On 29/06/07, Charles D Hixson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Yes, you would live on in one of the copies as if uploaded, and yes > the selection of which copy would be purely random, dependent on the > relative frequency of each copy (you can still define a measure to > derive probabilities even though we are talking infinite subsets of > infinite sets). What do you think would happen? Why in only one of the copies? This is the part of the argument that I don't understand. I accept that over time the copies would diverge, but originally they would be substantially the same, so why claim that the original consciousness would only be present in one of them?
Both copies are equivalent, so your consciousness can equally well be said to exist in each of them. However, each copy can only experience being one person at a time, a simple physical limitation. So although from a third person perspective you are duplicated in both copies, from a first person perspective you can only expect to find yourself one of the copies post-duplication, and which one has to be probabilistic (since we agreed that they're both equally well qualified to be you). In the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, every time you toss a coin you are duplicated and half the versions of you see heads while the other half see tails. The reason why this interpretation cannot be proved or disproved is precisely because you experience exactly the same thing if there is only one world and a 1/2 probability that the result will be heads or tails. -- Stathis Papaioannou ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&user_secret=7d7fb4d8
