Marty,
If I understand your position, it seems to be that the government has the final
say to define what are the "necessary" components of any occupation. Under
this view, so long as the government, in its wisdom, defines something as
necessary to a job, all citizens must fall in line and ei
So if I understand this right, religious institutions shouldn't take the Obama
Administration's Solicitor General at his word when he says tax exempt status
will be an "issue" or they should just assume he gave an incompetent answer?
I don't think it's "fear-mongering" to actually take him at hi
“"[l]iberals who opposed Smith in 1990 and supported RFRA in 1993 — including
liberal organizations, professors, and politicians — largely continue to
support religious exemptions for individuals, while opposing the extension of
such exemptions to commercial businesses."
I’m not sure I’m seeing
At least 3 circuits have already interpreted the federal RFRA to provide a
defense in a case involving private parties and the Obama DOJ has also endorsed
that position in the past. So, the Indiana RFRA is not breaking new ground
here.
From: Nelson Tebbe
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2015 5:59 PM
And I don't think we want to create a society where we the only exercise of
religion we protect is religious exercise that the elites are comfortable with.
Perhaps I'm misreading them, but it seems that many contributors to this
list are only fans of protecting religious liberty in the milque
Dear Greg,
If you or others are genuinely interested in exploring detailed arguments
explaining why opposition to same sex marriage is not irrational bigotry, I
would commend either the law review article or the longer book by Sherif
Girgis, Robert P. George, and Ryan T. Anderson entitled "What
o whom?
The claim is spurious. See
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/hobby-lobby-part-iv-myth-of.html
On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Gaubatz, Derek
mailto:dgaub...@imb.org>> wrote:
I don’t find the proposition to be particularly comforting that religious
liberty concerns must take a
We've been down this road before:forcing plaintiffs to choose between
abandoning their religious beliefs, paying crippling penalties, or becoming a
second-class employer that doesn't offer its employees benefits is a government
imposed substantial burden.It's only those employers with re
I don't find the proposition to be particularly comforting that religious
liberty concerns must take a back seat in areas "highly regulated" by the
government as opposed to "lightly regulated" ones.Instead, it seems to me
that the need to vigorously protect free exercise of religion is of gr
Respectfully, I think you missed the point of Professor Sisk's argument (and
mine in the preceding post). The argument is not that religious views are the
only ones that matter and that they must triumph over women's health concerns.
Instead, the argument was that with just a modicum of effo
Re Marci's assertion that the slippery slope is "perpendicular" if for profit
corporations are recognized to be protected under RFRA, it seems to me that we
don't have to just rely on the rhetorical speculation of Marci and the Obama
administration in its brief. Instead, we have, as Marty has he
Maybe I'm missing your point, but it seems to me that forcing religious
employers to such a coercive choice hardly relieves the burden. Why should an
employer be forced, because of its religious convictions to refuse to offer its
employees health coverage? The fact that there is a legal opti
Marty, I'd likewise quibble with your characterization of the grandfather
provision. A plan can maintain its grandfather provision for the foreseeable
future so long as it abides by the conditions for doing so. This was at least
part of the basis for the President's infamous "if you like your p
It seems to me that there is a much less nefarious explanation. In the context
of those Establishment Clause challenges, it was permissible for a religious
entity like Notre Dame to receive the government funds so long as they were not
used for items deemed to be inherently religious activities
Actually, the creator is the copyright owner of the work unless the purchaser
successfully negotiates for a work for hire agreement.
From: Marci Hamilton [mailto:hamilto...@aol.com]
Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2013 01:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Cc: Law & Religion issues fo
"To avoid a conflict over religion, government should simply take no cognizance
of religion, and if it will do that, then 'no man's right' to religious freedom
will be abridged by civil society."
I'm not sure whether this is a view that Professor Ellis is somehow imputing to
Madison (wrongly in
I'd also add that the law already does impose liability in the health care
reimbursement context for the type of complicity Eugene notes below. Among
its various regulations, the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) prohibits
US persons from engaging in any transactions with any entity on OF
I'd also add that the law already does impose liability in the health care
reimbursement context for the type of complicity Eugene notes below. Among
its various regulations, the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) prohibits
US persons from engaging in any transactions with any entity on OF
Dear Marci,
The substantial burden theory here is not new, it's merely another factual
iteration of what the Supreme Court has previously recognized in cases like
Yoder to be a substantial burden: levying a financial penalty against an
individual who refuses to violate his sincere religious b
Dear Marci,
The substantial burden theory here is not new, it’s merely another factual
iteration of what the Supreme Court has previously recognized in cases like
Yoder to be a substantial burden: levying a financial penalty against an
individual who refuses to violate his sincere religious b
Dear Marci,
The substantial burden theory here is not new, it’s merely another factual
iteration of what the Supreme Court has previously recognized in cases like
Yoder to be a substantial burden: levying a financial penalty against an
individual who refuses to violate his sincere religious b
Dear Marci,
The substantial burden theory here is not new, it’s merely another factual
iteration of what the Supreme Court has previously recognized in cases like
Yoder to be a substantial burden: levying a financial penalty against an
individual who refuses to violate his sincere religious b
Dear Marci,
The substantial burden theory here is not new, it’s merely another factual
iteration of what the Supreme Court has previously recognized in cases like
Yoder to be a substantial burden: levying a financial penalty against an
individual who refuses to violate his sincere religious b
. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
(212) 790-0215
hamilto...@aol.com
-----Original Message-
From: Gaubatz, Derek
Dear Chip,
Thomas is not mentioned in the findings of RFRA, but it’s holding is
certainly incorporated into the definition of rel
Dear Chip,
Thomas is not mentioned in the findings of RFRA, but it's holding is certainly
incorporated into the definition of religious exercise in RFRA (and RLUIPA).
In fact, it seems to me that much of the discussion on this list and in the
O'Brien case of whether there is a substantial b
Dear Chip,
Thomas is not mentioned in the findings of RFRA, but it's holding is certainly
incorporated into the definition of religious exercise in RFRA (and RLUIPA).
In fact, it seems to me that much of the discussion on this list and in the
O'Brien case of whether there is a substantial b
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