Re: [TLS] An IETF draft on TLS based on ECCSI public key (RFC 6507)

Dear all Thanks very much for the discussion over the thread. We have learnt a lot from the discussion. Due to the oversea travel, we were not able to send back our reply the comments from Ilari. Only yesterday, we got some time to prepare the reply. So in the below, we addressed the issue

Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption-00.txt

Thank you for writing the draft. I agree for the need to hide hostnames from passive attackers, and I really like the fact that the draft discusses of various attack vectors that a proper SNI protection should take care of. OTOH, it makes me sad that the proposed methods require an additional

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Jul 10, 2017 4:09 PM, "Eric Mill" wrote: On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Russ Housley wrote: > > >> So, I failed to convince you. However, you have also failed to > >> convince me that the proposal is wiretapping under the definition in > >> RFC

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 3:37 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > And if coercion of a server to comply with a wiretap > scheme like this stills fanciful to you, please check > out the history of lavabit - had there been a standard > wiretap API as envisaged here it's pretty

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Russ Housley wrote: > > >> So, I failed to convince you. However, you have also failed to > >> convince me that the proposal is wiretapping under the definition in > >> RFC 2804, Section 3. > > > > Consider SMTP/TLS. Where one MTA on the

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 23:32, Russ Housley wrote: > Stephen: > > >> And to avoid a repeat of Russ' failed justification, many >> protocols use and depend on TLS where the entity >> controlling the TLS server private key materials is not the >> higher layer sender or receiver, so all

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Stephen: > And to avoid a repeat of Russ' failed justification, many protocols > use and depend on TLS where the entity controlling the TLS server > private key materials is not the higher layer sender or receiver, > so all four points in the definition in 2804 are fully met

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 23:07, Russ Housley wrote: > Stephen: > >>> And to avoid a repeat of Russ' failed justification, many protocols use and depend on TLS where the entity controlling the TLS server private key materials is not the higher layer sender or receiver, so all four points

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Stephen: >> >>> And to avoid a repeat of Russ' failed justification, many protocols >>> use and depend on TLS where the entity controlling the TLS server >>> private key materials is not the higher layer sender or receiver, >>> so all four points in the definition in 2804 are fully met by your

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 22:26, Russ Housley wrote: > Stephen: > >> And to avoid a repeat of Russ' failed justification, many protocols >> use and depend on TLS where the entity controlling the TLS server >> private key materials is not the higher layer sender or receiver, >> so all four points in the

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Stephen: > And to avoid a repeat of Russ' failed justification, many > protocols use and depend on TLS where the entity controlling > the TLS server private key materials is not the higher > layer sender or receiver, so all four points in the definition > in 2804 are fully met by your wiretapping

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

> On Jul 10, 2017, at 15:29, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > You did not respond about the Prague agenda. I continue to ask that > you not give this bad idea more f2f time. If you do give it time, > then I'd ask for equal time to debunk this bad idea. But better to > have

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Most Enterprises do have well developed logging collection and parsing infrastructures (e.g. Splunk, etc.). But they are one of many tools needed to effectively manage complex corporate networks and applications.They cannot fully replace network monitoring any more than network

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 21:20, Ackermann, Michael wrote: > Then we read 2804 differently. When I read 2804, the contained > discourses on what is and is not wiretapping, clearly says to me, > that what Enterprises do within their networks, is NOT wiretapping > according to 2804 (or to me for that

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Then we read 2804 differently. When I read 2804, the contained discourses on what is and is not wiretapping, clearly says to me, that what Enterprises do within their networks, is NOT wiretapping according to 2804 (or to me for that matter). We (and many others in this discussion),

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Jul 10, 2017 8:46 AM, "Ackermann, Michael" wrote: +1 !!! And For the enterprise situations, we typically own, operate and manage the involved “Facilities”: The Servers The Applications The Networks The Keys The Data and in Many cases the clients as well

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 08:29:26PM +0100, Stephen Farrell wrote: > On 10/07/17 17:57, Sean Turner wrote: > > After some discussion amongst the chairs, we have decided to not shut > > down the discussion about draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13. > > Ok, that's your call. But a bad call IMO. IMO

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 17:42, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote: > It's clear that there is a strong distaste here for the kind of MITM being > talked about It is not (only) "distaste," it is IETF policy as a result of a significant debate on wiretapping. S signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 16:30, Ackermann, Michael wrote: > Given the above scenario, I do not understand how this can be construed as > "Wiretapping".2804 seems to make this clear. TLS is much more widely used that you seem to imagine. Please see the comments to the effect that there is no way to

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 20:07, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote: > My $0.02: absolutely not on the Standards Track (for reasons already > expressed by others), might be discussable if Informational. I haven't checked, but as far as I recall, other wiretapping RFCs inconsistent with 2804 have all been

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On 10/07/17 17:57, Sean Turner wrote: > Stephen, > > After some discussion amongst the chairs, we have decided to not shut > down the discussion about draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13. Ok, that's your call. But a bad call IMO. This topic, if not the specific draft, was already the subject

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

My $0.02: absolutely not on the Standards Track (for reasons already expressed by others), might be discussable if Informational. -- Regards, Uri Blumenthal On 7/10/17, 15:03, "TLS on behalf of Nico Williams" wrote: On Mon, Jul 10,

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 08:01:32PM +0300, Yoav Nir wrote: > > On 10 Jul 2017, at 17:16, Stephen Farrell wrote: > >> 2. this proposal offers > >> significantly better security properties than current practice > >> (central distribution of static RSA keys) > > > > I

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

> On 10 Jul 2017, at 17:16, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > >> 2. this proposal offers >> significantly better security properties than current practice >> (central distribution of static RSA keys) > > I fail to see any relevant difference in security properties >

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Stephen, After some discussion amongst the chairs, we have decided to not shut down the discussion about draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13. We are not shutting down this discussion because this topic is relevant to the constituents on both sides of the issue in the working group and there is

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 8:14 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos wrote: > Certainly, but that doesn't need to happen on this working group, nor > protocols which implement similar solutions need to be called TLS. > I'll belabor this point: rather than thinking about what these

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

+1 !!! And For the enterprise situations, we typically own, operate and manage the involved "Facilities": The Servers The Applications The Networks The Keys The Data and in Many cases the clients as well Given the above scenario, I do not understand how this can be construed as

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

On Mon, 2017-07-10 at 13:54 +, Polk, Tim (Fed) wrote: > First, I do not see this as a “wiretapping discussion” based on my > reading of 2804, although others may disagree. >   > Second, I believe that this discussion should go forward based on > several points: > this proposal does not involve

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Hiya, While we're waiting on Sean/Joe... :-) On 10/07/17 14:54, Polk, Tim (Fed) wrote: > First, I do not see this as a “wiretapping discussion” based on my > reading of 2804, although others may disagree. s/may/do/ Figure 3 in the draft is absolutely clearly describing an architecture for

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

First, I do not see this as a “wiretapping discussion” based on my reading of 2804, although others may disagree. Second, I believe that this discussion should go forward based on several points: 1. this proposal does not involve any changes to the bits on the wire specified in the TLS 1.3

Re: [TLS] chairs - please shutdown wiretapping discussion...

Message received. Expect a response in a couple of hours. spt > On Jul 8, 2017, at 05:17, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > Sean/Joe, > > This is a request that you, as chairs, shut down the distracting > wiretapping discussion, at least until DTLS1.3 is done. > > I