-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Ian Clarke wrote: > Even if we can't find a way to incorporate inserts into the "tit-for- > tat" mechanism, there is still much value in implementing such a > mechanism for requests.
Maybe. I'm worried that if there's an incentive to forward requests but no incentive to forward inserts, selfish nodes will have even more reason to drop inserts. > Even if C is faking responses, that will only lead to > B incurring a debt to C, which will make B less likely to forward > requests to C in future. Sorry, why will B be less likely to forward requests to C? Perhaps we're talking at cross purposes - what kind of mechanism do you have in mind? > Essentially I think the question is whether it is really such a bad > thing if C can mislead its neighbors into thinking that it is inserting > when it really isn't. What is the worst case scenario here? C saves bandwidth by dropping inserts, so it appears to have lots of bandwidth, and sends fake 'insert succeeded' responses, so it appears to be super-reliable. C's neighbours give it lots of bandwidth in return. C can mount a more powerful attack than it could have done without reciprocation, because its neighbours allow it to use a larger share of their bandwidth. Cheers, Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.3 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFEdg/ayua14OQlJ3sRAnEwAKDL+u1bjU9YcBxciwkAjdf8hPeumQCgx5J/ el2XLfC3CUcTo6kCcwWH9Lg= =dMSU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
