Section 2 identifies masquerade as a major security threat for syslog. In the draft, client authentication and server authentication are SHOULDs(server authenticaiton may be not spelled out explicitly). After reading RFC2818 once again, I think the server authentication may have to be a MUST for the specification to mitigate the MITM, while client authentication (mutual authentication actually) may still be kept SHOULD.
If generic certificate is not right to be reccomended in an IETF specification, probably we have to remove it from the draft. Thanks! Miao > -----Original Message----- > From: Sam Hartman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2007 5:37 PM > To: Miao Fuyou > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [Syslog] AD Review for draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls > > > I'll get back to you on the generic certificates issue. For > now, I recommend you read RFC 4107. Also note that each > device needs a unique MAC address so the manufacturing > process tends to have a step for making a device unique. > > > > So, it sounds like all forms of authentication are optional > in this spec. > > You need a clear table describing what attacks are protected > against given each authentication choice. > > > Wording that table so that man-in-the-middle issues are dealt > with correctly and it is still informative will be tricky. > > --Sam > > _______________________________________________ Syslog mailing list Syslog@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog
