Am 25.05.2017 um 15:25 schrieb Dave Cridland: > Perhaps. Ed25519 and EdDSA are used (or proposed to be) in many places > (DNSSEC, TLS, etc), so it *is* natural that it's implemented much more > widely. But of course, that also raises the question of why XEdDSA is > not proposed in DNSSEC, TLS, and so on. I suspect it's just fashion, > but it'd make me a lot happier to be using crypto primitives that > everyone else was, too, nonetheless. > > Dave.
So to summarize the current state of the discussion: There are concerns about the usage of XEdDSA, which could be solved by either implementing the XEdDSA conversion function in a non-GPL way (which could also then be used in Olm), or by using two seperate keys instead of just one. Afaik Andys PR does not cover the later option right now, but I guess that could be easily added. Either way, are there any other points speaking against Andys PR? I have the feeling, that XEdDSA is the only real blocker right now (again, which can be solved). Vanitasvitae
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