On 7 Oct 2005, at 20:37, jrandom at i2p.net wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > >> The question is what tool offers the most resistance given equal >> amounts of effort being expended to attack them. >> > > Interesting question, but it ignores economics.
Its not just an interesting question, its the fundamental question for anyone designing an anonymity tool. Its worrying that you don't see it as such. > Equal amounts of > effort will not be expended to attack all things, only those things > that are valuable enough. Using many different "primitive" > techniques keeps the value of individual attacks down, while using > one big "high tech" tool puts everything in one basket, making it > worth attacking. This logic doesn't make sense. Can you explain it in terms of real- world examples? >>> Any statements regarding the anonymity of Freenet when it >>> isn't under attack are meaningless, if not misleading. >>> >> >> Who is making such a statement? > > The darknet requires steganographic transports to offer any sort of > anonymity (since ISPs can easily detect abnormal flows). Again, you view anonymity as something binary, it isn't, it is measured in terms of the cost required to compromise someone's anonymity. > No such > steganographic transports exist, either in theory or in practice. > As such, the darknet is not dark, and won't be until someone comes > up with some steganographic transport that works on a wide scale and > can remain open source. This does not match the rhetoric. Again, you provide a classic example of the idealist ignoring practical reality. Why don't you ask a Chinese dissident whether they would prefer us to work on an impractical but "perfect" system based on steganography, or a system that would be useful for all practical purposes in the near-term. Ian.
