Paul, your restated problem reminds me of one I encountered in medicine in the 1980's. When an internist sends a patient's sample to a pathologist and the pathologist says "90% chance of cancer", how is the internist supposed to interpret that answer in light of his own priors? Empirically, what we discovered is that pathologists don't (or at least didn't) have a clear methodology for addressing such problems. Some tried to be scrupulously untainted by any evidence about the patient other than the submitted sample, whereas others would read the entire chart to understand the context in which they were interpreting the sample. My assumption from this is that the first group were trying to judge something like a likelihood, conditional probability, or conditional odds, whereas the second were giving posteriors.

If TWC is giving posteriors, integrating everything known about weather in your area based on their extensive professional knowledge (which presumably includes all the almanac information that goes into your prior judgments), then you should simply accept their answer. This is like the second group of pathologists. If, however, they are giving something like conditional odds (how much more likely would this weather pattern be if it turns out to snow Monday than if it does not), then it's most appropriate to do your Bayesian combination.

--Pete Szolovits

On Feb 16, 2009, at 11:39 AM, Lehner, Paul E. wrote:
...

Consider the following revised version.

The TWC problem
1.      Question: What is the chance that it will snow next Monday?
2.      My subjective prior: 5%
3. Evidence: The Weather Channel (TWC) says there is a “70% chance of snow” on Monday.
4.      TWC forecasts of snow are calibrated.

Notice that I did not justify by subjective prior with a base rate.

From P(S)=.05 and P(S|”70%”) = .7 I can deduce that P(“70%”|S)/ P(“70%”|~S) = 44.33. So now I can “deduce” from my prior and evidence odds that P(S|”70%”) = .7. But this seems silly. Suppose my subjective prior was 20%. Then P(“70%”|S)/P(“70%”|~S) = 9.33333 and again I can “deduce” P(S|”70%”)=.7.

My latest quandary is that it seems odd that my subjective conditional probability of the evidence should depend on my subjective prior. This may be coherent, but is too counter intuitive for me to easily accept. It would also suggest that when receiving a single evidence item in the form of a judgment from a calibrated source, my posterior belief does not depend on my prior belief. In effect, when forecasting snow, one should ignore priors and listen to The Weather Channel.

Is this correct?  If so, does this bother anyone else?

paull


From: uai-boun...@engr.orst.edu [mailto:uai-boun...@engr.orst.edu] On Behalf Of Lehner, Paul E.
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2009 4:29 PM
To: uai@ENGR.ORST.EDU
Subject: [UAI] A perplexing problem

I was working on a set of instructions to teach simple two- hypothesis/one-evidence Bayesian updating. I came across a problem that perplexed me. This can’t be a new problem so I’m hoping someone will clear things up for me.

The problem
5.      Question: What is the chance that it will snow next Monday?
6. My prior: 5% (because it typically snows about 5% of the days during the winter) 7. Evidence: The Weather Channel (TWC) says there is a “70% chance of snow” on Monday.
8.      TWC forecasts of snow are calibrated.

My initial answer is to claim that this problem is underspecified. So I add

9. On winter days that it snows, TWC forecasts “70% chance of snow” about 10% of the time 10. On winter days that it does not snow, TWC forecasts “70% chance of snow” about 1% of the time.

So now from P(S)=.05; P(“70%”|S)=.10; and P(“70%”|S)=.01 I apply Bayes rule and deduce my posterior probability to be P(S|”70%”) = . 3448.

Now it seems particularly odd that I would conclude there is only a 34% chance of snow when TWC says there is a 70% chance. TWC knows so much more about weather forecasting than I do.

What am I doing wrong?



Paul E. Lehner, Ph.D.
Consulting Scientist
The MITRE Corporation
(703) 983-7968
pleh...@mitre.org
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