On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I would prefer to leave behind these counterfactuals altogether and > > try to use information theory and control theory to achieve a precise > > understanding of what it is for something to be the standard(s) in > > terms of which we are able to deliberate. Since our normative concepts > > (e.g. should, reason, ought, etc) are fundamentally about guiding our > > attitudes through deliberation, I think they can then be analyzed in > > terms of what those deliberative standards prescribe. > > I agree. I prefer the approach of predicting what we *will* do as opposed to > what we *ought* to do. It makes no sense to talk about a right or wrong > approach when our concepts of right and wrong are programmable.
I don't quite follow. I was arguing for a particular way of analyzing our talk of right and wrong, not abandoning such talk. Although our concepts are programmable, what matters is what follows from our current concepts as they are. There are two main ways in which my analysis would differ from simply predicting what we will do. First, we might make an error in applying our deliberative standards or tracking what actually follows from them. Second, even once we reach some conclusion about what is prescribed by our deliberative standards, we may not act in accordance with that conclusion out of weakness of will. Allowing for the possibility of genuine error is one of the big tasks to be accomplished by a theory of intentionality. Take an example from our more ordinary concepts, though the same types of problems will arise for our deliberative standards. If I see a cow in the night and my concept of horse fires, what makes it the case that this particular firing of 'horse' is an error? Why does my concept horse really only correctly refer to horses rather than the disjunction horses-or-cows-in-the-night? (Although I earlier mentioned that I think Dretske's information theoretic semantics is probably the most promising theory of intentionality, it is at the moment unable to deliver the right semantics in the face of these types of errors.) I actually think the second difference poses a very similar type of problem. What makes it the case that we sometimes really do act out of weakness of will rather than it being the case that our will really endorsed that apparent exception in this particular case while presumably endorsing something different the rest of the time? ------------------------------------------- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
