-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > > In fact, I've explained how the bottleneck > > exposed by (2) is relatively small to such an adversary - ISPs are > > already more than capable of offering the local monitoring, technical > > review, and administrative channels necessary to break it.
> You have yet to establish this. Have you read that paper? My reading of > it is that traffic flow analysis is seriously expensive. Probably more > expensive than just NATting everyone, forcing them through government > proxies, and issuing server licenses. Yes, I've gone through it, and while my French isn't that great, I didn't draw the same conclusions you did. However, before going on to build a more clear analysis of the costs necessary to detect such communication, humor me - assuming that cost to attack (2) is less than the cost of (1), do you agree that further improvements upon (1) is immaterial to the practical anonymity of those who require Freenet/dark? If you don't agree, lets sort that out first, temporarily assuming that the cost of (2) isn't that high. I promise we'll get back to an analysis of (2)'s cost if necessary. =jr -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDS9J/WYfZ3rPnHH0RAjIiAJ91W3v8SpqfiPLAGrh0Bo46Si57RACeIQBa DROBcZbqEpbTgj9Y/9hUWJY= =rpNS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
