectful of me. T
Nathan, I agree with you here: it would be much better if there were an
employee participating in the litigation who could make these claims in a more
concrete way! But that doesn't mean they can't be aired, I hope.
Nelson
From: Nathan Chapman
mailto:nathan.s.chap...@gmail.com>>
Date: Dece
I’m sure there are some such situations, perhaps even quite a
few. But I imagine there are quite a few situations where the priest would
quite rightly not give me the advice that works for me given my philosophical
worldview. The benefit of the clergy-penitent privilege to the
Nelson,
I look forward to your blog post.
As to the first, this case seems a poor vehicle because no party is
complaining about RFRA applying only to religious objectors.
Second, I think parties are usually better at focusing a court's analysis
of their interests than others are, ergo the ordina
Actually, I think non-Catholics mostly would be pleasantly surprised, both on
the receptivity of the priest-confessor and the wisdom of the response. To be
sure, there are some misdeeds that are shared in confession that are understood
to be such solely from the perspective of the Catholic beli
My sense is that I (as someone who is irreligious) would get
relatively little solace or even wise counsel from speaking to an average
Catholic priest about my troubles and misdeeds, at least unless I was at least
contemplating converting to Catholicism. Unsurprisingly, the prie
I'm sorry that I misunderstood Micah's points; I thought they
were just about applying the law, but on reflection I see how they included a
policy question about the merits of RFRA. Let me try to tentatively respond to
this, as someone who is not one of RFRA's biggest boosters.
Nathan
Thanks so much for these perceptive thoughts. We are going to post something
soon on balkinization about the substantiality of burdens on third parties, but
in the interim I'd like to respond to some of your points (solely on my own
behalf).
First, the establishment clause analysis
It depends on the state actually. But generally the "confession" must be for
spiritual/salvation purposes
Marci A. Hamilton
Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School
Yeshiva University
@Marci_Hamilton
On Dec 5, 2013, at 12:32 PM, Paul Horwitz wrote:
> Is that accurate? It
Is that accurate? It may vary, but I thought the privilege could be claimed for
any confidential communication made to a clergy member in his/her professional
capacity as a spiritual advisor. The person seeking that counsel need not
necessarily be a co-communicant. I don't think this is just hai
I am coming in very late on this. Sorry.
But Eugene's most recent post about 3rd-party harms caused by religious conduct
(as opposed to communicative impact) caused me to think about other
constitutionally-protected conduct that may result in 3rd party harms. Moore v.
City of East Cleveland com
I have enjoyed the discussion of the third party burden issue. Thanks to all,
especially Nelson and Micah for kicking it off.
I would add a couple of thoughts to Eugene’s argument against applying the
Establishment Clause to limit RFRA in these cases.
http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b-grant
I'll stop after this, but I realize that RFRA requires strict scrutiny for
substantial burdens on religion. Under that standard, if Knox and United Foods
are right about Abood, then, by analogy, Hobby Lobby should be a relatively
easy case. Here, Glickman is relevant because the Court said that
I would assume that what justifies the asymmetry is, in large
measure, Congress's judgment. In RFRA, Congress said that substantial burdens
on religious exercise lead to strict scrutiny. Substantial burdens include
compulsion to do what one thinks is religiously forbidden; that
23 matches
Mail list logo
