Yes, peer entity authentication is seperate from integrity, this is addressed in section 3 of the current document. Client only authenticaiton is not available in TLS, so I think it is safe to say "peer entity authention" instead of sender authenticaiton.
Probably it is appropriate to say something in section 3 of the document like "Secure transport only secures syslog in a hop by hop manner, end to end message stream modificationis threat is not addressed in this document". Thanks, Miao > -----Original Message----- > From: Sam Hartman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tuesday, February 06, 2007 11:56 PM > To: Miao Fuyou > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [Syslog] AD Review for draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls > > I recommend that you drop message stream modification if my analysis > > [At this point, we're still figuring out what we want to say. > I'm speaking as an individual not an AD.] > > of the charter is a correct analysis and we meant for that to > apply to syslog-sign. > > I recommend you split out peer entity authentication as a > separate service from integrity. And point out that by > integrity, you mean that the sender knows that the data is > not modified between the sender and the receiver; by peer > entity authentication in this case we want to focus on > whether the receiver knows who its peer is. So, perhaps we > should cll that sender authentication. > > _______________________________________________ Syslog mailing list Syslog@lists.ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog