A big thank you to the authors. I fully support the intent of this document, whether by adopting it or by making the change in the hybrid document in the RFC-Editor process. My preference would be the latter.
Regarding the current PRs: - PR #2 (Set recommended=N for quantum vulnerable key shares) should be done in a different document, as the discussions would benefit from real-world data on deployments without ECC-only KEMs. I would be happy about a recommendation of hybrids over these curves in text form (e.g. "Clients and servers SHOULD rank X25519MLKEM768 higher"), if this is easy to embed in the process chosen to adopt this document's change. - PR #3 (Recommend SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024 as well) similarly sparks discussions which would slow us down. I am currently against such a change, mostly because such curves are harder to implement, but a different document (perhaps the same as for PR #2) would be an appropriate place to discuss this. Best, -- TBB
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