On 28/06/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

When logic conflicts with instinct, instinct wins and the logic gets
contorted.  The heated discussion on the copy paradox is a perfect example.
Your consciousness is tranferred to the copy only if the original is
destroyed, or destroyed in certain ways, or under certain conditions.  We
discuss this ad-infinitum, but it always leads to a contradiction because we
refuse to accept that consciousness does not exist, because if you accept it
you die.  So the best you can do is accept both contradictory beliefs and
leave it at that.

Well, maybe consciousness does not really exist, but even if it's just
the state of being able to interact with the environment in a
particular way, or something, I want it to continue happening in just
the same way after I upload.

So how do we approach the question of uploading without leading to a
contradiction?  I suggest we approach it in the context of outside observers
simulating competing agents.  How will these agents evolve?  We would expect
that agents will produce other agents similar to themselves but not identical,
either through biological reproduction, genetic engineering, or computer
technology.  The exact mechanism doesn't matter.  In any case, those agents
will evolve an instinct for self preservation, because that makes them fitter.
 They will fear death.  They will act on this fear by using technology to
extend their lifespans.  When we approach the question in this manner, we can
ask if they upload, and if so, how?  We do not need to address the question of
whether consciousness exists or not.  The question is not what should we do,
but what are we likely to do?

How does this answer questions like, if I am destructively teleported
to two different locations, what can I expect to experience? That's
what I want to know before I press the button.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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