--- Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Jun 28, 2007, at 7:35 PM, Tom McCabe wrote: > > You're assuming again that consciousness is > conserved. > > I have no idea why you think so. I would say that > I think that each copy is conscious only of their > own particular existence, and if that's what you > mean by "consciousness is conserved", I suppose I'd > agree with it. Your alternative requires some new, > interesting physics to explain how a single brain > can be conscious of input it's not receiving.
What? If you let the copies interact with each other, even briefly, they will realize that they are all conscious, even if their consciousnesses are all independent. I've been busy arguing that consciousness is *not* conserved- if there's one you at time A, that doesn't mean there's going to be one you at time B. > > If you go into the machine full of magical sticky > > consciousness stuff, and that stuff can only be > > present in one body at any given time, then sure, > when > > you wake up, the probability of you waking up in > box A > > is 50% and the probability of waking up in box B > is > > 50%. But if you assume that consciousness comes > only > > from information content, then you don't just wake > up > > once- you wake up 1024 times. The chance of you > waking > > up in box A is 100%, since it's guaranteed that > 512 > > copies will be in box A. The chance of you waking > up > > in box B is also 100%, since 512 copies are also > > guaranteed to be in box B. These discontinuities- > > going to sleep once and waking up one thousand and > > twenty-four times- are really confusing, and I > think > > Huh? Any one person would have a personal history > of > going to sleep 10 times, and waking up 10 times. I thought you meant if the copies were all kept asleep, duplicated ten times, and then woken up. Yes, in this case, they each would remember going to sleep and waking up ten times. > His > history might be of waking up each time in the B > box, > or of waking up each time in the A box, but more > likely, > of some combination of boxes. If you follow the > "more > likely" there, I've made my point. If you select one person at random from the copies after they've already been copied, yes. Any given person who wakes up is more likely to remember being in a series of different boxes rather than all As or all Bs. However, that does not mean that if you go to sleep, when you wake up you will have a higher probability of being in a "mixed-box" body than a "same-box" body, because that doesn't even make any sense as the "you" refers to more than one person. > > it works better to look at it from the perspective > of > > the guy doing the upload rather than the guy being > > uploaded. > > That just begs the question, though. Which question? > > If you magically inserted yourself into the > > brain of a copy at random, then you're right- > you'd > > have an equal chance of waking up in A or B. But > to > > say "you" have an equal chance of waking up in A > or B > > is nonsensical, because "you" as a singular person > > doesn't exist anymore. You can only talk about > "you" > > when referring to events before the copying- if > you > > try to refer to "you" to describe what happens > after > > the copying, your brain will barf as there are > 1024 > > possible references for the word. > > Pick one. Ask him whether he remembers waking up > 10 times or 1024. If 10, then he had a 50% chance > each time of waking up in the A box. Again, you've got to be careful using "he" here. This time it does work, because you can trace the copy's history back in such a manner that you're only referring to one person when you talk about past events. If you were doing a contraction- taking two persons, averaging their brain state, and waking the average up- then this wouldn't work, because if you interviewed the contraction you would get a whole jumble of contradictory memories. > If 1024, then > your "magickal consciousness stuff" It's not mine. I didn't invent it, I don't believe in it. > is real, and > I've > got no clue. I strongly doubt he'll remember all > 1024 awakenings. Why should there be any doubt whatsoever? This is a matter of physics, here. If you put them all in spaceships and flew the copies out to distant galaxies before waking them up, it is physically impossible for one being to remember everyone else waking up because all the memories are outside his past light cone (assuming the awakenings are done simultaneously from the perspective of the original copying facility). > > -- > Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > "If we have matter duplicators, will each of us be a > sovereign > and possess a hydrogen bomb?" -- Jerry Pournelle > > > ----- > This list is sponsored by AGIRI: > http://www.agiri.org/email > To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?&; > ____________________________________________________________________________________ Get the free Yahoo! toolbar and rest assured with the added security of spyware protection. http://new.toolbar.yahoo.com/toolbar/features/norton/index.php ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&user_secret=7d7fb4d8
